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Qubole AWS Attack: n0n Claim, Chase, Visa, Mastercard Data

November 21, 2026 · Team PlayCISO
TL;DR · the short version

An attacker used IAM credentials tied to the AWS account behind Qubole, the cloud data platform owned by Idera, to assume integration roles that Qubole customers had created, between 14 and 26 October 2026, then harvested secrets and downloaded S3 data, according to Wiz, Sentra and Mandiant (published 9 November). The extortion group n0n claimed responsibility on 11 November and on 16 November posted data it said belonged to customers of JPMorgan Chase, Visa and Mastercard. On 19-20 November JPMorgan confirmed attackers accessed marketing data held by its vendors, Visa said an Asia Pacific service provider was involved and no card numbers were affected, and Mastercard said a provider exposed a limited number of cardholder email addresses. None named Qubole, and neither Qubole nor Idera has commented. The Qubole link to the three companies is n0n's claim.

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Qubole was named by the extortion group n0n, which claims it stole data through the cloud data platform; Qubole and its owner Idera have not confirmed a breach or commented. What is documented: Wiz, with Sentra and Mandiant, reported on 9 November 2026 that an attacker used IAM credentials tied to Qubole's AWS account to assume the integration roles Qubole customers had created, between 14 and 26 October, and took secrets and S3 data. On 16 November n0n posted data it said belonged to customers of JPMorgan Chase, Visa and Mastercard. All three have since confirmed incidents at third-party vendors, describe the exposure as marketing data or email addresses, and say no card numbers were taken. None of them named Qubole.

Who this is for: anyone who has ever connected Qubole to an AWS account (including teams that stopped using it), cloud security and platform leads, and third-party risk owners at banks and payment companies.

Based on Wiz's research post, SecurityWeek, BleepingComputer and Cybersecurity Dive, read on 21 November 2026. We did not visit any leak site. PlayCISO is not affiliated with any company named here.

Confirmed vs not yet known

Reported by researchers (Wiz, Sentra, Mandiant): an attacker used two IAM users in the AWS account Wiz associates with Qubole's platform (805246085872) to assume customers' Qubole roles from 14 to 26 October 2026, harvested secrets and downloaded S3 data. Sentra says some roles were left over from companies that had stopped using Qubole.

Confirmed by the companies (19-20 Nov): JPMorgan says attackers accessed "certain marketing data held by" vendors; Visa says an incident at a third-party service provider in Asia Pacific, with "No payments data such as card numbers" affected; Mastercard says a third-party provider exposed a limited number of email addresses from one benefit programme.

Claimed by n0n, not verified: that it carried out the Qubole intrusion; that the JPMorgan, Visa and Mastercard data came through Qubole; 53.9 GB taken from Qubole and nearly one petabyte from its customers.

Not known: how the Qubole credentials were obtained, how many customers were affected (SecurityWeek says "over a dozen" organisations, citing researchers), and whether Qubole is the vendor behind any of the three companies' incidents.

What the researchers found

Qubole customers connect it to AWS by creating an IAM role in their own account that trusts Qubole's account, usually with an External ID. Wiz says every AssumeRole request it attributed to the attacker "included an External ID, and every one succeeded". Inside customer accounts the attacker enumerated storage, compute, databases and keys; read secrets from Lambda environment variables, Secrets Manager and SSM Parameter Store; checked them with TruffleHog, including AWS keys, Entra ID client secrets and Okta client credentials; and read S3 data, "sometimes downloading entire buckets in a single session". Activity came from Mullvad VPN addresses and an OVH server, not Qubole's network. Session names began with quiam-.

Wiz also saw a separate wave from 8 to 11 October in which customer-owned AWS keys, apparently created for Qubole integrations, were tested and in some cases used. It has not linked that to the role-assumption campaign. SecurityWeek reported on 10 November that over a dozen organisations were hit.

The n0n claim and the three companies' statements

Wiz updated its post on 11 November to say Risky Business had reported that an actor calling itself n0n claimed responsibility. Per BleepingComputer, n0n claims it took 53.9 GB across 30,743 files from Qubole itself and holds nearly a petabyte from customer networks, and on 16 November posted data it attributed to JPMorgan Chase, Visa and Mastercard customers. Cybersecurity Dive reports that Sophos and SOCRadar confirmed n0n made the claims, and that SOCRadar has not independently confirmed n0n carried out the attacks.

CompanyWhat it saidSource
JPMorgan Chase"third parties who provide services to the firm were the target of a cyber attack"; "the attackers accessed certain marketing data held by those vendors"; may include customer names and email addresses; no service disruptionBleepingComputer, Cybersecurity Dive
Visa"associated with an incident involving a third-party service provider in Asia Pacific"; "Visa's systems were not involved and were not impacted. No payments data such as card numbers were affected."BleepingComputer
MastercardAn incident at a third-party provider exposed a limited number of email addresses from a small subset of cardholders in one benefit programme; "no impact to the Mastercard payment network"; "the exposure has been contained"BleepingComputer, Cybersecurity Dive
Qubole / IderaNo response to BleepingComputer by 20 November; no public statement foundBleepingComputer

For the bank's wider record, see JPMorgan Chase in the Breach Index.

