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Network Breach Response Checklist

An attacker came in through the VPN or another edge device and moved inside. Thirty steps to triage the appliance, keep the evidence a reboot would destroy, isolate segments, evict the attacker from Active Directory and make sure they stay out.

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Template & sample only. Generated from a PlayCISO template as a starting point: it is not legal, audit, certification, investment or professional advice. Review, adapt and validate it for your organisation before you rely on it.You are looking at sample data. Replace it with your own details below — the document regenerates as you type and your copy is saved in this browser.

A working checklist for a network intrusion: triage the edge device, preserve volatile evidence before anything is rebooted, isolate segments, evict the attacker from Active Directory (tier-0 review, krbtgt double reset), block command-and-control in one coordinated move, rebuild rather than clean, and watch closely afterwards. Mark each step and generate a record of what was done, by whom and when.

Response steps complete (weighted)
57/100
20 of 30 items assessed
Material steps open
6 of 13
Material steps decide whether the attacker is really out
Evidence before reboot
Secured
Domain eviction
3 tier-0 steps open
Blocked items
0

Your context

1. Edge device triage

Most network intrusions now start at an internet-facing appliance: a VPN, firewall, load balancer or file-transfer gateway. Treat the device as a suspect, not as a sensor you can trust.

  • Check every internet-facing appliance against current vendor advisories and known-exploited vulnerability lists, and record firmware versions as foundNIST SP 800-61r3material

  • Run the vendor's integrity check (or an external one) and compare file hashes and running processes against a known-good buildmaterial

  • Confirm the management interface is not exposed to the internet, and list every admin account and API key on the device

  • Export the running configuration and diff it against the last known-good backup

  • Identify every other device of the same make and version, including spares, DR sites and devices run by a managed provider

2. Preserve volatile evidence before reboot

A reboot, patch or factory reset of an appliance usually destroys the attacker's in-memory tooling and recent logs. Capture first, then change things — unless damage is happening right now.

  • Capture memory and disk images (or the vendor's supported diagnostic snapshot) from compromised appliances and key servers before any reboot or patchmaterial

  • Pull firewall, VPN, proxy, DNS and authentication logs off the devices to a separate, write-protected store, and extend retentionmaterial

  • Preserve NetFlow / VPC flow logs and any packet captures covering the suspected window

  • Hash every evidence file, record who collected it and when, and keep a chain-of-custody logISO/IEC 27037

  • Record the time sources and time zones of every log source so events can be lined up

3. Isolate segments

Decide per segment: isolate now, contain and monitor, or fully disconnect. Isolating too early can tip off the attacker; too late lets them spread.

  • Make and record an isolation decision for each affected segment, with the reason and who approved itmaterial

  • Take the compromised edge appliance out of service or restrict it to a minimal, monitored function, with an alternative access path for staffmaterial

  • Restrict outbound internet from servers to only what they need (default-deny egress on the affected segments)

  • Set up an out-of-band channel for the response team (separate email/chat and accounts) on the assumption the attacker can read internal mail

  • If OT or plant networks connect to the affected IT segments, involve operations and decide on the IT/OT conduit with safety first

4. Active Directory / domain compromise

If the attacker reached a domain controller or a tier-0 account, assume they can create credentials at will until the eviction is complete.

  • Check for domain compromise: DCSync / replication requests from non-DCs, NTDS.dit access, new domain admins, changed AdminSDHolder or GPOsmaterial

  • Review tier-0: Domain/Enterprise/Schema Admins, built-in Administrators, DC computer objects, AD CS, Entra Connect / sync servers, backup servers, and anyone who can manage themmaterial

  • Reset all tier-0 and service-account passwords from a clean admin workstation, after attacker access is cut, in one coordinated windowmaterial

  • Reset the krbtgt account twice, waiting for replication and at least the maximum ticket lifetime (10 hours by default) between resetsmaterial

  • Hunt for persistence: scheduled tasks, services, GPO scripts, new trusts, SID history, certificate templates and rogue certificates, WMI subscriptions

  • Check the cloud identity side: sync accounts, federation settings, app registrations and privileged roles in your cloud directory

5. Command-and-control and eviction

  • Build an indicator list (IPs, domains, hashes, user agents, JA3/JA4 fingerprints) from the evidence and threat intelligence

  • Sweep EDR, DNS and proxy logs for the indicators across the whole estate, not only the known hosts

  • Block C2 at DNS, proxy and firewall in a single coordinated eviction, together with the credential resetsmaterial

  • Look for secondary access: other remote-access tools, new VPN accounts, cloud tunnels, scheduled beacons with long sleep times

6. Rebuild vs clean, and monitoring after

  • Rebuild compromised appliances and servers from known-good images, with new credentials and certificates, instead of cleaning them in placematerial

  • Replace certificates and private keys held on the compromised appliance (VPN, TLS, SAML signing) and revoke the old ones

  • Run enhanced monitoring for at least 30 days: high-fidelity alerts on tier-0 changes, the IOCs, new remote access and replication requestsmaterial

  • Have counsel assess notification duties if personal data on reached systems could have been accessed (for example GDPR: 72 hours to the supervisory authority after becoming aware)GDPR Art. 33

  • Hold a post-incident review and track fixes: edge patch SLA, MFA on remote access, admin tiering, egress filtering, log retentionNIST CSF ID.IM

TL;DR

What this template gives you

  • Thirty response steps in six sections, from the first look at the edge appliance to the monitoring after eviction.
  • Evidence comes before the patch: a reboot or factory reset of a compromised appliance usually wipes the in-memory webshell and recent logs.
  • Domain compromise gets its own section: tier-0 review, coordinated password resets and the krbtgt double reset with the right wait between resets.
  • Command-and-control is blocked in one planned eviction with the credential resets, not piecemeal — partial blocks warn the attacker.
  • Mark each step To do, In progress, Done or Blocked; the summary flags material steps still open and whether evidence is secured.

Frequently asked questions

Should we patch and reboot the compromised VPN appliance straight away?

Not before you capture evidence, unless damage is happening right now. A reboot usually destroys in-memory tooling and recent logs, which you need to know what the attacker took and where they went. Restrict the device first (disable the portal or the management interface), capture memory, disk and logs using the vendor's supported process, then patch or rebuild.

Why reset krbtgt twice?

The domain keeps the current and the previous krbtgt key so that tickets keep working during a change. A forged ticket made with the old key stays valid until both keys have changed. Reset once, wait for replication and at least the maximum ticket lifetime (10 hours by default), then reset again. Resetting twice back-to-back works faster but breaks every existing session at once.

Should we rebuild or clean compromised servers and appliances?

Rebuild where you can. Cleaning in place only works if you know every change the attacker made, and in a network intrusion you rarely do. Rebuild from known-good images, apply configuration fresh rather than restoring a backup that may contain the attacker's changes, and replace any keys or certificates the device held.

Is this a finished document I can rely on?

No. Every tool in this suite is a template with sample content. It gives you a structured, editable starting point and generates a document from your own answers, but it is not legal, audit, certification, investment or professional advice. Review and adapt the output, and have it checked by the appropriate specialist before you rely on it.

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Network Breach Response Checklist (VPN, AD, C2) · PlayCISO