ROMULUS ClickFix Drops CNCMachineRMS RAT: What to Hunt
TL;DR · the short version
On 18 November 2026 Blackpoint Cyber's Adversary Pursuit Group (APG) said it assesses "with high confidence" that the remote access trojan delivered through the ROMULUS ClickFix delivery platform's Stardock chain is CNCMachineRMS, a RAT LevelBlue SpiderLabs first documented in August 2026 at the end of a BabaDeda loader chain. The chain: a ClickFix lure gets the victim to paste a PowerShell command, which downloads IconEdit2Turb.msi and installs it silently; the MSI drops the signed Stardock DeElevate64.exe beside a modified DeElevator64.dll that loads a malicious I++u.dll (DLL sideloading). Blackpoint says ROMULUS likely works as a delivery service for both CNCMachineRMS and LegionLoader, that shared tooling does not prove a shared operator, and that no post-exploitation activity was observed. Hunt for silent msiexec installs started by PowerShell, signed apps loading DLLs from user-writable folders, and a Run key and scheduled task both named "Stardock DeElevation Tool".
On 18 November 2026, Blackpoint Cyber's Adversary Pursuit Group (APG) said the remote access trojan (RAT) served by the ROMULUS ClickFix delivery platform is CNCMachineRMS, a RAT LevelBlue SpiderLabs first described in August. Blackpoint assesses the match "with high confidence". It also says ROMULUS likely acts as a delivery service, handing out CNCMachineRMS and the LegionLoader malware through separate chains, and that no post-exploitation activity was observed. The Hacker News covered the finding on 20 November.
Who this is for: SOC and detection teams, endpoint owners, and security leaders deciding whether ClickFix deserves a dedicated control.
Independent summary of research by Blackpoint Cyber, Forescout Vedere Labs, LevelBlue SpiderLabs and Siemens. PlayCISO is not affiliated with any of them. Facts as published on 21 November 2026.
Confirmed vs not yet known
Blackpoint states: the RAT in the ROMULUS Stardock chain is CNCMachineRMS (high confidence, from a matching payload SHA-256, family strings and storage structures); ROMULUS likely distributes CNCMachineRMS and LegionLoader through separate chains; "no post-exploitation activity has been observed".
Forescout states (15 Oct): ROMULUS is a reusable delivery panel found on six IP addresses; its operators are unknown.
Not known: who runs ROMULUS, who operates CNCMachineRMS (Blackpoint says shared tooling "does not establish a shared or connected operator"), how many machines were infected, and which sectors or countries were hit. None of the three reports names victims.
How the Stardock chain works, per Blackpoint
- ClickFix lure. The victim is persuaded to paste and run a command. That starts an obfuscated PowerShell stager, which reaches its server by a decimal IP address.
- Silent MSI. The stager downloads
IconEdit2Turb.msi, removes the Mark of the Web and installs it silently withmsiexec.exe. - Hidden install. The MSI poses as "Stardock Smart DeElevation Tool", installs under
%LOCALAPPDATA%and setsARPSYSTEMCOMPONENT=1so it does not appear in the installed-programs list. - DLL sideloading. A custom action starts the legitimate, signed
DeElevate64.exe. Its companionDeElevator64.dllhas been modified to load a maliciousI++u.dll, which decrypts a payload fromBuild.datand runs shellcode. - RAT. The shellcode loads a storage file (
execute_engine_disconnect.raw) holding a controller script and the CNCMachineRMS implant, which finds its server over DNS-over-HTTPS. - Persistence. A Run key and a scheduled task, both named "Stardock DeElevation Tool", recreated every 150 and 875 seconds, plus a shutdown monitor that puts the Run key back.
LevelBlue's August report shows the same RAT arriving another way: a ClickFix lure, a signed IBM SPSS WinWrapIDE.exe loading decoy DLLs, then the BabaDeda loader. Forescout's ROMULUS report describes a second ROMULUS route that ends in LegionLoader, which Forescout says can read Chrome browser data. Siemens advisory SSA-580366 covers CVE-2026-110936, a DLL sideloading flaw in Siemens Software Center fixed in V4.0.9.8; Help Net Security reports Siemens tied its active exploitation to the same ROMULUS campaign.
