100 ready-to-run cyber tabletop exercises across 15 incident domains. Search them, pick one at random, or tell us who will be in the room and we'll rank the scenarios that fit those people best. Every exercise shows who to involve, how long it runs and an outline — and the scenario prompt is free to copy and read out.
Running one for real? Pro adds the facilitator's run sheet for each exercise: a minute-by-minute timeline, timed injects, step-by-step facilitation guide and the questions to put to each person. Or build your own with the Tabletop Runbook Generator.
Who's in the room?
Pick the people you have — we'll suggest exercises that fit them.
Four days after you contained a ransomware attack and restored most systems from backup, a threat intelligence vendor emails your CISO a screenshot. Your company is listed on the group's leak site with a 72-hour countdown and a sample: forty scanned employee passports and a folder of customer contracts. The listing claims 600 GB was taken and will be published unless you pay $2.4 million. Your original investigation found no sign of data theft, and staff were told so. A trade reporter has already left a voicemail asking for comment. Do you engage, and what do you say?
A message arrives at your CEO's and general counsel's inboxes: "We have 380 GB of your source code, including your payment service and your infrastructure scripts. Sample attached. Pay 40 BTC in five days or we publish everything and send it to your competitors." The sample is real: three repositories, including commit history and a configuration file with what look like live database credentials. Your code host shows a personal access token belonging to a senior engineer cloned 212 repositories eleven days ago from an unfamiliar country. The board meets in two days.
It is 09:00 on Black Friday at an online homeware retailer that takes 18% of its annual revenue in the next four days. Requests to the checkout API jump to 40 times normal, response times pass ten seconds and the site starts returning errors. An email arrives at the press address: pay 5 bitcoin or the site stays down all weekend. Your CDN has basic DDoS protection, but the checkout API sits outside it on a separate hostname. Marketing has a promotional email going to 3 million customers at 10:00. What do you do in the next hour?
Three days after attackers stole HR files from a 900-person engineering consultancy, they change tactics. Twelve employees, including the CEO and two HR staff, receive texts on their personal phones listing their home address and their children’s school, with a demand: tell your company to pay, or this goes online. One message includes a photo of an employee’s front door. The attackers’ leak site now lists the company with a five-day countdown. Staff are frightened and some want to stay home. The board meets tomorrow. What do you do for your people today?
A journalist emails your communications team at 16:10 on a Thursday. She has a screenshot of a leak-site post naming your 22-clinic outpatient group, with a sample file of 300 patient records: names, dates of birth, diagnoses and insurance numbers. The post claims 1.2 million records and gives you five days before full publication. Your security team has seen no ransomware and no obvious intrusion. The journalist wants comment by 18:00 and says two patients have already contacted her. You do not yet know whether the data is real, current or even yours. What happens before 18:00?
A parent forwards your district office an email from someone claiming to hold the records of every student in your 14-school district: names, addresses, grades, special-education plans and medical notes. Attached is a spreadsheet with her own child's details, correct as of last month. Your student information system is hosted by a vendor, and their support desk says they are 'looking into an incident affecting several customers'. The superintendent has a school board meeting tonight, and the local parents' group online already has 200 comments. What do you tell parents before the meeting?
Day two of a ransomware outage at a 2,000-person logistics company. Dispatch, billing and the warehouse system are encrypted. The attacker wants 4.2 million dollars in cryptocurrency, offers a 20% discount if you pay within 48 hours, and has published a sample of stolen payroll files. IT says restoring from backup will take nine to fourteen days, and two of the backup sets have not been verified clean. The insurer's panel negotiator is on the line. The CEO turns to the room and asks for a recommendation by 17:00.
Your accounting software company refused a ransom demand last week after a data theft. This morning hundreds of your small-business customers received an email from the attacker. It quotes each customer's own invoice data as proof, says you 'chose not to protect them', and invites them to pay 500 dollars each to have their records deleted. Support has 900 tickets in the queue. Two customers have posted the email on social media, and one says they have already paid.
A threat-intelligence feed alerts you that your regional law firm has been listed on a ransomware group's leak site. The post shows a timer with 72 hours remaining, a list of client names, and three screenshots of documents that look like your matter files. There has been no ransomware outbreak and no ransom note, and IT finds nothing encrypted. Partners are asking whether this is real, whether clients must be told before the timer runs out, and whether anyone should contact the group.
Monday: ransomware encrypts file servers at your online travel agency, but customer bookings still work. Wednesday: after you decline to engage, a DDoS takes the booking site down at peak hour. Thursday: the attacker emails journalists a sample of passport scans and threatens to call your largest corporate customers. Each pressure point lands on a different team that is already exhausted. The attacker's latest message sets a 24-hour deadline and promises the DDoS will stop the moment you pay.