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AuditTeam OpsAgent Ransomware: What Kaspersky Found

November 19, 2026 · Team PlayCISO
TL;DR · the short version

On 18 November 2026 Kaspersky's GReAT team published research on AuditTeam, a ransomware and data-extortion group it says used a custom framework called OpsAgent against dozens of organisations from January through at least October 2026. Kaspersky observed victims in Russia, Italy, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Senegal, Finland and China; the group's leak site claims seven more countries. OpsAgent gives operators host control, credential tools, keylogging, screenshots and lateral movement; an add-on module uses a signed antivirus driver to kill security products, and a cryptor stops databases and backups, deletes shadow copies and encrypts files. The ransom note is framed as an audit log demanding an "Audit & Consulting fee". Kaspersky says code patterns suggest LLM-assisted development but does not say how the group gets in, and names no victims.

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Kaspersky says a ransomware group called AuditTeam used a custom framework, OpsAgent, to break into dozens of organisations between January and at least October 2026, then demanded an "Audit & Consulting fee" for a "vulnerability report" instead of leaking their data. Kaspersky's GReAT team published the research on 18 November 2026. It says it observed victims in Russia, Italy, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Senegal, Finland and China, and that the group's leak site claims victims in seven more countries. OpsAgent gives operators full control of a host and moves between machines; add-on modules kill security tools with a signed driver and encrypt files. Kaspersky does not name any victim and does not say how the group gets in.

Who this is for: CISOs, SOC and incident-response leads, and infrastructure teams who own endpoint protection and backups.

Based on Kaspersky's Securelist report of 18 November 2026, read in full on 19 November 2026. PlayCISO is not affiliated with Kaspersky. We publish no domains, IP addresses, hashes or command syntax; Kaspersky's indicators section has them.

Confirmed vs not yet known (19 November 2026)

Kaspersky's findings (one vendor's research): AuditTeam used OpsAgent from 5 January 2026 (per the attacker's own GitHub commit history) through at least October 2026; Kaspersky saw infections in seven countries and territories; OpsAgent and its AV/EDR killer and cryptor modules work as described below. Kaspersky attributes the campaign to AuditTeam "with high confidence", based on the ransom note's wording, the Tor leak site and the group's "remediation report" pitch.

Claimed by the group, not confirmed: victims in Turkey, Thailand, Ukraine, Argentina, South Korea, Japan and Spain, listed on AuditTeam's leak site.

Not stated by Kaspersky: how AuditTeam gets initial access; the names, sectors or number of victims (Kaspersky says "dozens of organizations" in its summary and "dozens of machines" in the background section, and that victims "belong to different industries"); how much was paid. No US victim is named.

Not established: that any attack was run by AI. Kaspersky says code patterns "suggest LLM-assisted development" of the malware, which is a statement about how it was written.

What Kaspersky says happened

Kaspersky says it found suspicious activity at an organisation in Hong Kong on 10 March 2026. The tool was OpsAgent, "a framework designed to resemble a penetration testing utility". Looking further, it found attacks in other countries. It links the tool to AuditTeam, which dbdigest.com first mentioned publicly in March 2026 and which, according to DeXpose (as cited by Kaspersky), claimed an attack on a Russian organisation in June 2026.

The group's pitch is what sets it apart. Its ransom note is formatted as an audit log and offers two options: pay the "Audit & Consulting fee" and receive a vulnerability report, or face publication of the stolen data on its Tor site. Kaspersky stresses that although the note does not mention encryption, it is dropped by the encryption module: "if a victim sees the note, their files are already encrypted." The group "claims a mission to educate organizations about cybersecurity". That framing does not change what it is: data theft, encryption and extortion.

Timeline

Date (2026)EventSource
5 JanCampaign starts, per the commit history of the public GitHub repository OpsAgent used to find its command serversKaspersky
29 JanFirst command-server address added to that repositoryKaspersky
21 FebLeak site lists its first victim; first command server first seen in useKaspersky
10 MarKaspersky detects OpsAgent at an organisation in Hong KongKaspersky
MarchFirst public mention of AuditTeam, by dbdigest.comKaspersky, citing dbdigest.com
AprilC-language loader discoveredKaspersky
June.NET loader discoveredKaspersky
25 JunDeXpose reports AuditTeam claimed an attack on a Russian organisation and listed it on its leak siteKaspersky, citing DeXpose
19-20 AugNew command-server addresses for the new OpsAgent version added to the repository, then used in attacksKaspersky
SeptemberRust loader and the Rust rewrite of the implant (OpsAgent-rs) foundKaspersky
29 SepActor deletes the older command-server address from the repositoryKaspersky
OctoberActivity continues "through October 2026, at a minimum"Kaspersky
NovemberThe GitHub repository is removed; the newest Rust implants have the GitHub lookup switched off, so Kaspersky says the campaign is not necessarily overKaspersky
18 NovKaspersky publishes its reportSecurelist

