100 ready-to-run cyber tabletop exercises across 15 incident domains. Search them, pick one at random, or tell us who will be in the room and we'll rank the scenarios that fit those people best. Every exercise shows who to involve, how long it runs and an outline — and the scenario prompt is free to copy and read out.
Running one for real? Pro adds the facilitator's run sheet for each exercise: a minute-by-minute timeline, timed injects, step-by-step facilitation guide and the questions to put to each person. Or build your own with the Tabletop Runbook Generator.
Who's in the room?
Pick the people you have — we'll suggest exercises that fit them.
At 14:10 your SOC sees a new federated domain added to your cloud identity tenant, then a conditional access policy disabled. Both changes came from a Global Admin account belonging to a cloud engineer who is on holiday. Within twenty minutes, two new app registrations with mail-read permissions appear and three other admins report their MFA methods were changed. The attacker can now create users, issue tokens and read any mailbox. You are not sure which admin accounts are still yours. How do you take the tenant back without locking yourselves out?
The head of sales operations clicked a link to a shared proposal on Monday and signed in as usual, MFA and all. This morning your identity logs show her session in use from a hosting provider while she is also active from the office, with no new sign-in and no MFA prompt. Overnight the session read 900 emails, downloaded the pricing folder, exported contacts from the CRM through single sign-on and consented to a new mail app. The help desk reset her password an hour ago. The activity has not stopped. Why not, and what do you revoke?
A public advisory says a popular open-source logging package was hijacked: version 4.8.2, published three days ago, runs a post-install script that reads environment variables and sends them to a remote server. Your dependency manifests allow minor updates. A quick search shows 14 of your repositories pulled 4.8.2, and your CI runners, which hold cloud deploy credentials, package registry tokens and a signing key in their environment, built every one of them, many times. Two developers also installed it on their laptops. What do you assume was taken?
Your EDR raises a medium-severity alert on a senior developer's laptop: an unsigned executable launched from the downloads folder, then deleted itself. The developer says they installed a "free licence key generator" for a design tool on Saturday. It is now Monday. Since Saturday, their code-hosting session, their cloud console session and their password manager browser extension have all been used from an IP address in another country, with no multi-factor prompts, because the attacker replayed session cookies. The developer has admin rights on 60 repositories. Where do you start?
Your help-desk software provider emails all customers at 18:00: an attacker accessed its production environment and "may have obtained" OAuth tokens that customers granted for integrations. Your instance has integrations with your CRM, your file-sharing platform and your code host, all granted with broad scopes two years ago by someone who has since left. The provider's notice gives no indicators, no timeline and a link to a status page. Your support team has 4,000 open tickets, many with customer attachments. The provider's account manager is not answering.