--- title: "ROMULUS ClickFix Drops CNCMachineRMS RAT: What to Hunt" url: https://playciso.com/blog/romulus-clickfix-cncmachinerms-rat updated: 2026-11-21 section: Blog publisher: PlayCISO --- # ROMULUS ClickFix Drops CNCMachineRMS RAT: What to Hunt > Blackpoint ties the RAT behind the ROMULUS ClickFix platform to CNCMachineRMS: the Stardock DLL sideloading chain, persistence names and hunts to run now. Source: https://playciso.com/blog/romulus-clickfix-cncmachinerms-rat · Published: 2026-11-21 · Publisher: PlayCISO (https://playciso.com) Primary source: https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/romulus-cncmachinerms/ --- On 18 November 2026, Blackpoint Cyber's Adversary Pursuit Group (APG) said the remote access trojan (RAT) served by the **ROMULUS** ClickFix delivery platform is **CNCMachineRMS**, a RAT LevelBlue SpiderLabs first described in August. Blackpoint assesses the match "with high confidence". It also says ROMULUS likely acts as a delivery service, handing out CNCMachineRMS and the LegionLoader malware through separate chains, and that no post-exploitation activity was observed. The Hacker News covered the finding on 20 November. **Who this is for:** SOC and detection teams, endpoint owners, and security leaders deciding whether ClickFix deserves a dedicated control. *Independent summary of research by Blackpoint Cyber, Forescout Vedere Labs, LevelBlue SpiderLabs and Siemens. PlayCISO is not affiliated with any of them. Facts as published on 21 November 2026.* Confirmed vs not yet known **Blackpoint states:** the RAT in the ROMULUS Stardock chain is CNCMachineRMS (high confidence, from a matching payload SHA-256, family strings and storage structures); ROMULUS likely distributes CNCMachineRMS and LegionLoader through separate chains; "no post-exploitation activity has been observed". **Forescout states (15 Oct):** ROMULUS is a reusable delivery panel found on six IP addresses; its operators are unknown. **Not known:** who runs ROMULUS, who operates CNCMachineRMS (Blackpoint says shared tooling "does not establish a shared or connected operator"), how many machines were infected, and which sectors or countries were hit. None of the three reports names victims. ## How the Stardock chain works, per Blackpoint - ClickFix lure. The victim is persuaded to paste and run a command. That starts an obfuscated PowerShell stager, which reaches its server by a decimal IP address. - Silent MSI. The stager downloads IconEdit2Turb.msi, removes the Mark of the Web and installs it silently with msiexec.exe. - Hidden install. The MSI poses as "Stardock Smart DeElevation Tool", installs under %LOCALAPPDATA% and sets ARPSYSTEMCOMPONENT=1 so it does not appear in the installed-programs list. - DLL sideloading. A custom action starts the legitimate, signed DeElevate64.exe. Its companion DeElevator64.dll has been modified to load a malicious I++u.dll, which decrypts a payload from Build.dat and runs shellcode. - RAT. The shellcode loads a storage file (execute_engine_disconnect.raw) holding a controller script and the CNCMachineRMS implant, which finds its server over DNS-over-HTTPS. - Persistence. A Run key and a scheduled task, both named "Stardock DeElevation Tool", recreated every 150 and 875 seconds, plus a shutdown monitor that puts the Run key back. LevelBlue's August report shows the same RAT arriving another way: a ClickFix lure, a signed IBM SPSS `WinWrapIDE.exe` loading decoy DLLs, then the BabaDeda loader. Forescout's ROMULUS report describes a second ROMULUS route that ends in LegionLoader, which Forescout says can read Chrome browser data. Siemens advisory SSA-580366 covers CVE-2026-110936, a DLL sideloading flaw in Siemens Software Center fixed in V4.0.9.8; Help Net Security reports Siemens tied its active exploitation to the same ROMULUS campaign. ## Timeline | Date (2026) | What | Source | | --- | --- | --- | | 10 Aug | LevelBlue documents CNCMachineRMS at the end of a BabaDeda loader chain | LevelBlue SpiderLabs | | 28 Sep | Huntress reports ChatGPT Custom GPTs