CBOM Analyzer
NIST IR 8547 is final (27 October 2026): RSA, ECDSA, EdDSA, DH, ECDH and MQV are deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035, at every key size. For US federal high value assets and high impact systems, Executive Order 14412 sets earlier dates: post-quantum key establishment by 31 December 2030 and signatures by 31 December 2031. Paste a CycloneDX cryptographic bill of materials (CBOM) to see which of your assets those dates hit, and what to move first.
No CBOM yet? Download the sample CBOM or build one with the CBOM Generator.
1. Your CBOM
CycloneDX 1.6 or 1.7 JSON, up to 2 MB. It is read in your browser and never sent to us.TL;DRWhat this analyzer does
4 points
- Paste or upload a CycloneDX CBOM (1.6 or 1.7 JSON, up to 2 MB), or load our fictional sample. It is parsed in your browser and never sent to us.
- Every algorithm, certificate, protocol and key is classified as quantum-vulnerable, weakened, hybrid, quantum-resistant or unknown, using NIST IR 8547 (final, October 2026), FIPS 203, 204 and 205 and RFC 10024.
- You get a summary score, the IR 8547 and EO 14412 deadlines, and a migration order: key establishment before signatures (harvest now, decrypt later), long-lived data first.
- Flags cover SHA-1, 112-bit security, TLS below 1.3, certificates valid past 2030, missing OIDs and missing NIST quantum levels, and the wrong ML-KEM-1024 OID printed in the CycloneDX guide. Viewing the analysis is free; the report downloads are available with a paid plan.
How it classifies
- Quantum-vulnerable: RSA, ECDSA, EdDSA, DH, ECDH, MQV and DSA, and any asymmetric algorithm it cannot match that declares no post-quantum level (OMB M-26-15). Certificates, keys and protocols inherit from the algorithms they link to.
- Weakened: SHA-1 (disallowed in FIPS-validated modules after 2030) and 112-bit security (IR 8547 says NIST's 112-bit symmetric standards will be disallowed in 2030).
- Hybrid: ML-KEM combined with a classical key exchange, such as X25519MLKEM768 (RFC 10024). NIST expects hybrids to be temporary, followed by a move to PQC only.
- Quantum-resistant: ML-KEM (FIPS 203), ML-DSA (FIPS 204), SLH-DSA (FIPS 205), LMS and XMSS (SP 800-208), and AES, SHA-2 and SHA-3 at the NIST categories in IR 8547.
- Sources: NIST IR 8547 (final), EO 14412, OMB M-26-15, RFC 10024 and the NIST OID register.
Frequently asked questions
What is a CBOM?
A cryptographic bill of materials lists the cryptography in software or hardware: algorithms, certificates, protocols and keys, and where each is used. CycloneDX added CBOM in version 1.6; 1.7 (21 October 2025) is current. OMB M-26-15 says the foundation of a PQC migration plan is a continuously updated inventory of all cryptographic assets, and that this data should populate a central CBOM.
Which algorithms are quantum vulnerable?
NIST IR 8547 (final, October 2026) lists RSA, ECDSA, EdDSA, finite-field DH, ECDH and MQV, and deprecates them after 2030 and disallows them after 2035 at every key size. OMB M-26-15 adds DSA and tells agencies to treat any asymmetric algorithm not definitively known to be quantum-resistant as vulnerable. This analyzer does the same for asymmetric algorithms it cannot match.
What should we migrate first?
Key establishment, starting with systems that protect data that must stay secret for years. That is the "harvest now, decrypt later" risk: data captured today can be decrypted once a cryptanalytically relevant quantum computer exists. Mosca's inequality, as NIST restates it, says to start before the years data must stay secure plus the years the transition takes exceed the time until such a computer exists. Signatures are not exposed to harvest now, decrypt later, but NIST calls their migration urgent too because it takes longer.
Does it read CycloneDX 1.6 CBOMs?
Yes. A 1.6 CBOM stays valid. The analyzer reads the 1.6 link fields (algorithmRef, signatureAlgorithmRef, subjectPublicKeyRef, cryptoRefArray) as well as the 1.7 relatedCryptographicAssets that replace them, and it follows cipher suite algorithm references and dependencies to find which component or service uses each asset.
What does a CBOM example look like?
Load the sample: a fictional company's web app with TLS 1.2 and 1.3, an RSA-2048 certificate, ECDSA P-256 code signing, AES-256-GCM for data at rest, SHA-1 in a legacy integration and a hybrid X25519MLKEM768 pilot. You can download the same file and build your own with the CBOM Generator.
How do I create a CBOM to analyze?
OMB M-26-15 lists software composition analysis of SBOMs, static and dynamic application security testing and network scanners as discovery sources. CBOMkit, a Post-Quantum Cryptography Alliance (Linux Foundation) project, offers open-source tools including a SonarQube plugin that detects cryptographic assets in source code and generates a CBOM, cbomkit-theia for container images and directories, and a GitHub Action. For assets scanners miss, use the CBOM Generator.
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