ICS Threat-Model Builder
Pick the OT components you actually run and this builds your threat model mapped to MITRE ATT&CK® for ICS: the applicable techniques across all 12 ICS tactics, rendered as the familiar tactic × technique matrix, grounded in real incidents like Stuxnet, Industroyer, TRITON and Pipedream. Mark each technique mitigated, accepted or open, watch your residual-coverage score move, and export the whole model to CSV or Markdown. Everything runs in your browser — no data leaves the page.
1 · Your OT environment
Toggle the components you operate, or start from a scenario.
Residual exposure
Coverage by tactic
ATT&CK for ICS matrix
Prioritised mitigations
Open techniques, highest-impact first. Click a technique to mark it mitigated.
Rapidly toggle outputs/registers to force equipment into damaging states.
- Rate/limit logic and interlocks on outputs
- Mechanical safety limits independent of logic
- Detect abnormal command rates
Temporarily prevent operators from interacting with the process while an attack proceeds.
- Redundant control channels
- Detect comms disruption fast
- Manual override procedures
The process or service becomes unavailable — a shutdown, outage or production stop.
- Redundancy and tested manual fallback
- Offline, tested backups and recovery runbooks
- IT/OT segmentation to contain ransomware
Operators lose the ability to control the process from the control system.
- Local/manual control fallback
- Out-of-band operator access
- Resilient, segmented control architecture
Intercept and optionally alter OT traffic between devices (formerly "Man in the Middle").
- Authenticated / encrypted protocols where available
- Segmentation and switch-port security to block interposition
- Detect ARP spoofing and unexpected gateways
Directly manipulate the process to a damaging or attacker-chosen state.
- Independent safety instrumented systems
- Physical interlocks and limits
- Process-aware anomaly detection
Alter the controller’s I/O image so logic acts on forged inputs/outputs.
- Logic/memory integrity checks
- Independent field verification of I/O
- Restrict write access to controller memory
Change setpoints, thresholds or tuning so the process runs outside safe bounds.
- Alarm/limit-check on setpoint changes
- Role-restricted setpoint authority
- Out-of-band verification of critical parameters
Flash malicious firmware onto a controller module to subvert or disable process control.
- Signed-firmware enforcement
- Restrict firmware-update capability to authorised hosts
- Alarm on firmware version changes
Hide malicious presence at the OS, firmware or logic level so operators and tools see a clean system.
- Firmware/logic integrity verification from a trusted source
- Out-of-band network monitoring that the host cannot alter
- Signed-code enforcement
Send a valid-looking but illegitimate control command to actuate equipment.
- Authenticate command sources; allow-list masters
- Protocol-aware IDS to flag unexpected commands
- Interlocks requiring multiple conditions to actuate
Send falsified status/telemetry so operators see normal values while the process is being manipulated.
- Independent sensing / out-of-band process verification
- Authenticated protocols where available
- Cross-check HMI values against raw field data
Real incidents your model touches
Attacker used exposed remote-access software to change the sodium hydroxide setpoint on a water treatment HMI.
Worm that re-programmed Siemens S7 PLCs to damage uranium centrifuges while spoofing normal readings to operators.
Spearphishing into utilities, then operators watched remote attackers open breakers via hijacked HMIs; KillDisk wiped systems.
Purpose-built grid malware speaking IEC-101/104, IEC-61850 and OPC DA to trip breakers in Kyiv.
IEC-104 variant aimed at a Ukrainian substation, tailored to specific RTUs/breaker configurations.
Modular toolkit (CODESYS, OPC UA, Modbus, Omron, Schneider) able to scan, command and brick a wide range of PLCs — the most flexible ICS malware found to date.
Malware targeting Triconex safety controllers to disable the SIS at a Saudi petrochemical plant — the first attack aimed squarely at safety.
IT ransomware forced a precautionary OT shutdown — a loss of availability via the enterprise side.
Loading…
Sample report · illustrative data
Sample result: ATT&CK for ICS threat model
Example model for an invented site with a PLC, HMI, engineering workstation, historian and remote-access path selected, with a few techniques marked mitigated or accepted.
Model summary
- Components
- PLC / Controller, HMI / SCADA, Engineering Workstation, Data Historian, Remote Access
- Status values
- Open, mitigated, accepted (an accepted risk keeps 40% of its weight)
- Exposure bands
- Low residual, Moderate, High, Critical
- Weighting
- Impact, Impair Process Control and Inhibit Response techniques weigh 3; initial access, execution and lateral movement weigh 2; the rest 1
Prioritised remediation queue (open techniques)
| Technique | Tactic | Weight | Example mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|
| T0836 Modify Parameter | Impair Process Control | 3 | Alarm/limit-check on setpoint changes |
| T0878 Alarm Suppression | Inhibit Response Function | 3 | Independent alarm annunciation / hardwired alarms |
| T0855 Unauthorized Command Message | Impair Process Control | 3 | Authenticate command sources; allow-list masters |
| T0822 External Remote Services | Initial Access | 2 | Enforce MFA and per-session approval on all remote access |
| T0812 Default Credentials | Lateral Movement | 2 | Change every default credential at commissioning |
Exports
The model also lists each technique with its status, the OT asset types it applies to, Purdue levels and the mitigations, plus the public incidents the techniques are drawn from.
Made-up example data. Your own run uses your inputs. Downloads of the full report need Pro.
This tool maps your OT components to MITRE ATT&CK® for ICS. ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation; the ATT&CK content is © The MITRE Corporation and used under its terms of use. PlayCISO is not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by The MITRE Corporation.