Evooo1Bot and SSHStalker: Cron Persistence on Edge Devices
TL;DR · the short version
Two Linux botnet reports show why deleting malware from an edge device or server is not the end of it. Fortinet's FortiGuard Labs (13 August 2026) says Evooo1Bot, a Mirai-derived botnet targeting internet-facing devices since July 2026, installs five persistence mechanisms at once: a systemd service, a SysV init script, a cron entry that downloads and runs a script every five minutes, a login script in /etc/profile.d and an rc.local line. Flare (9 February 2026) says SSHStalker, an IRC-controlled botnet that gets in by SSH brute force, installs a cron job that runs every minute and relaunches the bot if its process is gone, plus a service script. Unit 42's Operation MidnightEclipse (April 2024) showed the same cron technique on Palo Alto Networks firewalls after CVE-2024-3400. Neither 2026 report names a compromised switch model. The fix is to remove every persistence path together, rotate credentials and reimage where the vendor supports it.
Deleting a botnet's binary from a Linux device does not remove the botnet if a cron job is still there to fetch or relaunch it. Two research reports show the pattern. Fortinet's FortiGuard Labs says Evooo1Bot, a botnet attacking internet-facing devices since July 2026, schedules a script to be downloaded and run every five minutes, and backs that up with a systemd service, an init script, an rc.local entry and a login script. Flare says SSHStalker installs a cron job that runs every minute and relaunches the bot from a local script if its process has gone. Neither report establishes that any specific switch model was compromised. What they establish is how to clean up properly.
Who this is for: security leaders, network and infrastructure teams, and incident responders who own Linux-based routers, firewalls, VPN gateways, cameras and servers.
Based on Fortinet's report (13 August 2026), Flare's report (9 February 2026), Unit 42's Operation MidnightEclipse brief (April 2024) and the CISA KEV catalog, read on 19 November 2026. PlayCISO is not affiliated with any of them. We publish no addresses, domains, hashes or download commands; the vendor reports carry the indicators.
Confirmed vs not yet known
Fortinet reports: Evooo1Bot's persistence command installs a systemd service, a SysV init script, a five-minute download-and-run cron entry, an /etc/profile.d login injection and an /etc/rc.local line at the same time. It has targeted internet-facing devices since July 2026, with exploits for known router, camera, firewall and enterprise-application flaws.
Flare reports: SSHStalker gets in by SSH brute force, installs a cron job that runs every minute and a service or init script, relaunches its bot within about a minute if the process is killed, and carries tools to wipe login records.
Unit 42 reported (2024): after exploiting CVE-2024-3400 on Palo Alto Networks firewalls, an attacker set up a cron job that ran every minute and pulled commands from an external server.
Not established: compromise of any specific switch model; how many devices Evooo1Bot has infected; a confirmed SSHStalker victim count (Flare's figure of almost 7,000 is fresh SSH scan results, not confirmed infections); and any link between the two botnets.
Evooo1Bot: five ways back in
Fortinet's researcher Cara Lin describes Evooo1Bot as a previously undocumented Linux family named after the string "evooo1" in every binary. It reuses the leaked Mirai DDoS engine and adds encrypted command-and-control, an SSH brute-force scanner with a dictionary of more than 150 credentials (including service accounts common in enterprise and operational-technology environments), a credential sniffer, a SOCKS5 relay and an exploit module. The exploits Fortinet lists are known, mostly older flaws in NETGEAR, Tenda, D-Link and TP-Link routers, Zyxel firewalls, Hikvision cameras, Telesquare and Mitsubishi Electric devices, plus enterprise software; Fortinet notes some entries are broken as shipped.
Fortinet says a single !persist command installs all of these at once:
- systemd service with
Restart=alwaysand a description posing as an Apache cache-management service. - SysV init script in
/etc/init.dthat downloads and runs the script. - Cron entry that downloads and runs the script every five minutes.
- Shell profile injection in
/etc/profile.d/, run at every login. - rc.local line appended to
/etc/rc.local, run at boot.
It also lowers its own priority for the kernel's out-of-memory killer and holds /dev/watchdog open so a reboot does not interrupt it. Our reading of Fortinet's description: because the cron entry fetches the script again every five minutes, deleting the binary alone does not get rid of the bot while that entry exists and the download server answers, and because four other paths do the same thing, removing only the cron entry is not enough either.
The reason Fortinet calls the SOCKS relay the most significant module: it turns a compromised router, firewall or IP camera into a proxy the operator can use to hide its origin and reach internal networks.