pointing users to ClickFix pages, and documents the RAT's capabilities | Huntress, as cited by Blackpoint and Forescout | | 15 Oct | Forescout names the ROMULUS panel, finds it on six IPs, analyses the LegionLoader route | Forescout Vedere Labs | | 15 Oct | Siemens publishes SSA-580366 (CVE-2026-110936, fixed in V4.0.9.8); updated 19 Oct | Siemens ProductCERT | | 18 Nov | Blackpoint identifies the Stardock-chain RAT as CNCMachineRMS | Blackpoint Cyber | | 20 Nov | The Hacker News reports the Blackpoint finding | The Hacker News | ## What to hunt for | Signal | Why | Source | | --- | --- | --- | | PowerShell (hidden, -ep bypass, a URL in the command line) spawning msiexec /i ... /qn from %TEMP% | The stager-to-silent-MSI step | Forescout, Blackpoint | | URLs with decimal IP addresses (one number instead of dotted quads) | ROMULUS stagers use them | Forescout, Blackpoint | | DeElevate64.exe under %LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs\Stardock Smart DeElevation Tool\ loading DLLs whose hashes are not Stardock's | The sideloading step | Forescout, Blackpoint | | Run value and scheduled task both named "Stardock DeElevation Tool" | CNCMachineRMS persistence in this chain | Blackpoint | | DNS-over-HTTPS from non-browser processes | The RAT resolves its gate this way, so internal DNS logs may show nothing | Blackpoint, LevelBlue | | WinWrapIDE.exe in an unusual folder, %LOCALAPPDATA%\SProject\sp.bin, %TEMP%\CNCMachineRMS\tasks\, an empty C:\Intel | The BabaDeda route to the same RAT | LevelBlue | | Event IDs 4720 and 4732; tasks created with /SC ONLOGON /RU SYSTEM /RL HIGHEST | Local account backdoor and persistence | LevelBlue | Blackpoint lists the ROMULUS command servers, including the domains `cloubflare[.]top` and `cloubflare[.]net`, and the file hashes in its IOC table; LevelBlue and Forescout publish theirs too. Take indicators from those tables rather than from secondary copies. ## What security leaders should do this week - Ask the SOC to run the hunts above across the last 60 days, starting with PowerShell-to-silent-MSI and the "Stardock DeElevation Tool" task name. - Check whether endpoint policy blocks or alerts on a signed application loading unsigned or unexpected DLLs from user-writable folders. - Update Siemens Software Center to V4.0.9.8 or later wherever engineering teams use it (Siemens SSA-580366). - Add ClickFix to awareness material in one sentence: no real website, CAPTCHA or "fix" page asks you to paste a command into Run, PowerShell or a terminal. - Decide who owns DNS-over-HTTPS policy. If browsers are the only allowed DoH clients, other processes using it become a clean signal. - If CNCMachineRMS is found, follow LevelBlue: assume hands-on-keyboard access, look for new local admin accounts and treat follow-on payloads as the incident. ## FAQ ### What is ROMULUS? ROMULUS is the name Forescout Vedere Labs gave on 15 October 2026 to a web panel it found on attacker servers. Forescout describes it as "a reusable delivery backend rather than a single hard-coded malware server": it serves PowerShell staging scripts and trojanised MSI installers to victims of ClickFix lures. Forescout found it on six IP addresses and could not tell whether it is a private tool, a commercial service, an affiliate framework or shared software. Forescout says it has no evidence linking it to the RomulusLoader reported by Proofpoint. ### What is CNCMachineRMS? CNCMachineRMS is a remote access trojan first documented by LevelBlue SpiderLabs on 10 August 2026, which called it a "previously undocumented 1.14 MB x64 remote access trojan" delivered at the end of a BabaDeda loader chain. LevelBlue lists an interactive shell, file manager, screen capture, a local account backdoor, seven persistence mechanisms and a task engine with its own scripting language. Blackpoint, citing Huntress, adds remote desktop control, screen streaming, microphone and camera capture and system reconnaissance. ### How sure is the link between ROMULUS and CNCMachineRMS? Blackpoint says it assesses the