Timeline
| Date (2026) | What | Source |
|---|---|---|
| 10 Aug | LevelBlue documents CNCMachineRMS at the end of a BabaDeda loader chain | LevelBlue SpiderLabs |
| 28 Sep | Huntress reports ChatGPT Custom GPTs pointing users to ClickFix pages, and documents the RAT's capabilities | Huntress, as cited by Blackpoint and Forescout |
| 15 Oct | Forescout names the ROMULUS panel, finds it on six IPs, analyses the LegionLoader route | Forescout Vedere Labs |
| 15 Oct | Siemens publishes SSA-580366 (CVE-2026-110936, fixed in V4.0.9.8); updated 19 Oct | Siemens ProductCERT |
| 18 Nov | Blackpoint identifies the Stardock-chain RAT as CNCMachineRMS | Blackpoint Cyber |
| 20 Nov | The Hacker News reports the Blackpoint finding | The Hacker News |
What to hunt for
| Signal | Why | Source |
|---|---|---|
PowerShell (hidden, -ep bypass, a URL in the command line) spawning msiexec /i ... /qn from %TEMP% | The stager-to-silent-MSI step | Forescout, Blackpoint |
| URLs with decimal IP addresses (one number instead of dotted quads) | ROMULUS stagers use them | Forescout, Blackpoint |
DeElevate64.exe under %LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs\Stardock Smart DeElevation Tool\ loading DLLs whose hashes are not Stardock's | The sideloading step | Forescout, Blackpoint |
| Run value and scheduled task both named "Stardock DeElevation Tool" | CNCMachineRMS persistence in this chain | Blackpoint |
| DNS-over-HTTPS from non-browser processes | The RAT resolves its gate this way, so internal DNS logs may show nothing | Blackpoint, LevelBlue |
WinWrapIDE.exe in an unusual folder, %LOCALAPPDATA%\SProject\sp.bin, %TEMP%\CNCMachineRMS\tasks\, an empty C:\Intel | The BabaDeda route to the same RAT | LevelBlue |
Event IDs 4720 and 4732; tasks created with /SC ONLOGON /RU SYSTEM /RL HIGHEST | Local account backdoor and persistence | LevelBlue |
Blackpoint lists the ROMULUS command servers, including the domains cloubflare[.]top and cloubflare[.]net, and the file hashes in its IOC table; LevelBlue and Forescout publish theirs too. Take indicators from those tables rather than from secondary copies.
Useful next, if this was relevant to you
What security leaders should do this week
- Ask the SOC to run the hunts above across the last 60 days, starting with PowerShell-to-silent-MSI and the "Stardock DeElevation Tool" task name.
- Check whether endpoint policy blocks or alerts on a signed application loading unsigned or unexpected DLLs from user-writable folders.
- Update Siemens Software Center to V4.0.9.8 or later wherever engineering teams use it (Siemens SSA-580366).
- Add ClickFix to awareness material in one sentence: no real website, CAPTCHA or "fix" page asks you to paste a command into Run, PowerShell or a terminal.
- Decide who owns DNS-over-HTTPS policy. If browsers are the only allowed DoH clients, other processes using it become a clean signal.
- If CNCMachineRMS is found, follow LevelBlue: assume hands-on-keyboard access, look for new local admin accounts and treat follow-on payloads as the incident.
FAQ
What is ROMULUS?
ROMULUS is the name Forescout Vedere Labs gave on 15 October 2026 to a web panel it found on attacker servers. Forescout describes it as "a reusable delivery backend rather than a single hard-coded malware server": it serves PowerShell staging scripts and trojanised MSI installers to victims of ClickFix lures. Forescout found it on six IP addresses and could not tell whether it is a private tool, a commercial service, an affiliate framework or shared software. Forescout says it has no evidence linking it to the RomulusLoader reported by Proofpoint.
