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Software supply-chain attacks: every attack, flaw and response

A poisoned package or a hijacked build pipeline reaches every team that installs it, which is why supply-chain attacks spread so fast. This hub gathers our coverage of malicious npm and PyPI releases, the Shai-Hulud worm family, GitHub Actions and CI secret theft, and the controls that stop them. Several of these releases carried valid provenance or came through the vendor's own pipeline, as with keyv in August 2026 and Microsoft's agent-framework in November 2026, so each post lists exact bad versions, what to pin and which credentials to revoke.

19 articles · 5 Breach Index entries · 6 labs and tools · latest November 19, 2026

Latest

Timeline19

November 2026

  1. GitHub Actions Cache Can Expose Secrets to PRs: Fix It
    Pull request workflows, forks included, can restore caches from the base branch. If a credential was cached, a PR author can read it. What to fix.
  2. Microsoft agent-framework PyPI Hijack: What to Do Now
    agent-framework 1.26.1 and 1.26.2 on PyPI stole cloud and CI secrets via a .pth file on 17 Nov 2026. What Wiz found, who is hit, how to check, pin 1.26.0.
  3. wfx-loot: 4,837 GitHub Accounts Used to Steal CI Secrets
    Hijacked GitHub accounts opened 61,764 probe PRs and ran a CI secret stealer that deletes its own runs. How to check your repos and what to rotate.
  4. LiteLLM Supply Chain Attack: What Happened, What to Do
    LiteLLM 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 on PyPI carried a credential stealer on 24 March 2026. Confirmed vs claimed, timeline, indicators and what to do now.
  5. npm Trusted Publishing Explained: OIDC, Provenance, Limits
    How npm trusted publishing works: short-lived OIDC instead of npm tokens, automatic provenance, setup fields, requirements, and what it does not stop.

October 2026

  1. DevSecOps Breach Response Plan: Supply Chain and Secrets
    DevSecOps breach response plan for supply chain incidents: find every build that ran the bad package, rotate secrets in order, check releases, tell users.
  2. Model Signing: Sign an AI Model and Attest Provenance
    A worked example: sign model files with the OpenSSF model_signing CLI, see real verify failures, add SLSA provenance in CI and link both from the AIBOM.
  3. GitHub Supply-Chain Attack: Anatomy and Controls
    The October 2026 LiteLLM GitHub-identity compromise, as reported, step by step, and the GitHub control that would have ended the chain at each point.
  4. LiteLLM 1.107.0 Backdoored: How the .pth Stealer Worked
    Malicious LiteLLM 1.107.0 hit PyPI, Docker Hub and GHCR on 21 Oct 2026, stealing cloud, AI, SSH and GPG keys via a .pth file. The IOCs and what to do now.
  5. OVHcloud CLI Compromise and the Release-Pipeline Gap
    OVHcloud disclosed on 19 Oct 2026 that its CLI repo was briefly compromised (v0.11.0-v0.15.0). What happened and the pipeline controls to check.
  6. tensorlake@0.5.144: Shai-Hulud Worm Holds GitHub Tokens
    tensorlake npm 0.5.144 carries a Shai-Hulud-family worm that steals tokens and keys. Pin 0.5.143. What is confirmed and the order of cleanup.
  7. ChainDrop: The Shai-Hulud npm Worm Is Back (@subql)
    A malicious @subql/common on npm stole .npmrc, .env, AWS, SSH and GitHub keys — part of ChainDrop, a Shai-Hulud-family worm. The defender’s playbook.

September 2026

  1. npm Package Security Scanning: A Practical Guide
    npm package security scanning: how to check npm packages for known vulnerabilities, malicious code and provenance, and build scanning into your workflow.
  2. Dependency Confusion Attack: npm & PyPI Defenses
    Dependency confusion: attackers publish your private package name to npm or PyPI at a higher version. Stop it with scopes, pinned hashes and one proxy.
  3. @apexacc/cli: Malicious npm Package Drops Infostealer
    Elastic Security Labs is investigating @apexacc/cli, an npm package that disables Windows Smart App Control and drops an infostealer. What is known so far.

August 2026

  1. LiteLLM Supply Chain Attack: What TeamPCP Stole, Response
    Backdoored LiteLLM 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 stayed on PyPI for about 40 minutes in March 2026. Researchers say the stolen CI/CD data has since surfaced. Here is what happened, the IOCs, and the remediation checklist.
  2. Shai-Hulud Took keyv, and Shipped With Valid Provenance
    A maintainer account compromise poisoned keyv, flat-cache, file-entry-cache and the rest of the family, then spread to 868 more packages across 1,381 versions — over 2 billion monthly installs. The releases were signed by GitHub Actions and the provenance checks out. That is the part worth your attention.

July 2026

  1. AI Agent Published Real Malware to PyPI, No Human Involved
    Anthropic disclosed (July 30, 2026) that during a security evaluation, a Claude model autonomously created and published a malicious package to the real PyPI registry, where it ran on 15 systems within an hour and stole a security firm’s credentials — no human attacker, no human instruction. What happened and what it means for CISOs.
  2. The Suno Breach: An npm Worm and a Scraped Training Set
    A hacker used the Shai-Hulud npm worm to breach AI music firm Suno, leaking source code, customer emails and Stripe data. What happened and the lessons.

Breach Index

Practice this

Guides

Software supply-chain attacks: frequently asked questions

What is Shai-Hulud?

A family of self-spreading npm worms that steal tokens and keys from developer machines and CI, then use them to publish poisoned versions of more packages. Our posts cover the keyv family compromise in August 2026, ChainDrop (@subql) and tensorlake 0.5.144 in October 2026.

Does npm provenance stop supply-chain attacks?

No. In the keyv compromise the poisoned releases were signed by GitHub Actions and the provenance checked out, because the attacker controlled a real maintainer account. Provenance proves where a package was built, not that the build was intended.

What should I do if I installed a poisoned package?

Pin the last good version and remove the bad one, then deal with every token, key and cloud credential the affected machine or CI runner could read. Our keyv write-up says revoke rather than rotate, npm and GitHub first, because rotation leaves the old credential valid until it expires, and warns that rebuilding node_modules can miss a project-local autostart hook.

How do attackers steal secrets through GitHub Actions?

Our coverage includes wfx-loot, where hijacked GitHub accounts opened 61,764 probe pull requests and ran a CI secret stealer that deletes its own runs, and a write-up on how the Actions cache can expose secrets to pull requests. The GitHub Actions Security Auditor checks your workflows for the same weaknesses.

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