link "with high confidence", based on a matching payload SHA-256, family-specific strings (`CNCMachineRMS\tasks` and `task_payload.bin` built at runtime) and matching storage structures, including 1,128 storage records and a 3,904-byte controller script in both the ROMULUS sample and LevelBlue's sample. Blackpoint also says the shared tooling "does not establish a shared or connected operator". ### Was anyone actually breached with CNCMachineRMS through ROMULUS? Not as far as the published research says. Blackpoint states that "no post-exploitation activity has been observed" in its analysis, and neither Blackpoint, Forescout nor LevelBlue names victims, sectors or countries. LevelBlue's advice if you find the RAT is to assume hands-on-keyboard access and treat any follow-on payload as the incident. ### What should I hunt for? From Blackpoint and Forescout: PowerShell launching msiexec with /qn from %TEMP%; PowerShell using decimal IP addresses in URLs; DeElevate64.exe running from the Stardock Smart DeElevation Tool folder under %LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs and loading DLLs that do not match legitimate Stardock hashes; a Run key value and a scheduled task both named "Stardock DeElevation Tool"; and DNS-over-HTTPS traffic from processes that are not browsers. From LevelBlue (the BabaDeda chain): WinWrapIDE.exe running from an unusual folder, %LOCALAPPDATA%\SProject\sp.bin, %TEMP%\CNCMachineRMS\tasks\, an empty C:\Intel folder, and Windows events 4720 and 4732. ### How does this relate to the Siemens Software Center vulnerability? Siemens advisory SSA-580366 (published 15 October 2026) covers CVE-2026-110936, a DLL sideloading flaw in Siemens Software Center, fixed in V4.0.9.8 (all earlier versions affected). Help Net Security reports that Siemens tied active exploitation to the ROMULUS ClickFix campaign, using a genuine signed Siemens executable with attacker files placed beside it. That is a separate route on the same platform; Blackpoint's CNCMachineRMS finding is about the Stardock route. ### How do I stop ClickFix lures? Blackpoint recommends user education about ClickFix lures, application allowlisting, least privilege and tamper-protected endpoint security. In practice that means telling staff that no genuine website or CAPTCHA asks them to paste a command into Run, PowerShell or a terminal, and alerting on PowerShell started from explorer.exe with a URL in the command line. ## Practise it - [C2 Detection Lab](/tools/c2-detection-lab): find timed beacons and DNS-over-HTTPS in telemetry. - [Detection Lab](/tools/detection-lab): turn the hunts above into detections. - [Hunt plan review](/tools/hunt-plan-review): check a hunt plan before the SOC spends a week on it. - [IR Playbook Lab](/tools/ir-playbook-lab): rehearse the response once a RAT is found. ## Sources - [Blackpoint Cyber APG: ROMULUS campaign, CNCMachineRMS RAT analysis](https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/romulus-cncmachinerms/) (18 Nov 2026) - [Forescout Vedere Labs: ROMULUS, a new multi-payload ClickFix delivery platform](https://www.forescout.com/blog/romulus-analysis-of-a-new-multi-payload-clickfix-delivery-platform/) (15 Oct 2026) - [LevelBlue SpiderLabs: CNCMachineRMS, the undocumented RAT at the end of a BabaDeda chain](https://levelblue.com/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/cncmachinerms-the-undocumented-rat-at-the-end-of-a-babadeda-chain) (10 Aug 2026) - [Siemens SSA-580366: DLL sideloading vulnerability in Siemens Software Center](https://productcert.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-580366.html) (15 Oct 2026, updated 19 Oct) - [Help Net Security: Siemens Software Center flaw exploited in ClickFix campaign](https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/10/20/exploitation-siemens-software-center-vulnerability-cve-2026-110936/) (20 Oct 2026) - [The Hacker News: ROMULUS ClickFix attacks deliver RAT](https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/romulus-clickfix-attacks-deliver-rat.html) (20 Nov 2026)