What is CNCMachineRMS?
CNCMachineRMS is a remote access trojan first documented by LevelBlue SpiderLabs on 10 August 2026, which called it a "previously undocumented 1.14 MB x64 remote access trojan" delivered at the end of a BabaDeda loader chain. LevelBlue lists an interactive shell, file manager, screen capture, a local account backdoor, seven persistence mechanisms and a task engine with its own scripting language. Blackpoint, citing Huntress, adds remote desktop control, screen streaming, microphone and camera capture and system reconnaissance.
How sure is the link between ROMULUS and CNCMachineRMS?
Blackpoint says it assesses the link "with high confidence", based on a matching payload SHA-256, family-specific strings (CNCMachineRMS\tasks and task_payload.bin built at runtime) and matching storage structures, including 1,128 storage records and a 3,904-byte controller script in both the ROMULUS sample and LevelBlue's sample. Blackpoint also says the shared tooling "does not establish a shared or connected operator".
Was anyone actually breached with CNCMachineRMS through ROMULUS?
Not as far as the published research says. Blackpoint states that "no post-exploitation activity has been observed" in its analysis, and neither Blackpoint, Forescout nor LevelBlue names victims, sectors or countries. LevelBlue's advice if you find the RAT is to assume hands-on-keyboard access and treat any follow-on payload as the incident.
What should I hunt for?
From Blackpoint and Forescout: PowerShell launching msiexec with /qn from %TEMP%; PowerShell using decimal IP addresses in URLs; DeElevate64.exe running from the Stardock Smart DeElevation Tool folder under %LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs and loading DLLs that do not match legitimate Stardock hashes; a Run key value and a scheduled task both named "Stardock DeElevation Tool"; and DNS-over-HTTPS traffic from processes that are not browsers. From LevelBlue (the BabaDeda chain): WinWrapIDE.exe running from an unusual folder, %LOCALAPPDATA%\SProject\sp.bin, %TEMP%\CNCMachineRMS\tasks\, an empty C:\Intel folder, and Windows events 4720 and 4732.
How does this relate to the Siemens Software Center vulnerability?
Siemens advisory SSA-580366 (published 15 October 2026) covers CVE-2026-110936, a DLL sideloading flaw in Siemens Software Center, fixed in V4.0.9.8 (all earlier versions affected). Help Net Security reports that Siemens tied active exploitation to the ROMULUS ClickFix campaign, using a genuine signed Siemens executable with attacker files placed beside it. That is a separate route on the same platform; Blackpoint's CNCMachineRMS finding is about the Stardock route.
How do I stop ClickFix lures?
Blackpoint recommends user education about ClickFix lures, application allowlisting, least privilege and tamper-protected endpoint security. In practice that means telling staff that no genuine website or CAPTCHA asks them to paste a command into Run, PowerShell or a terminal, and alerting on PowerShell started from explorer.exe with a URL in the command line.
Practise it
- C2 Detection Lab: find timed beacons and DNS-over-HTTPS in telemetry.
- Detection Lab: turn the hunts above into detections.
- Hunt plan review: check a hunt plan before the SOC spends a week on it.
- IR Playbook Lab: rehearse the response once a RAT is found.
Sources
- Blackpoint Cyber APG: ROMULUS campaign, CNCMachineRMS RAT analysis (18 Nov 2026)
- Forescout Vedere Labs: ROMULUS, a new multi-payload ClickFix delivery platform (15 Oct 2026)
- LevelBlue SpiderLabs: CNCMachineRMS, the undocumented RAT at the end of a BabaDeda chain (10 Aug 2026)
- Siemens SSA-580366: DLL sideloading vulnerability in Siemens Software Center (15 Oct 2026, updated 19 Oct)
- Help Net Security: Siemens Software Center flaw exploited in ClickFix campaign (20 Oct 2026)
- The Hacker News: ROMULUS ClickFix attacks deliver RAT (20 Nov 2026)