Useful next, if this was relevant to you

Showing 1 of 3: Cloud Posture Lab

Timeline

DateEventSource
8-11 Oct 2026Separate testing of customer-owned AWS keys created for Qubole integrations (not linked by Wiz)Wiz
14-26 Oct 2026Attacker assumes customers' Qubole integration roles using Qubole-account IAM credentialsWiz
9 Nov 2026Wiz publishes its findings with Sentra and MandiantWiz
10 Nov 2026SecurityWeek reports over a dozen organisations hitSecurityWeek
11 Nov 2026n0n claims responsibility (reported by Risky Business; Wiz updates its post)Wiz, BleepingComputer
16 Nov 2026n0n posts data it attributes to JPMorgan Chase, Visa and Mastercard customers (claim)BleepingComputer
19 Nov 2026JPMorgan confirms marketing data held by vendors was accessedCybersecurity Dive
20 Nov 2026Visa and Mastercard confirm third-party provider incidents; no card data affected, per bothBleepingComputer, Cybersecurity Dive

What security leaders should do this week

  • Find every role that trusts Qubole, including old ones. Search IAM in every AWS account for trust policies naming account 805246085872. Sentra's point is the important one: roles left behind after you stopped using Qubole were used. Delete them if you no longer use the service.
  • Hunt in CloudTrail from 1 October 2026. Follow Wiz's steps: AssumeRole from that account with non-AWS source IPs, the principal IDs and IP addresses it lists, sessions named quiam-*, and TruffleHog GetCallerIdentity calls. For any session you find, review Secrets Manager, SSM, Lambda and S3 access after it. Check you have S3 data events and an organisation trail; without them you cannot answer "what was read".
  • Rotate what those roles could read, and revoke sessions. Wiz notes rotating a credential does not end sessions already issued. Plan the order with the Key Rotation Planner, starting with Entra ID, Okta and AWS secrets.
  • Narrow every third-party trust, not just Qubole's. Wiz's list: inventory roles that trust external accounts, remove unused ones, pin the vendor principal and add source IP or VPC endpoint conditions, treat the External ID as non-secret, and least-privilege what integration roles can reach. Check policies with the IAM Policy Analyzer.
  • Ask your marketing, loyalty and benefits vendors directly. All three financial firms point to vendors holding customer contact data. Ask yours whether they use Qubole or were contacted about this campaign, and run the Third-Party Breach Response Checklist on any yes.
  • Warn customers about phishing if your contact data was exposed. Names and email addresses linked to a bank or card brand are the raw material for convincing phishing. Practise the cloud side in the AWS Account Compromise Lab.

For other recent extortion claims, see our leak-site claims roundup for 19 November, which covers n0n's GRAIL listing, and bank cyber incidents in November 2026.

Frequently asked questions

Was Qubole hacked?

Not confirmed by Qubole. Wiz, working with Sentra and Mandiant, reported on 9 November 2026 that an attacker used IAM credentials tied to the AWS account Qubole's platform uses (805246085872) to assume the integration roles its customers had created, between 14 and 26 October 2026. The group n0n later claimed responsibility. Qubole, owned by Idera, had not responded to BleepingComputer by 20 November, and we found no public statement from either company.

Who is n0n?

n0n is an extortion group that, per Cybersecurity Dive, first appeared in September 2026 and posts victims on a leak site. Wiz says Catalin Cimpanu of Risky Business reported on 11 November that an actor calling itself n0n claimed the Qubole intrusion; Wiz has not linked the campaign to other activity. Sophos told Cybersecurity Dive the group "is having a real impact, but some of its claims around major brands need to be treated with caution".

Were JPMorgan Chase, Visa and Mastercard breached through Qubole?

That is n0n's claim and it is not confirmed. On 16 November n0n posted data it said belonged to customers of the three companies. JPMorgan said third parties that provide services to it were attacked and that attackers accessed "certain marketing data held by those vendors". Visa said the claims relate to an incident at a third-party service provider in Asia Pacific and that its systems and card numbers were not affected. Mastercard said a third-party provider exposed a limited number of email addresses of cardholders in one benefit programme. None of them named Qubole.

Were card numbers stolen?

Not according to the companies. Visa said "No payments data such as card numbers were affected." Mastercard said the exposure was email addresses, non-payments information, with no impact on its payment network. JPMorgan said the data was marketing data, which it believes may include customer names and email addresses.

What did the attacker do inside customer AWS accounts?

Per Wiz, the attacker assumed Qubole integration roles, enumerated storage, compute, databases and keys, harvested secrets from Lambda environment variables, Secrets Manager and SSM Parameter Store, checked them with TruffleHog (AWS keys, Entra ID client secrets, Okta client credentials) and downloaded S3 data, sometimes entire buckets. Sentra says some of the roles were left in place after companies stopped using Qubole.

How do I check whether my AWS accounts were affected?

Wiz advises reviewing CloudTrail from 1 October 2026 in every account that holds a Qubole integration role, including accounts that no longer use Qubole: look for AssumeRole events from account 805246085872 with source IPs that are not AWS addresses, for the IAM principal IDs and IP addresses Wiz lists, for sessions named quiam-*, and for TruffleHog GetCallerIdentity calls. Then review Secrets Manager, SSM, Lambda and S3 activity in any session you find, rotate exposed secrets and revoke active sessions.

How much data did n0n take?

Only n0n's figures exist. It claims 53.9 GB in 30,743 files taken directly from Qubole and nearly one petabyte from Qubole customers' environments, per BleepingComputer. None of this is verified. Outlets also give different counts for the JPMorgan, Visa and Mastercard records; none is confirmed by the companies, which describe the exposure only as limited.

Sources

Work through a vendor breach that reaches your cloud
What to ask the vendor, which logs to pull, which credentials to rotate and when to notify, in order.
Open the checklist
Take this with you
What the researchers found · The n0n claim and the three companies' s… · Timeline · What security leaders should do this week · Sources

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