100 ready-to-run cyber tabletop exercises across 15 incident domains. Search them, pick one at random, or tell us who will be in the room and we'll rank the scenarios that fit those people best. Every exercise shows who to involve, how long it runs and an outline — and the scenario prompt is free to copy and read out.
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A national cyber agency publishes an alert on Thursday evening: a critical, unpatched flaw in the managed file-transfer appliance you use to exchange files with banks, insurers and two government departments is being exploited at scale. The alert lists a web-shell file name and asks organisations to check for it. Your appliance has that file, created four days ago. The appliance holds 30 days of transfers, including claims files with health information. The vendor says a patch is "coming within 48 hours". Your partners start emailing to ask whether you are affected.
It is 02:40 on a Saturday at a 450-bed regional hospital. The night supervisor calls: the electronic health record is frozen, workstations on three wards show a ransom note, and the pharmacy dispensing system has dropped offline. The emergency department has 31 patients, two ambulances are ten minutes out, and the trauma surgeon on call wants to know whether to divert. Downtime procedures exist on paper, but nobody has run them for longer than four hours. The ransom note says patient data has already been copied. Who decides on diversion, and what do you tell the ambulance service right now?
A journalist emails your communications team at 16:10 on a Thursday. She has a screenshot of a leak-site post naming your 22-clinic outpatient group, with a sample file of 300 patient records: names, dates of birth, diagnoses and insurance numbers. The post claims 1.2 million records and gives you five days before full publication. Your security team has seen no ransomware and no obvious intrusion. The journalist wants comment by 18:00 and says two patients have already contacted her. You do not yet know whether the data is real, current or even yours. What happens before 18:00?
Your medical billing company, a business associate that processes claims for your 180-physician practice, sends a two-paragraph email: an unauthorised party accessed one of their file servers 'between March and June' and some of your patients may be affected. They found it 41 days ago. They have not said which patients, what data, or whether it was encrypted. Your compliance officer asks when your own 60-day clock started, and whether it started without you. Patients are calling the front desk after a local news story. What do you need from the vendor today, and who owns the answer?
You signed the agreement to buy a regional medical-billing company three weeks ago. Closing is in five weeks, pending regulatory approval. This morning the target's CEO calls: ransomware hit them overnight and patient billing records may have been taken. Your security team wants to send people in to help. Your lawyers warn that you cannot run the target's business before close. The agreement has a material adverse effect clause, and your board meets in four days. What do you do, and what are you allowed to do?