AIBOM Maturity Self-Assessment
Answer 26 questions about how your organisation records, checks and proves what is inside its AI systems. Get a score per domain and overall, the five improvements worth doing first, and a one-page board summary you can hand over as a PDF.
Who this is for: CISOs and security leaders who must tell a board or audit committee where the organisation stands on AI supply-chain risk, and GRC teams who need a baseline to track. Answer with the people who run the model pipeline in the room. The questions and levels are below; Pro scores them and writes the summary.
What this tool is
- 26 questions in six domains: inventory and coverage, identity and lineage, data documentation, security and runtime, evaluation and risk, attestation and change.
- Each question is answered 0 to 4, and every level says what is actually in place, so an answer can be checked rather than argued.
- You get a score per domain and overall, a radar chart, and the top five improvements ranked by impact, gap and effort.
- It writes a one-page board summary in plain language: where you are, the risk in one sentence per domain, and three asks.
- Downloads: the board one-pager as PDF, every answer as CSV with its next step, the score card as JPG, and the full assessment as markdown.
- A self-assessment, run in your browser. It is not an audit and it does not certify anything.
The six domains and the 26 questions
Each level describes what is in place, not an attitude. Levels run 0 not in place, 1 informal, 2 partial, 3 systematic, 4 enforced. Answer for the whole scope: if one model is signed and the rest are not, signing is not at level 3. An AIBOM is the evidence most questions ask about; how to produce one is in how to build an AIBOM.
1. Inventory and coverage · 5 questions
Do you know every AI model and AI service you run, and does each one have an AIBOM?
Is there a register of every AI model and AI service in use?
- 0: No list. AI use is discovered by accident: an invoice, an incident, a staff question.
- 1: A one-off spreadsheet from a survey, not updated since.
- 2: A maintained register of in-house models. AI features in bought products and staff-adopted AI tools are missing or partial.
- 3: One register covering in-house models, third-party models and APIs, and AI features in bought software, each with a named owner.
- 4: The register is fed automatically from the model registry, cloud accounts and procurement, and gaps are reviewed every month.
What share of production AI systems have an AIBOM?
- 0: None.
- 1: One or two, written by hand for a specific request such as a customer or an audit.
- 2: Some in-house models have one. Third-party and vendor models have none.
- 3: Every in-house production model has a machine-readable AIBOM (CycloneDX or SPDX). Each vendor model has a supplier AIBOM or a recorded gap.
- 4: Every production AI system, built or bought, has a current AIBOM, and a release without one is blocked.
How are AIBOMs produced?
- 0: They are not produced.
- 1: Written by hand in a document or spreadsheet.
- 2: Generated by a script someone runs on request. The output varies with who runs it.
- 3: Generated in CI for every model release and stored with the model artefact.
- 4: Generated in CI, validated against the CycloneDX or SPDX schema, and the build fails when a required field is missing.
How fast can you answer “which of our systems use model or library X?”
- 0: We could not answer with confidence.
- 1: Days, by asking each team.
- 2: Within a week, by searching spreadsheets and code repositories.
- 3: Within a working day, from a searchable inventory.
- 4: Within an hour, by querying the stored AIBOMs.
Do you know which bought products contain AI, and which models they use?
- 0: No.
- 1: A few, from vendor marketing.
- 2: Procurement asks whether a product uses AI, but not which model or provider.
- 3: Contracts or questionnaires record the model provider, model family and where data is processed for each AI-enabled product.
- 4: Suppliers must provide an AIBOM or equivalent and notify model changes, and this is checked at every renewal.
NIST AI RMF 1.0 subcategories this domain gives evidence for: GOVERN 1.6, GOVERN 6.1, MAP 4.1.
2. Identity and lineage · 4 questions
Can you say exactly which model is deployed and what it was built from?
Does every deployed model have an exact, unchangeable identity?
- 0: Models are known by nickname (“the triage bot”).
- 1: A name and a loose version (“v2”) in documents.
- 2: Name and version in a model registry. The weights file is not hashed.
- 3: Name, version and a SHA-256 hash of the weights are recorded in the AIBOM and the registry.
- 4: The running service reports the hash it loaded, and deploy checks it against the AIBOM.
Is the base model recorded exactly?
- 0: Not recorded.
- 1: Family only (“built on Mistral”).