How OpsAgent works, at a defender's level

  • Loaders. Kaspersky found three: a C loader (April) and a .NET loader (June), both obfuscated, that inject the implant into a separate process, by default msiexec.exe; and a Rust loader (September) that fetches an encrypted payload from the command server and runs it inside its own process.
  • The implant. Version 5.2.8, which Kaspersky says "rivals Cobalt Strike in functionality": file and process management, running commands, privilege escalation and token theft, keylogging, screenshots, and lateral movement by linking agents on compromised hosts over SMB, HTTP or TCP, plus SOCKS proxying. Credential-theft tools (Mimikatz, pass-the-hash) and .NET tools are not built in: they arrive from the server on demand and run in a separate host process, usually msiexec.exe (notepad.exe for keylogging). That keeps the implant small and lets the operators bring custom payloads.
  • Command and control. Traffic runs over WebSocket with TLS. The command servers are Amazon CloudFront subdomains, which Kaspersky says makes IP-based blocking impractical because the address space is shared with legitimate traffic. OpsAgent could look up its server address, encrypted, from a public GitHub repository; that repository was removed in November.
  • Rust rewrite (OpsAgent-rs). Same core functions, plus interactive shells, directory creation and sleep changes; starts with HTTP POST polling and upgrades to a persistent WebSocket on command; drops the pivoting commands.
  • AV/EDR killer. Installs a driver presented as Beijing Jiangmin Antivirus (KV series) that "carries a valid digital signature". Told a process name, the driver terminates it. Kaspersky says the kill list has about 220 entries, including Microsoft Defender and other endpoint products, TeamViewer, Sysmon, Splunk and Wazuh agents, Veeam and Acronis backup services, and database servers. This is the "bring your own signed driver" pattern: a legitimately signed kernel driver used to switch off defences.
  • Cryptor. Encrypts files with AES-CBC or ChaCha20, with a separate key per file protected by X25519 key exchange. Before encrypting it stops SQL Server, Oracle, MySQL, PostgreSQL, MongoDB and Redis, and backup services such as Veeam; it deletes shadow copies, empties the recycle bin, wipes temporary folders, and overwrites files with random data before deleting them, "preventing forensic recovery". Then it drops the audit-style note.

Is OpsAgent AI-driven?

Not in the sense of an AI agent running the attacks. Kaspersky says "Several code patterns suggest LLM-assisted development": API functions resolved by hash with the plain-text name sometimes left in memory, and all injection commands sharing near-identical code, which "matches LLM-generated scaffolding". In its conclusions Kaspersky notes that custom frameworks are usually built by APT groups with dedicated engineering resources, and that a ransomware crew building comparable tooling "may be enabled by AI-assisted development tools". The point for defenders: expect better-built custom tooling from mid-tier criminal groups, and do not count on signatures for well-known frameworks.

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What security leaders should do this week

  • Load Kaspersky's indicators. Put the file paths, driver hash and command-server entries from the Securelist report into your EDR, SIEM and proxy tooling, and search back to January 2026.
  • Block abused drivers. Turn on Microsoft's vulnerable driver blocklist and memory integrity (HVCI) where you can, use application control (WDAC or equivalent) on servers, and alert on any new kernel driver from a security vendor you do not run. A Jiangmin antivirus driver appearing on a machine that has never run Jiangmin is a strong signal.
  • Alert when defences go quiet. Several security, logging (Sysmon, Splunk, Wazuh), backup and database services stopping on one host within minutes should page someone. Check that EDR tamper protection is on and that a dead agent raises an alert, not just a grey icon.
  • Watch odd host processes. msiexec.exe or notepad.exe with no installer or user activity behind it, holding network connections or named pipes, deserves a look.
  • Protect recovery. Keep at least one backup copy offline or immutable and outside the domain, and test a restore of a database server. The cryptor targets databases, backup services and shadow copies first. Check yourself with the Backup 3-2-1-1-0 checker.
  • Make credential theft and lateral movement harder. OpsAgent delivers Mimikatz and pass-the-hash tooling on demand and moves over SMB: use unique local admin passwords (LAPS), Credential Guard, admin tiering, and restrict workstation-to-workstation SMB.
  • Assume the entry point is ordinary. Kaspersky does not say how AuditTeam gets in, so patch internet-facing systems, enforce phishing-resistant MFA on remote access, and review exposed services.
  • Brief the people who will read the note. A demand for an "audit fee" is extortion. Make sure your incident response plan sends it to the IR team, legal and leadership, not to procurement, and that the payment decision follows your plan. The Ransom note interpreter and Ransom decision lab help rehearse that.

