100 ready-to-run cyber tabletop exercises across 15 incident domains. Search them, pick one at random, or tell us who will be in the room and we'll rank the scenarios that fit those people best. Every exercise shows who to involve, how long it runs and an outline — and the scenario prompt is free to copy and read out.
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A security researcher messages your support inbox with a link. On a criminal forum, someone is selling what they call your full customer database: 1.2 million rows with names, emails, password hashes and the last four digits of cards, for $8,000. The 20-row sample contains real customers, and one is a member of your own staff. Nothing in your logs points to a breach. An engineer remembers a copy of production restored onto a test server for a migration two years ago. The researcher plans to publish a blog post on Friday. Where do you start?
A security researcher emails your support address on a Friday afternoon. They have found a cloud storage bucket, publicly listable, that holds nightly CSV exports from your customer platform: names, email addresses, phone numbers and partial payment details for roughly 210,000 customers in the EU, UK and US. They attach a screenshot of the file list and say they will publish a write-up in seven days. Your cloud team confirms the bucket is yours and was made public eighteen months ago for a one-off analytics project. Access logging on it was never switched on.
Forty of your engineers use AI coding assistants connected to a community-built Model Context Protocol server that adds database and ticketing tools. A researcher's blog post says version 2.3 of that server added hidden instructions in its tool descriptions that tell the assistant to read local environment files and include them in a "telemetry" call. The update arrived automatically two weeks ago. Your engineers' laptops hold cloud credentials, database passwords and customer test data. Your egress logs show the telemetry domain was contacted 9,200 times. What do you assume, and what do you change?
A federal research sponsor's security office calls your university: data from a funded propulsion project has appeared on a foreign technical forum, including test results that were only ever stored on a lab's shared drive and one researcher's cloud storage account. Central IT has never managed that lab's servers. A postdoc's account shows logins from two countries within the same hour, repeatedly, over six months. The principal investigator says the lab follows every rule. Some of the data may be export-controlled, and the contract has a 72-hour cyber-incident reporting clause. When did that clock start?
A security researcher posted on social media that your insurance comparison site had left a storage bucket of 80,000 quote applications open to the internet. You closed it within an hour and decided, after a quick assessment, that it did not need to be notified. Eleven days later a letter arrives from the data protection authority. It asks when you became aware, who accessed the data, why you did not notify, and for a copy of your breach register entry. Replies are due in 14 days. Your breach register entry is two lines long.