- 2: Repository id recorded (for example mistralai/Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3), but not the exact revision.
- 3: Repository id, exact revision, licence and source recorded in the AIBOM (CycloneDX pedigree.ancestors or equivalent).
- 4: As level 3, plus the base model’s own card or AIBOM is linked and the base is re-checked when its publisher changes it.
Is the adaptation recorded: fine-tune method, merges, quantisation?
- 0: Not recorded.
- 1: Known to the team that did it, not written down.
- 2: Described in prose, in a wiki page or model card.
- 3: Method, key parameters (such as LoRA rank), training run id and resulting artefact recorded for each release.
- 4: Recorded by the training pipeline and linked from the AIBOM. Merged and quantised variants each get their own identity.
Can you trace a model version back to the code, data and config that produced it?
- 0: No.
- 1: Partly, from people’s memory and chat history.
- 2: Training code is in version control, but the commit used for a given release is not recorded.
- 3: Each release records the training code commit, dataset versions and configuration used.
- 4: The pipeline records the link itself, so it cannot be edited by hand after the fact.
NIST AI RMF 1.0 subcategories this domain gives evidence for: MAP 4.1, MANAGE 3.2.
3. Data documentation · 4 questions
Are training and evaluation datasets recorded with licence, sensitive content and a card?
Are training, fine-tuning and evaluation datasets listed for each model?
- 0: No.
- 1: Dataset names appear in prose only.
- 2: In-house datasets named with a version. The base model’s training data is not mentioned.
- 3: Each dataset is an AIBOM component with version, size, date range and hash. The base model’s data is recorded as disclosed by its supplier, with a link.
- 4: Dataset entries come from the data platform and update when a dataset version changes.
Is the licence or legal basis for each dataset recorded?
- 0: Not checked.
- 1: Assumed: internal data is “ours”, public data is “free”.
- 2: Checked for some datasets, once, at the time of use.
- 3: Licence or legal basis recorded per dataset and reviewed by legal or privacy before training.
- 4: As level 3, and use restrictions (no commercial use, retention end date) are machine-readable and checked before any reuse.
Is personal or sensitive data in each dataset recorded, with how it was handled?
- 0: Unknown.
- 1: “No personal data” is asserted but not checked.
- 2: Known for some datasets. Handling such as de-identification is described informally.
- 3: Each dataset records its sensitive data categories and the treatment applied (for example the de-identification method), signed off by privacy.
- 4: As level 3, plus an automated scan for identifiers runs before training and the result is attached to the dataset record.
Do datasets have dataset cards (Datasheets, Data Cards, Croissant or similar)?
- 0: None.
- 1: A readme with a short description.
- 2: A card for the main training set. Collection method and known gaps or bias are not covered.
- 3: A card for every training and evaluation set covering source, collection, composition, known gaps and intended use.
- 4: Cards are machine-readable (for example Croissant with the RAI vocabulary) and linked from the AIBOM.
NIST AI RMF 1.0 subcategories this domain gives evidence for: MAP 4.1, MEASURE 2.10.
4. Security and runtime · 4 questions
Are model files, the inference stack and the tools a model can reach covered by security controls?
Are model files checked for unsafe formats and tampering before they are loaded?
- 0: Models are downloaded and loaded as they are.
- 1: Informal guidance to prefer safetensors.
- 2: A policy bans pickle-based formats for third-party models, but nothing enforces it.
- 3: The pipeline scans model files for unsafe formats and embedded code, and verifies hashes before deploy.
- 4: Production loads only models whose hash and signature verify. Anything else is refused.
Is the software that runs the model covered by vulnerability management?
- 0: No.
- 1: Only the application’s SBOM. The inference stack (for example vLLM, PyTorch) is not in it.
- 2: The inference stack is in the SBOM, but ML libraries are not monitored for advisories.
- 3: Inference server, ML libraries and their versions are in the AIBOM and checked against vulnerability feeds.
- 4: As level 3, with alerts routed to owners and patch deadlines tracked like any other production system.
Are the tools, agents, MCP servers and retrieval (RAG) sources each model can reach recorded?
- 0: Not recorded.
- 1: Known to the team that built it.
- 2: Listed in design documents. Permissions are not recorded.
