100 ready-to-run cyber tabletop exercises across 15 incident domains. Search them, pick one at random, or tell us who will be in the room and we'll rank the scenarios that fit those people best. Every exercise shows who to involve, how long it runs and an outline — and the scenario prompt is free to copy and read out.
Running one for real? Pro adds the facilitator's run sheet for each exercise: a minute-by-minute timeline, timed injects, step-by-step facilitation guide and the questions to put to each person. Or build your own with the Tabletop Runbook Generator.
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Pick the people you have — we'll suggest exercises that fit them.
It is Wednesday morning. Payroll for 2,300 staff must reach the bank by 14:00 Thursday to land on Friday. Overnight, ransomware encrypted the HR and payroll servers and the file share holding timesheets. IT estimates at least four days to restore. Last month's bank file still sits in a finance team member's email. Union representatives have heard rumours and are asking whether people will be paid this week. The CFO asks the room: can we just re-run last month's payroll? What do you decide, and how do you tell 2,300 people?
It is day five after ransomware hit a 1,400-person insurance broker. Identity has been rebuilt and the attacker appears to be out. The infrastructure team can restore about twelve systems a day. Twenty-three business owners have each told the CEO their system is the most critical: claims, policy administration, finance, the broker portal, email archives. Two large clients threaten to move their accounts if the portal is not back by Monday. Yesterday a restored file server was found to contain the attacker's remote access tool and had to be taken down again. Who decides what comes back next, and on what basis?
At 22:47 a payables clerk receives 31 MFA push requests in eight minutes. On the 32nd, half asleep, she taps Approve. By the time she reports it next morning, the account has signed in from a hosting provider, registered a new MFA device and created an inbox rule that moves any email containing 'invoice' or 'payment' to an obscure folder. Two supplier payment runs are scheduled for 11:00 today. Your SOC saw the overnight push alert and closed it as user error. What do you do before 11:00?
The finance team forwards a billing alert at 08:15: your cloud spend for the last 24 hours is $182,400 against a usual $3,000. The cloud team finds hundreds of large GPU instances running in four regions you have never used. They were launched from the root account of a development tenancy that nobody has logged into for a year. Its recovery email points to a former employee's personal address. Your provider's support line says a credit "may be considered" once you secure the account. The instances are still running and costing roughly $7,500 an hour.
On Monday a finance manager joined a video call with what looked and sounded like your CEO and CFO, plus an "external lawyer". They explained a confidential acquisition and asked for three urgent payments to an escrow account, totalling $2.4 million. The manager made the payments after a follow-up email from the CEO's real address, sent through a compromised mail rule. Today the real CEO asks why finance moved money on a deal that does not exist. Your bank says the first transfer has left the receiving bank. The finance manager is distraught.
A finance manager at a 600-person logistics company reports on Monday morning that her bag, with her access badge inside, was stolen from her car on Saturday night. She did not report it over the weekend. The access-control log shows her badge opened the side entrance at 03:12 on Sunday and the server room door at 03:16, a room she has never had reason to enter and should not have been able to open. The camera covering that corridor has pointed at the ceiling since a refit two months ago. What do you do in the next hour?
Three weeks after a ransomware attack, your company has spent 1.8 million on forensics, overtime and lost revenue. The insurer's coverage letter arrives. It reserves its rights and cites two problems. The application you signed last year stated that multi-factor authentication was enforced for all remote access, but the attacker came in through a legacy VPN account without it. And a war and state-actor exclusion may apply, because a government advisory linked the ransomware group to a hostile state. Finance needs to know what to book this quarter.