SSHStalker: a one-minute watchdog
Flare's research team describes SSHStalker as an IRC-controlled botnet built from old-school parts. It scans for open SSH with a Go binary, brute-forces logins, installs GCC on the victim to compile its bot there, and carries exploits for Linux 2.6-era kernels from 2009 and 2010. It aims at long-forgotten legacy systems such as abandoned virtual-server images, outdated appliances and embedded deployments; Flare's scan data is dominated by cloud hosting providers.
For persistence, Flare says the kit "installs a cron job that runs every minute and silently executes an update script." That script checks whether the bot's process is still alive and, if not, relaunches it from the local copy, so killing the process buys about 60 seconds. A distribution-specific script also installs and enables a service or init script. The bot favours memory-backed paths such as /dev/shm, and two utilities scrub evidence: one edits log entries, the other targets the utmp, wtmp and lastlog login records. Flare says the botnet held access without visible impact, despite DDoS and cryptomining capability.
The precedent: Operation MidnightEclipse
Cron persistence on a security appliance is not new. In April 2024, Unit 42 described post-exploitation activity after attackers exploited CVE-2024-3400, a command-injection flaw in the GlobalProtect feature of PAN-OS (CVSS 10.0) that gave an unauthenticated attacker root on the firewall. When an attempt to install a Python backdoor failed, the attacker set up a cron job on the firewall that ran every minute and pulled commands from an external server. Palo Alto Networks fixed it in PAN-OS 10.2.9-h1, 11.0.4-h1, 11.1.2-h3 and later, and CISA added it to KEV on 12 April 2024.
Useful next, if this was relevant to you
Timeline
| Date | Event | Source |
|---|---|---|
| 12 Apr 2024 | Unit 42 publishes its Operation MidnightEclipse brief on CVE-2024-3400 exploitation; CISA adds the CVE to KEV the same day | Unit 42, CISA KEV |
| 20 May 2024 | Unit 42 last updates the brief | Unit 42 |
| Jan 2026 | Almost 7,000 fresh SSH scan results found in an SSHStalker staging file (scan data, not confirmed infections) | Flare |
| 9 Feb 2026 | Flare publishes its SSHStalker report | Flare |
| Jul 2026 | Evooo1Bot begins targeting internet-facing devices, per its command-and-control telemetry | Fortinet |
| 13 Aug 2026 | Fortinet publishes its Evooo1Bot report | Fortinet |
Persistence-removal checklist for Linux-based edge devices
Use this on routers, firewalls, VPN gateways, cameras and servers where you have a shell. On a vendor appliance with a restricted shell, follow the vendor's compromise-recovery procedure instead and open a support case: the vendor knows where its platform keeps startup scripts.
- Contain first. Block the device's outbound internet access (or isolate it) before you change anything, so a cron job or login script cannot download a fresh copy while you work. Keep management access from a trusted host only.
- Capture evidence. Save the process list, network connections, crontabs and the files below before deleting them. Logs and login records may have been edited, so also pull what the device sent to your central log collector.
- Check every user's crontab, not just root's. Run
crontab -l -u <user>for each account in/etc/passwd, and read/var/spool/cron/,/etc/crontab,/etc/cron.d/and/etc/cron.hourly,daily,weeklyandmonthly. Entries that run every minute or every five minutes, pipe a download into a shell, or start something from/tmpor/dev/shmdeserve a hard look. - Check systemd units. List unit files and look in
/etc/systemd/system/and the vendor unit directories for services you did not install, especially recently modified ones withRestart=alwaysand a plausible-sounding description. - Check SysV init. Look in
/etc/init.d/and the/etc/rc*.d/links for scripts that download or start unknown binaries. - Check rc.local. Read
/etc/rc.local(and/etc/rc.d/rc.local) for appended lines. - Check login scripts.
/etc/profile, everything in/etc/profile.d/,/etc/bash.bashrc, and each user's.bashrc,.profileand.bash_profile. - Check SSH keys. Every user's
~/.ssh/authorized_keys, including root and service accounts; remove keys you cannot account for. - Look in the usual hiding places. Executables in
/tmp,/var/tmpand/dev/shm, a compiler installed on a production device, and processes holding/dev/watchdogopen. - Remove all paths together, then kill the processes. Removing one path at a time gives the others a chance to put it back. With SSHStalker's one-minute watchdog, a process killed before the cron job is gone returns within about a minute.
- Verify. Watch the device for at least 15 minutes (three Evooo1Bot cron cycles) and after a reboot: no new processes, files, cron entries or outbound connections should appear.
- Rotate credentials. Every password and key the device used or stored: local and admin accounts, SSH keys, VPN and RADIUS secrets, SNMP communities and API tokens. Both botnets spread by guessing SSH passwords, so turn off password logins and use keys.
- Close the way in. Patch the exploited flaw, take the management interface off the internet, and retire devices that no longer get firmware updates.
