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Fugaku Supercomputer Breach: SSH Keys at Risk, What to Do

November 17, 2026 · Team PlayCISO
TL;DR · the short version

RIKEN says an intruder got into systems supporting the Fugaku supercomputer between 10 and 13 November 2026 through a publicly accessible dashboard page, tampered with internal servers and installed malicious programs. Names, email addresses and user IDs of up to 4,222 Fugaku users, names and emails of up to 375 users of the RIKYU AI for Science supercomputer, and credentials users kept in Fugaku home directories (such as SSH private keys and access keys for other systems) were or may have been taken. RIKEN says the intruder tried to use some of those credentials on other systems; whether it succeeded is under investigation. Fugaku has been offline since 04:30 JST on 14 November, and all users' login public keys were invalidated on 15 November. If anyone in your organisation used Fugaku, revoke every public key whose private key sat on Fugaku and rotate any token stored there.

Put it into practice
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Map which SSH keys and API tokens live where, who can rotate them, and in what order, so a shared-system breach is a checklist, not a scramble.
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RIKEN, Japan's national research institute, says an intruder broke into systems supporting the Fugaku supercomputer between 10 and 13 November 2026, reaching servers that hold user data. RIKEN's notice (16 November in Japanese, 17 November in English) says names, email addresses and user IDs of up to 4,222 Fugaku users, plus SSH private keys and access keys that users stored in their Fugaku home directories for other systems, were or may have been taken. RIKEN confirms the intruder tried to use some of those credentials elsewhere; whether it got in is not yet known. Fugaku has been offline since 14 November.

Who this is for: universities, labs and companies whose researchers have Fugaku or RIKYU accounts, anyone who runs servers that accept SSH keys from HPC users, and security leaders who own research-computing risk.

Based on RIKEN's own notice in Japanese and English, the TOP500 November 2026 list and reporting by The Register. PlayCISO is not affiliated with RIKEN. Facts are as published on 17 November 2026 and may change. All times are Japan Standard Time (JST) as given by RIKEN.

Confirmed vs not yet known

Confirmed by RIKEN: unauthorized access via a public Fugaku operational-status dashboard (10-13 Nov); several internal servers tampered with and malicious programs installed; users had stored credentials for external systems on Fugaku; the intruder attempted to connect to other systems with some of them; Fugaku stopped since 04:30 JST on 14 Nov; all user login public keys invalidated; administrative keys replaced; MEXT, HPCI partner organisations and Japan's Personal Information Protection Commission notified.

Possibly taken (RIKEN's wording: "was or may have been"): names, emails and user IDs of up to 4,222 Fugaku users; names and emails of up to 375 RIKYU users; SSH private keys, access keys and other credentials in home directories; user files including research data.

Not yet known: how the dashboard was exploited; exactly what left the network; whether any login attempt on another system succeeded; whether third parties' personal data was in the files; who did it; when Fugaku will return. RIKEN says it has found no evidence so far that research data was exfiltrated.

What happened

RIKEN's Center for Computational Science (R-CCS) runs Fugaku. According to RIKEN's notice, the intruder entered through "a publicly accessible dashboard page showing Fugaku's operational status", moved into the internal operations network and reached servers that hold user data. RIKEN says several internal servers were tampered with, including the installation of malicious programs. Suspicious communication was detected on 12 November and the unauthorized access was confirmed on 13 November.

The serious part for everyone outside RIKEN is what users kept in their home directories. RIKEN says users had stored "authentication credentials for other systems or services, such as SSH private keys and access keys" on Fugaku, and that the intruder attempted to connect to other systems using some of them. The Register describes these as credentials for supercomputers and services not run by RIKEN. That turns one facility's breach into a problem for every system those keys could open.

RIKEN says Fugaku will restart only after it has finished the investigation, fixed the exploited software, rebuilt the compromised servers, reviewed the network configuration and added security measures. It also says it will review how operations and maintenance responsibilities are divided.

