100 ready-to-run cyber tabletop exercises across 15 incident domains. Search them, pick one at random, or tell us who will be in the room and we'll rank the scenarios that fit those people best. Every exercise shows who to involve, how long it runs and an outline — and the scenario prompt is free to copy and read out.
Running one for real? Pro adds the facilitator's run sheet for each exercise: a minute-by-minute timeline, timed injects, step-by-step facilitation guide and the questions to put to each person. Or build your own with the Tabletop Runbook Generator.
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Pick the people you have — we'll suggest exercises that fit them.
It is day five after ransomware hit a 1,400-person insurance broker. Identity has been rebuilt and the attacker appears to be out. The infrastructure team can restore about twelve systems a day. Twenty-three business owners have each told the CEO their system is the most critical: claims, policy administration, finance, the broker portal, email archives. Two large clients threaten to move their accounts if the portal is not back by Monday. Yesterday a restored file server was found to contain the attacker's remote access tool and had to be taken down again. Who decides what comes back next, and on what basis?
At 07:30 on Monday the head of IT calls the CEO. Most office systems show a ransom note, email is down, and only the phones work. Staff are arriving and asking what to do. The note gives an email address and says the price doubles in 48 hours. Your cyber insurance policy sits in a shared folder that is now encrypted. Nobody is sure who should be in the room or who decides. In one hour the first customer calls will start. What happens in that hour?
A regional HR manager reports on Monday morning that she left her laptop in an airport security tray on Friday evening. She waited because she hoped the airport would find it. The device management console shows it last checked in on Saturday at 09:12 from an unknown home network. Disk encryption shows 'pending' because a policy change was never completed on her model. The laptop held disciplinary files and a local copy of an investigation into a senior manager. What do you do first, and is this a notifiable breach?
At 14:10 your SOC sees a new federated domain added to your cloud identity tenant, then a conditional access policy disabled. Both changes came from a Global Admin account belonging to a cloud engineer who is on holiday. Within twenty minutes, two new app registrations with mail-read permissions appear and three other admins report their MFA methods were changed. The attacker can now create users, issue tokens and read any mailbox. You are not sure which admin accounts are still yours. How do you take the tenant back without locking yourselves out?
Your platform team moved CI to keyless federated identity last quarter: pipelines exchange a signed token for a short-lived cloud deploy role. Tonight the SOC sees that role assumed 31 times in two hours. The token claims name a repository under an organisation you have never heard of. The trust policy, it turns out, checks the identity provider but not which organisation the token comes from. Using the role, someone has created two new identities, read your secrets store and changed a load balancer rule in production. Nothing has failed yet. Where do you cut, and what do you trust after?
Your new data-loss prevention pilot produces its first weekly report. In seven days, staff pasted content into a free public AI chatbot 1,840 times. The sample includes a production database connection string, a customer contract with pricing, two HR investigation notes and a spreadsheet of patient appointment details. Your acceptable-use policy says nothing about AI. The approved enterprise AI tool, bought six months ago, has 30 active users out of 1,200. A department head replies to your email: "Everyone uses it. Banning it will just push people to their phones."
Your acquiring bank emails: card-fraud analysis links 212 fraudulent transactions to cards used on your online store over the past five weeks, and they want a forensic investigation. Your developers find nothing changed in your own code. Then a front-end engineer notices the checkout page loads a chat widget from a vendor's CDN, and the script now contains 40 extra lines of obfuscated JavaScript that post form fields to an unfamiliar domain. The widget is on every page, including payment. Peak-season trading starts in nine days. What do you remove, what do you keep, and what do you tell the bank?
Monday, 07:30. Staff at a county council serving 280,000 residents arrive to find file shares encrypted and the housing benefits, social care case management and parking systems unavailable. Phones still work, but the contact centre cannot see case records. A social worker needs a child's safeguarding history for an emergency court hearing at 11:00. The ransom note demands payment within 72 hours and threatens to publish residents' data. Councillors are already asking questions, and a local reporter has heard that the payments portal is down. What do you prioritise this morning?