- 3: Each tool, MCP server and retrieval source is a service in the AIBOM with endpoint, data classification and permissions (such as tickets:read, tickets:write).
- 4: As level 3, and the deployed configuration is compared with the AIBOM so a new tool or permission is flagged.
Can incident responders tell which model version was running at a given time?
- 0: No.
- 1: By asking the team, from memory.
- 2: From deploy logs, with effort. The logs are not linked to the AIBOM.
- 3: Deploy records link each time window to a model version and its AIBOM, kept for the log retention period.
- 4: Runtime logs carry the model version or hash per request, so responders can scope affected requests directly.
NIST AI RMF 1.0 subcategories this domain gives evidence for: MEASURE 2.7, MANAGE 4.1.
5. Evaluation and risk · 4 questions
Is each model’s intended use, test results, safety testing and limitations recorded?
Is each model’s intended use, out-of-scope use and human oversight recorded?
- 0: No.
- 1: Implied in project documents.
- 2: Stated in prose for some models.
- 3: Every production model records intended use, out-of-scope uses and the human oversight step in its model card and AIBOM.
- 4: As level 3, and out-of-scope uses are tested (for example refusal tests) before each release.
Are evaluation results recorded with the test set and the metric?
- 0: No evaluation records.
- 1: “Performs well” statements, no numbers.
- 2: Numbers in slides or notebooks, without the test set version.
- 3: Each release records metric, value and a named, versioned test set.
- 4: Evaluations run in CI on every release, results are stored in the AIBOM, and a release below its thresholds is blocked.
Is safety and security testing (red-teaming, prompt injection, harmful output) recorded?
- 0: None.
- 1: Manual testing that nobody wrote down.
- 2: A one-off red-team exercise before the first launch.
- 3: Red-team and prompt-injection tests for each release, with findings and mitigations recorded.
- 4: As level 3, with a maintained attack test set that runs automatically and results compared across versions.
Are known limitations and risks recorded with mitigations and owners?
- 0: No.
- 1: Known to the team only.
- 2: Listed in the model card. Mitigations or owners are missing for some.
- 3: Each limitation has a mitigation and an owner, in the model card and AIBOM (CycloneDX modelCard.considerations or equivalent).
- 4: As level 3, reviewed at every release and linked to the risk register.
NIST AI RMF 1.0 subcategories this domain gives evidence for: MAP 1.1, MAP 2.2, MEASURE 2.1.
6. Attestation and change · 5 questions
Are models signed, is provenance verifiable, and do changes update the AIBOM?
Are model artefacts signed?
- 0: No.
- 1: Stored in an access-controlled bucket. No signature.
- 2: Signed by hand for some releases, with keys held by individuals.
- 3: Signed in CI for every release (for example Sigstore with OpenSSF model signing), with the signature linked from the AIBOM.
- 4: As level 3, and deploy verifies the signature and refuses unsigned or mismatched models.
Is build provenance produced and verifiable?
- 0: No.
- 1: Build logs exist and are kept for a short time.
- 2: The pipeline writes provenance, but it is not signed or not kept.
- 3: Signed build provenance (for example SLSA provenance as an in-toto attestation) for every release, linked from the AIBOM.
- 4: As level 3, verified at deploy, and provenance for third-party models is requested and checked.
Do model changes go through change control that updates the AIBOM?
- 0: Models are replaced without a record.
- 1: Changes are announced in chat.
- 2: Changes go through change tickets. The AIBOM is updated later, if at all.
- 3: A new model version, dataset, tool or prompt template is a change that needs an updated AIBOM before release.
- 4: As level 3, and the AIBOM difference between versions is reviewed and approved as part of the change.
Is it recorded who attests to each claim about a model, and on what evidence?
- 0: Nobody has been asked.
- 1: Vendor marketing statements.
- 2: Self-attestation by the team that built it, unsigned.
- 3: Each claim has a named attester (team, build platform, auditor) and evidence, kept with the AIBOM or in the evidence store.
- 4: As level 3, with independent checks by internal audit or a third party on a sample each year.
Can you produce regulatory technical documentation from your records?
- 0: No.
- 1: It would be written from scratch on request.
- 2: Partly. Data, evaluation and oversight sections would need research.
- 3: Documentation for in-scope systems (for example EU AI Act Annex IV for a high-risk system) can be assembled from the AIBOM and cards within days.
