100 ready-to-run cyber tabletop exercises across 15 incident domains. Search them, pick one at random, or tell us who will be in the room and we'll rank the scenarios that fit those people best. Every exercise shows who to involve, how long it runs and an outline — and the scenario prompt is free to copy and read out.
Running one for real? Pro adds the facilitator's run sheet for each exercise: a minute-by-minute timeline, timed injects, step-by-step facilitation guide and the questions to put to each person. Or build your own with the Tabletop Runbook Generator.
Who's in the room?
Pick the people you have — we'll suggest exercises that fit them.
Your team has spent six hours on an active intrusion in production: an attacker with a stolen engineer session is moving between services, and you are close to cutting them off. At 16:05 your cloud provider posts a major incident for your primary region. Half your services are unreachable, including the logging pipeline and the identity console you were using to contain the attacker. Customers are calling. Your disaster-recovery runbook says to fail over to the secondary region, which is built from the same templates and secrets the attacker may have already read. Do you fail over?
It is 02:40 on a Saturday at a 450-bed regional hospital. The night supervisor calls: the electronic health record is frozen, workstations on three wards show a ransom note, and the pharmacy dispensing system has dropped offline. The emergency department has 31 patients, two ambulances are ten minutes out, and the trauma surgeon on call wants to know whether to divert. Downtime procedures exist on paper, but nobody has run them for longer than four hours. The ransom note says patient data has already been copied. Who decides on diversion, and what do you tell the ambulance service right now?
At 09:31 on the morning of a major interest-rate announcement, your online brokerage's order-entry service starts returning errors. Customers can log in and see positions but cannot place or cancel orders. Traffic is four times a normal day. A configuration change to the order-routing gateway went out at 08:50, and the network team is also seeing a surge from a few thousand IP addresses that could be a DDoS or could be your own customers' apps retrying. Customers with open positions are posting angrily on social media. Roll back, scale out or block traffic? You have one move to make first.
It is 20:05 on Black Friday. Your online retailer's checkout has been failing for 18 minutes; about one payment attempt in three times out. The promotional email to 2.4 million customers went out at 20:00. Revenue for this hour last year was $1.9 million. Engineering thinks the payment provider is rate-limiting you; the payment provider says its systems are healthy. Social media has noticed, and a competitor has just extended its own sale by an hour. The CEO has joined the bridge and wants to know whether to pause the promotion. What do you decide in the next ten minutes?
At 14:10 on a Friday your online store is taken offline by an attack that has encrypted the order database. The CEO is on a 14-hour flight with no reliable connectivity and lands tomorrow morning. The COO is on leave. Someone has to decide whether to shut down the payment gateway, whether to tell customers, and whether to engage an incident response firm that wants 250,000 dollars up front. The incident plan says 'the CEO approves'. It says nothing else.
At 02:15 a help-desk agent reset MFA for a cloud administrator after a convincing phone call. By 03:00 the attacker had registered a new device, created an access key in your production cloud account and disabled two logging trails. By 05:30, 3 TB had left a storage bucket holding customer documents. Your SOC sees an impossible-travel alert at 07:50. The identity, cloud and data teams each hold part of the picture, and each believes someone else is containing it.
At 10:20 your SOC escalates a confirmed business email compromise: an attacker in the CFO's mailbox has redirected a 1.3 million dollar supplier payment due to leave at 15:00. At 10:35 a second escalation: crypto-mining containers are running in production Kubernetes after a leaked deploy token, and the same token can push images. You have four incident responders, one of them on leave, and a retainer firm that can send two people tomorrow. Who works on what first?