- Reimage if the vendor supports it. A factory reset, firmware reflash or rebuild from a known-good image is more reliable than a clean-up, given how many layers these kits install. Restore configuration from a trusted backup, not from the infected device.
What security leaders should do this week
- Know which edge devices you own. List internet-facing routers, firewalls, VPN gateways and cameras, their firmware level and whether the vendor still patches them. Check the CVEs Fortinet lists against that inventory in the KEV checker.
- Make "remove every persistence path" part of the playbook. Add the checklist above to your incident response playbook for Linux and appliance compromises, and rehearse it with the Edge VPN Intrusion Lab or the IR Playbook Lab.
- Alert on cron changes. Flare recommends alerting on new or modified cron entries, especially ones that run every minute or from unusual directories, and on execution from
/dev/shm. Add those to your next hunt plan. - Stop password SSH on anything exposed. Rate-limit and restrict SSH to trusted networks, and monitor changes to login records and new SSH keys.
- Filter egress. Edge devices rarely need to start arbitrary outbound connections; blocking them breaks download-and-run persistence and IRC control alike.
For another recent case where cron beacons and SSH keys were left behind, see our PHP2Shell post. For the edge-appliance pattern, read Ivanti Connect Secure in KEV and why Citrix NetScaler keeps getting breached.
Frequently asked questions
What is Evooo1Bot?
Evooo1Bot is a Linux botnet that Fortinet's FortiGuard Labs named in August 2026. Fortinet says it reuses the leaked Mirai DDoS code and adds encrypted command-and-control, an SSH brute-force scanner, a credential sniffer, a SOCKS relay that turns an infected router, firewall or camera into a proxy, and exploits for known flaws in routers and other internet-facing devices. Fortinet says it has been targeting internet-facing devices since July 2026.
How does Evooo1Bot persist?
Fortinet says one command installs five mechanisms at once: a systemd service set to restart always, a SysV init script in /etc/init.d, a cron entry that downloads and runs a script every five minutes, an injection into /etc/profile.d that runs at login, and a line appended to /etc/rc.local. Each of them fetches the bot again, so removing one, or deleting the binary, is not enough.
What is SSHStalker?
SSHStalker is a Linux botnet that Flare documented in February 2026. Flare says it gets in by SSH brute force, compiles its bot on the victim with GCC, and is controlled over IRC. It aims at older Linux systems, and Flare's scan data is dominated by cloud hosting providers.
How does SSHStalker use cron?
Flare says the kit "installs a cron job that runs every minute and silently executes an update script." The script acts as a watchdog: if the bot's process is gone, it relaunches the bot from the local copy within about a minute. Flare also describes a service or init script enabled through the system's service manager.
Did these botnets compromise network switches?
Neither report establishes that. Fortinet describes targets in general terms (routers, firewalls, IP cameras and other edge devices) and lists exploited CVEs, mostly in consumer and small-business routers; it names no switch model. Flare names no switch either. Treat any Linux-based device you manage as in scope for the checks, not because a switch model was named.
What was Operation MidnightEclipse?
Operation MidnightEclipse is Palo Alto Networks Unit 42's name for post-exploitation activity after attackers exploited CVE-2024-3400, a command-injection flaw in PAN-OS GlobalProtect (CVSS 10.0), in April 2024. Unit 42 says that when an attempt to install a backdoor failed, the attacker set up a cron job on the firewall that ran every minute and pulled commands from an external server. CISA added CVE-2024-3400 to KEV on 12 April 2024.
How do I remove cron persistence from a Linux edge device?
Cut the device off from the internet or block its outbound traffic first so nothing re-downloads, capture evidence, then remove every persistence path together: all users' crontabs and the system cron directories, systemd units, init scripts, rc.local, login scripts and SSH authorized_keys. Kill the processes, confirm nothing comes back, then rotate every credential the device held and fix the way in. Reimage or reflash from the vendor's image where the vendor supports it.
Is reimaging better than cleaning?
Usually, yes. Both botnets layer several persistence paths and SSHStalker carries tools to wipe login records, so a clean-up can miss something. If the vendor supports a factory reset, firmware reflash or rebuild from a known-good image, use it, then restore configuration from a trusted backup rather than from the infected device.
Sources
- Fortinet FortiGuard Labs (Cara Lin): multi-functional Linux botnet Evooo1Bot (13 August 2026)
- Flare Research: Old-School IRC, New Victims: Inside the Newly Discovered SSHStalker Linux Botnet (9 February 2026)
- Unit 42: Threat Brief: Operation MidnightEclipse, Post-Exploitation Activity Related to CVE-2024-3400 (12 April 2024, updated 20 May 2024)
- CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: CVE-2024-3400, added 12 April 2024