The numbers, checked

FigureWhat it isSource
Up to 4,222Registered Fugaku users whose names, emails and IDs were in the affected authentication systemRIKEN (Japanese notice; English overview); The Register
4,224Fugaku figure in one section of the English notice; it does not match RIKEN's own total, so treat 4,222 as the working numberRIKEN (English notice)
Up to 375Registered RIKYU users (names and emails)RIKEN; The Register
Up to 4,597 (about 4,600)Total across Fugaku and RIKYURIKEN (Japanese notice)
No. 9, 442.01 PFlop/sFugaku's rank and Rmax on the November 2026 TOP500 listTOP500

Timeline

When (2026, JST)WhatSource
10-13 NovIntruder has access via a public Fugaku operational-status dashboard and moves into the internal operations networkRIKEN
12 NovSuspicious communication detectedRIKEN
13 Nov, 16:33Unauthorized access confirmedRIKEN
13 NovLogin attempt on Fugaku reported; RIKEN takes the machine offlineThe Register
13 Nov, 20:59Reported to the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT)RIKEN
13 Nov, 22:07System used for the intrusion isolatedRIKEN
14 Nov, 04:30Fugaku operations suspended; external access route blockedRIKEN
14 Nov, 20:20Administrative keys replacedRIKEN
15 Nov, 10:51HPCI (High Performance Computing Infrastructure) partner organisations notifiedRIKEN
15 Nov, 16:18All running and queued jobs stopped; affected users emailed; every user's login public key invalidatedRIKEN
16 Nov, 17:55Reported to the Personal Information Protection CommissionRIKEN
16 NovRIKEN publishes its notice in JapaneseRIKEN
17 NovEnglish notice published; TOP500 November 2026 list ranks Fugaku 9thRIKEN, TOP500

Am I affected?

  • You had a Fugaku or RIKYU account: assume your name, email and (for Fugaku) user ID are exposed. RIKEN says it emailed affected users on 15 November.
  • You kept a private key or token on Fugaku: treat it as stolen. RIKEN's own advice is to remove or revoke the matching public key on every external service and generate a new key pair, and to revoke and replace other stored credentials.
  • You run a server that trusts keys from researchers who use Fugaku (another HPC centre, a lab cluster, a Git host, a cloud account): you are the system the intruder tried to reach. Check which keys you accept and who has logged in with them since 10 November.
  • Your company has a Fugaku project: RIKEN names no organisations and says there is no evidence so far of research-data exfiltration, but user files may have been taken. Ask RIKEN through your project contact what was in your project's home directories.

What security leaders should do this week

  • Find your Fugaku and RIKYU users. Ask research groups, HPC liaisons and R&D teams who has an account, and keep the list: you will need it for every step below.
  • Rotate every SSH key and access key that ever sat on the shared system. Not just the Fugaku login key (RIKEN already disabled those), but keys for other clusters, Git hosts, cloud accounts and object storage that users copied there. Revoke the public key at each service, then issue a new pair generated on the user's own device. The Key Rotation Planner helps order this.
  • Audit authorized_keys and key reuse. The same public key often unlocks several systems. Find every place a Fugaku-held key's public half is installed, and remove it. See the commands below.
  • Look for logins with HPC-issued keys. Review accepted public-key logins and API-key use since 10 November on every system those keys reached, especially from unfamiliar IPs or at odd hours. Any hit: treat that system as compromised.
  • Check where else keys and tokens live in plain files. Home directories on shared systems are a common place for .aws/credentials, .netrc, cloud CLI tokens and id_* files. Scan for them with the Secret Scanner and work through exposed ones with Leaked Credential Response.
  • Treat research collaboration as supply chain. A partner facility's breach reached your systems through keys your people put there. List the external research platforms your staff use, what credentials they hold, and who you would call. The Third-Party Breach Response Checklist covers the questions to ask.
  • Move HPC access off long-lived keys. Prefer an SSH certificate authority that issues short-lived certificates after multi-factor sign-in, and forbid storing private keys for one system on another. A stolen short-lived certificate expires; a stolen id_ed25519 does not.
  • Notify partners and check your clock. If personal data of your staff or study participants was in those directories, a notification duty may apply. Work out deadlines with the Breach Notification Clock Calculator, and tell collaborating institutions whose systems trusted the exposed keys.
  • Warn users about phishing. Exposed names and emails of supercomputer users make a ready target list. RIKEN says it will never ask for passwords or personal information by email.

Commands for the key audit

Run on servers that accept SSH keys from researchers. Compare the fingerprints with the keys your users say they kept on Fugaku, and check accepted logins since the intrusion window began.

# On every server that trusts keys from HPC users: list authorized keys with fingerprints
for f in /home/*/.ssh/authorized_keys /root/.ssh/authorized_keys; do
  [ -f "$f" ] && echo "== $f" && ssh-keygen -lf "$f"
done

# Logins accepted by public key since 10 Nov (Debian/Ubuntu: /var/log/auth.log; RHEL: /var/log/secure)
grep -h "Accepted publickey" /var/log/auth.log* /var/log/secure* 2>/dev/null | less
# systemd hosts:
journalctl -u ssh -u sshd --since "2026-11-10" | grep "Accepted publickey"

On the user side, ssh-keygen -lf ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub prints a key's fingerprint, which is what sshd logs on an accepted login. Remove the old public key everywhere before you add the new one.