Put it to work

Leak-site claims are claims until a victim, regulator or court confirms them; see how we handled that in Deloitte named on The Gentlemen leak site. Another operation that pairs access brokering with its own ransomware is in tcherber: VPN access broker exposed.

FAQ

What is AuditTeam?

AuditTeam is a ransomware and data-extortion group described by Kaspersky's Global Research and Analysis Team (GReAT) on 18 November 2026. Kaspersky says it has been active from January 2026 through at least October 2026, uses a custom framework called OpsAgent, and leaves a ransom note dressed up as an audit log that demands an "Audit & Consulting fee" in exchange for a vulnerability report, or the stolen data is published. Kaspersky attributes the OpsAgent campaign to AuditTeam with high confidence.

What is OpsAgent?

OpsAgent is the implant framework Kaspersky says AuditTeam uses. It is built to look like a penetration-testing tool and, in Kaspersky's words, "rivals Cobalt Strike in functionality": file and process control, privilege escalation, credential tools delivered on demand, keylogging, screenshots, and lateral movement by chaining agents on compromised hosts. Two add-on modules kill security products and encrypt files. During 2026 it was rewritten from C++ to Rust (OpsAgent-rs).

Is an AuditTeam "audit" a real security audit?

No. Kaspersky describes it as extortion framed as a paid security audit. The note is dropped by the encryption module after files are encrypted, even though the note itself does not mention encryption. Kaspersky says: "if a victim sees the note, their files are already encrypted." Treat it as a ransomware incident, not a consulting offer.

Which countries has AuditTeam targeted?

Kaspersky says it observed victims in China, the Philippines, Senegal, Italy, Finland, Hong Kong and Russia. The group's own leak site also claims victims in Turkey, Thailand, Ukraine, Argentina, South Korea, Japan and Spain; those are the group's claims, not confirmed by Kaspersky. Kaspersky names no victim organisations and says only that they "belong to different industries". No US victim is named.

How does AuditTeam get into a network?

Kaspersky's report does not say. It describes the loaders, the implant and the modules, but not the initial access vector. Until that is known, defend the usual entry points: internet-facing services and remote access, stolen credentials and phishing.

Is OpsAgent AI-generated malware?

Kaspersky says "Several code patterns suggest LLM-assisted development", for example near-identical code across all injection commands, which it says "matches LLM-generated scaffolding". In its conclusions it says a ransomware crew building APT-grade tooling "may be enabled by AI-assisted development tools". That is about how the malware was written. Kaspersky does not say the attacks are run by an AI agent.

How do you detect AuditTeam's OpsAgent?

From Kaspersky's description: watch for a newly loaded, signed kernel driver from an antivirus product you do not use (Kaspersky says the AV/EDR killer uses a driver presented as Beijing Jiangmin Antivirus), for security, logging, backup and database services stopping in bulk, for shadow copies being deleted, and for msiexec.exe or notepad.exe processes behaving like command-and-control hosts. Load the file paths and hashes from Kaspersky's indicators section into your EDR and SIEM. Blocking by IP address does not work well, because the command servers sit on shared Amazon CloudFront infrastructure.

Sources

This article is educational guidance for security leaders, not a forensic report. Check Kaspersky's report for the full indicator list and any updates before acting.

Check whether you could recover from this
Score backups, EDR tamper protection, privileged access and response plans, and get a gap list to take into this week's review.
Open the ransomware readiness scorecard
Take this with you
What Kaspersky says happened · Timeline · How OpsAgent works, at a defender's level · Is OpsAgent AI-driven? · What security leaders should do this week · Put it to work

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