- 4: Documentation is generated from the same records and kept current with each release.
NIST AI RMF 1.0 subcategories this domain gives evidence for: MANAGE 4.1, MANAGE 3.1, GOVERN 1.1.
How it scores
- Domain score is the mean of its answered questions, 0 to 4. Unanswered questions are left out and the summary says so.
- Overall score is the mean of the six domains, so a domain with five questions does not outweigh one with four.
- Improvements are ranked by impact × (4 − current level) ÷ effort. Impact and effort are fixed per question (shown in the CSV). The next step is always the description of the next level up.
- The three board asks are the top improvements, one per domain where possible, written as decisions rather than tasks.
- Leading (3.5+): Records are produced by the pipeline and enforced at release. Keep them current.
- Managed (3.0+): Records exist for every production system and are kept with each release. Next: enforce them at deploy.
- Developing (2.0+): Records exist for the main systems, made partly by hand. Coverage and enforcement are the gaps.
- Initial (1.0+): Some knowledge exists in people and documents, but little is recorded in a form you can query or show.
- Not started (0.0+): No AI supply-chain records to speak of. Start with an inventory.
Worked example: Northwind Health
Northwind Health and its Triage Assistant are fictional, used across the AIBOM Library. The base model, Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3, is real.
Northwind’s flagship model, Triage Assistant v2.3, has a complete CycloneDX AIBOM generated in CI: hashed weights, the exact base-model revision, both datasets with hashes, the RAG index and the ticketing-mcp tool server with their permissions, a named evaluation set, a Sigstore signature and SLSA provenance. You can download it from the AIBOM Template Library. That is why identity, signing and runtime questions score well. The rest of the estate is a different story: AI features in bought software are not recorded, nothing verifies signatures at deploy, and nobody could say which model served a given request last month.
Overall: 2.3/4 (Developing). One excellent AIBOM does not make a mature programme; coverage and enforcement are the gaps.
| Domain | Score | Board risk sentence |
|---|---|---|
| Inventory and coverage | 2.0 | We know our main AI systems, but bought products and team-built tools are only partly recorded, so “are we affected?” gets a slow, partial answer. |
| Identity and lineage | 2.5 | We know our models by name and version, but base models and fine-tunes are not pinned exactly, so tracing a flawed base model would take research. |
| Data documentation | 2.5 | Our main datasets are named, but licence, personal-data handling and known gaps are not recorded for all of them, so a data complaint would be hard to answer. |
| Security and runtime | 2.3 | The inference software is partly covered, but model files are not always checked and model tool access is not fully recorded, which slows an incident response. |
| Evaluation and risk | 2.5 | Some models are tested, but results and limits are not recorded consistently, so we could not show a customer or regulator what each model was tested for. |
| Attestation and change | 2.2 | Some releases are signed or change-controlled, but not all, and the record lags the change, so our evidence is incomplete when we need it. |
Northwind’s three board asks, as the tool writes them:
- Make the AI inventory searchable, so “are we affected?” is answered in hours when a model or library flaw is announced.
- Treat a new model, dataset, tool or prompt as a change that needs an updated AIBOM and an approval before release.
- Log which model version served each request, so an incident can be scoped to the exact customers and time affected.
The vendor gap is the usual one. The questions to send suppliers are in the AIBOM questions to ask every AI vendor and the AI Supplier Questionnaire. For the incident-response gap, read using an AIBOM in incident response.
NIST AI RMF references
The subcategories below are quoted from NIST AI 100-1 (AI RMF 1.0, January 2023). A good answer in a domain is evidence toward them; it does not make you conformant. ISO/IEC 42001 Annex A control numbers are not listed because we could not check them against the published standard. For which AIBOM field supports which requirement, see the AIBOM as compliance evidence; for who can vouch for what, who can attest to an AI model.