What this means for research and HPC security

RIKEN's notice shows the two weak points that matter beyond Japan. First, the entry point was a public status dashboard, a low-glamour web page sitting next to an internal operations network. Second, the damage multiplies because users parked credentials for other systems on a shared machine. Neither is unusual in research computing, where convenience and collaboration win by default. A shared HPC system should be treated as a place where any private key you store is a key you have lent to everyone who breaks in. For a structured way to rehearse the response, see PlayCISO's incident response hub.

FAQ

Was Fugaku hacked?

RIKEN confirms unauthorized access to a system that supports Fugaku. Its 16 November 2026 notice says an intruder got in between 10 and 13 November through a publicly accessible dashboard page that shows Fugaku's operational status, tampered with several internal servers and installed malicious programs. RIKEN confirmed the access at 16:33 JST on 13 November and stopped Fugaku at 04:30 JST on 14 November. How the dashboard was abused is still under investigation.

What data was stolen from Fugaku?

RIKEN says the data "was or may have been" taken; it has not confirmed what left its network. From the user authentication system: names, email addresses and user IDs of Fugaku users. From users' home directories: credentials users stored there for other systems and services, such as SSH private keys and access keys, plus users' files (research data). RIKEN says it has found no evidence so far that research data was exfiltrated, and is still checking whether third parties' personal data was included.

How many Fugaku users are affected?

Up to 4,222 registered Fugaku users and up to 375 RIKYU users, a total of up to 4,597 (about 4,600), according to RIKEN's Japanese notice. One section of the English notice says 4,224 for Fugaku; 4,222 is the figure that matches RIKEN's total and is the one The Register reports.

Did the attackers use the stolen credentials?

Yes, they tried. RIKEN says the intruder attempted to connect to other systems using some of the credentials it obtained. Whether any attempt succeeded, and any resulting damage, is under investigation; The Register reports RIKEN is working with the operators of those systems to find out.

Is RIKYU affected?

RIKYU (理究), RIKEN's AI for Science supercomputer, appears in the notice because up to 375 of its users had names and email addresses in the affected authentication system. RIKEN's notice does not say that RIKYU itself or RIKYU home directories were accessed.

Is Fugaku offline?

Yes. RIKEN suspended Fugaku operations and blocked the external access route at 04:30 JST on 14 November 2026, stopped all running and queued jobs at 16:18 JST on 15 November and invalidated every user's login public key. It says Fugaku will restart only after the cause is found, the exploited software is fixed, compromised servers are rebuilt and further security measures are in place. No restart date has been given.

Is Fugaku still the fastest supercomputer?

No. Fugaku topped the TOP500 list from June 2020 to November 2021. On the November 2026 TOP500 list (68th edition) it is ranked 9th with an HPL result (Rmax) of 442.01 petaflops. LineShine in Shenzhen is number 1. The 415.5 petaflops figure in some social posts is Fugaku's older June 2020 result.

Was data from companies such as Toyota or Honda exposed?

Nothing published says so. RIKEN's notice names no organisations; it says user files (research data) in home directories may have been taken but that there is no evidence so far of research-data exfiltration. Fugaku is open to industry users, and Sumitomo Rubber announced in 2021 that it uses Fugaku for materials simulation. We found no primary source for the social-media claim that Toyota, Honda or Nippon Steel use Fugaku, so we do not repeat it. Companies with Fugaku projects should ask RIKEN directly.

What should Fugaku users do now?

RIKEN asks users to remove or revoke, on every external service, the public key matching any SSH private key they kept on Fugaku and to create a new key pair; to revoke and replace any other credential they stored there through the service that issued it; and to be wary of emails claiming to be from Fugaku or RIKEN. RIKEN says it will never ask for passwords or personal information by email.

Sources

This article is educational guidance for security leaders, not legal advice. Check RIKEN's notice for updates before acting.

Plan the key rotation before you need it
Map which SSH keys and API tokens live where, who can rotate them, and in what order, so a shared-system breach is a checklist, not a scramble.
Open the Key Rotation Planner
Take this with you
What happened · The numbers, checked · Timeline · Am I affected? · What security leaders should do this week · What this means for research and HPC sec…

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