| Subcategory | Text (NIST AI 100-1) | Domains |
|---|---|---|
| GOVERN 1.1 | Legal and regulatory requirements involving AI are understood, managed, and documented. | Attestation and change |
| GOVERN 1.6 | Mechanisms are in place to inventory AI systems and are resourced according to organizational risk priorities. | Inventory and coverage |
| GOVERN 6.1 | Policies and procedures are in place that address AI risks associated with third-party entities, including risks of infringement of a third-party’s intellectual property or other rights. | Inventory and coverage |
| MANAGE 3.1 | AI risks and benefits from third-party resources are regularly monitored, and risk controls are applied and documented. | Attestation and change |
| MANAGE 3.2 | Pre-trained models which are used for development are monitored as part of AI system regular monitoring and maintenance. | Identity and lineage |
| MANAGE 4.1 | Post-deployment AI system monitoring plans are implemented, including mechanisms for capturing and evaluating input from users and other relevant AI actors, appeal and override, decommissioning, incident response, recovery, and change management. | Security and runtime, Attestation and change |
| MAP 1.1 | Intended purposes, potentially beneficial uses, context-specific laws, norms and expectations, and prospective settings in which the AI system will be deployed are understood and documented. | Evaluation and risk |
| MAP 2.2 | Information about the AI system’s knowledge limits and how system output may be utilized and overseen by humans is documented. | Evaluation and risk |
| MAP 4.1 | Approaches for mapping AI technology and legal risks of its components – including the use of third-party data or software – are in place, followed, and documented, as are risks of infringement of a third party’s intellectual property or other rights. | Inventory and coverage, Identity and lineage, Data documentation |
| MEASURE 2.1 | Test sets, metrics, and details about the tools used during TEVV are documented. | Evaluation and risk |
| MEASURE 2.10 | Privacy risk of the AI system – as identified in the MAP function – is examined and documented. | Data documentation |
| MEASURE 2.7 | AI system security and resilience – as identified in the MAP function – are evaluated and documented. | Security and runtime |
What it does not do
It scores what you say is in place. It does not read your AIBOMs, check signatures or test anything; for that, use the AIBOM Validator on real files. Impact and effort are PlayCISO’s judgement for a typical organisation, fixed per question and shown in the CSV, so you can disagree with them openly. Everything else is on the AIBOM Library hub.
Sources
NIST subcategory IDs and text were checked against the NIST AI 100-1 PDF on 29 October 2026. Assessment v1.0.
- NIST AI 100-1, Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (AI RMF 1.0), January 2023
- NIST AI RMF Playbook
- CycloneDX 1.7 JSON reference (pedigree, modelCard, services)
- SLSA v1.0 provenance specification
- OpenSSF / Sigstore model signing (model-transparency)
- MLCommons Croissant RAI specification
- Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 (AI Act), EUR-Lex
Frequently asked questions
What is an AIBOM maturity model?
A scale for how well an organisation knows and controls the parts of its AI systems: which models it runs, what they were built from, what data trained them, what they can reach, how they were tested and whether any of that can be proven. This one uses six domains and five levels, from 0 (nothing in place) to 4 (enforced by the pipeline). An AIBOM file is the evidence; maturity is whether you produce, keep and use that evidence for every system.
How do I measure AI supply chain security maturity?
Ask concrete questions about practice, not intent, and answer for the whole estate rather than your best system. "Is the base model pinned to an exact revision?" and "Can you tell which model version was running at 14:00 last Tuesday?" have checkable answers. This tool asks 26 of them. If your flagship model has a full AIBOM but bought products have none, coverage scores low, and that is the honest answer.
How do I report AI supply chain risk to the board?
In one page: a score they can track over time, one sentence of risk per area in business terms, and no more than three asks with impact and effort. Boards act on a decision, not on field names. The board summary this tool writes follows that shape, and the asks come from your highest-impact, lowest-effort gaps.
Does this map to NIST AI RMF or ISO/IEC 42001?
Each domain lists the NIST AI RMF 1.0 subcategories it gives evidence for (GOVERN 1.1, GOVERN 1.6, GOVERN 6.1, MANAGE 3.1, MANAGE 3.2, MANAGE 4.1, MAP 1.1, MAP 2.2, MAP 4.1, MEASURE 2.1, MEASURE 2.10, MEASURE 2.7), checked against NIST AI 100-1. That is a pointer to relevant evidence, not a claim of conformance. ISO/IEC 42001 Annex A control numbers are not mapped here because we could not check them against the published standard.
What maturity level should we aim for?
Level 3 in every domain is a sensible first target: records exist for every production AI system and are kept with each release. Level 4 adds enforcement, for example deploy refusing an unsigned model. Aim for 4 first where the impact is highest for you, often signing and inventory lookup.
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