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ICS Threat-Model Builder

Pick the OT components you actually run and this builds your threat model mapped to MITRE ATT&CK® for ICS: the applicable techniques across all 12 ICS tactics, rendered as the familiar tactic × technique matrix, grounded in real incidents like Stuxnet, Industroyer, TRITON and Pipedream. Mark each technique mitigated, accepted or open, watch your residual-coverage score move, and export the whole model to CSV or Markdown. Everything runs in your browser — no data leaves the page.

1 · Your OT environment

Toggle the components you operate, or start from a scenario.

Residual exposure

100/ 100
Critical exposure
49 techniques apply to your 5-component model.
0mitigated0accepted49open

Coverage by tactic

Initial Access9 openExecution6 openPersistence5 openPrivilege Escalation2 openEvasion5 openDiscovery4 openLateral Movement4 openCollection4 openCommand and Control3 openInhibit Response Function5 openImpair Process Control6 openImpact5 open
Tactic
Asset

ATT&CK for ICS matrix

open mitigated acceptedclick a cell to cycle
Drive-by Compromise
T0817open
Exploit Public-Facing Application
T0819open
External Remote Services
T0822open
Replication Through Removable Media
T0847open
Supply Chain Compromise
T0862open
Transient Cyber Asset
T0864open
Spearphishing Attachment
T0865open
Exploitation of Remote Services
T0866open
Internet Accessible Device
T0883open
Command-Line Interface
T0807open
Modify Controller Tasking
T0821open
Scripting
T0853open
Change Operating Mode
T0858open
User Execution
T0863open
Hooking
T0874open
Module Firmware
T0839open
System Firmware
T0857open
Valid Accounts
T0859open
Project File Infection
T0873open
Modify Program
T0889open
Hooking
T0874open
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
T0890open
Change Operating Mode
T0858open
Masquerading
T0849open
Rootkit
T0851open
Spoof Reporting Message
T0856open
Indicator Removal on Host
T0872open
Network Connection Enumeration
T0840open
Network Sniffing
T0842open
Remote System Discovery
T0846open
Remote System Information Discovery
T0888open
Exploitation of Remote Services
T0866open
Valid Accounts
T0859open
Program Download
T0843open
Lateral Tool Transfer
T0867open
Monitor Process State
T0801open
Automated Collection
T0802open
Adversary-in-the-Middle
T0830open
Program Upload
T0845open
Standard Application Layer Protocol
T0869open
Connection Proxy
T0884open
Commonly Used Port
T0885open
System Firmware
T0857open
Rootkit
T0851open
Manipulate I/O Image
T0835open
Alarm Suppression
T0878open
Service Stop
T0881open
Module Firmware
T0839open
Spoof Reporting Message
T0856open
Adversary-in-the-Middle
T0830open
Brute Force I/O
T0806open
Modify Parameter
T0836open
Unauthorized Command Message
T0855open
Denial of Control
T0813open
Loss of Availability
T0826open
Loss of Control
T0827open
Manipulation of Control
T0831open
Theft of Operational Information
T0882open

Prioritised mitigations

Open techniques, highest-impact first. Click a technique to mark it mitigated.

Brute Force I/OT0806Impair Process Control

Rapidly toggle outputs/registers to force equipment into damaging states.

  • Rate/limit logic and interlocks on outputs
  • Mechanical safety limits independent of logic
  • Detect abnormal command rates
Denial of ControlT0813Impact

Temporarily prevent operators from interacting with the process while an attack proceeds.

  • Redundant control channels
  • Detect comms disruption fast
  • Manual override procedures
Loss of AvailabilityT0826Impact

The process or service becomes unavailable — a shutdown, outage or production stop.

  • Redundancy and tested manual fallback
  • Offline, tested backups and recovery runbooks
  • IT/OT segmentation to contain ransomware
Loss of ControlT0827Impact

Operators lose the ability to control the process from the control system.

  • Local/manual control fallback
  • Out-of-band operator access
  • Resilient, segmented control architecture
Adversary-in-the-MiddleT0830Collection · Impair Process Control

Intercept and optionally alter OT traffic between devices (formerly "Man in the Middle").

  • Authenticated / encrypted protocols where available
  • Segmentation and switch-port security to block interposition
  • Detect ARP spoofing and unexpected gateways
Manipulation of ControlT0831Impact

Directly manipulate the process to a damaging or attacker-chosen state.

  • Independent safety instrumented systems
  • Physical interlocks and limits
  • Process-aware anomaly detection
Manipulate I/O ImageT0835Inhibit Response Function

Alter the controller’s I/O image so logic acts on forged inputs/outputs.

  • Logic/memory integrity checks
  • Independent field verification of I/O
  • Restrict write access to controller memory
Modify ParameterT0836Impair Process Control

Change setpoints, thresholds or tuning so the process runs outside safe bounds.

  • Alarm/limit-check on setpoint changes
  • Role-restricted setpoint authority
  • Out-of-band verification of critical parameters
Module FirmwareT0839Persistence · Impair Process Control

Flash malicious firmware onto a controller module to subvert or disable process control.

  • Signed-firmware enforcement
  • Restrict firmware-update capability to authorised hosts
  • Alarm on firmware version changes
RootkitT0851Evasion · Inhibit Response Function

Hide malicious presence at the OS, firmware or logic level so operators and tools see a clean system.

  • Firmware/logic integrity verification from a trusted source
  • Out-of-band network monitoring that the host cannot alter
  • Signed-code enforcement
Unauthorized Command MessageT0855Impair Process Control

Send a valid-looking but illegitimate control command to actuate equipment.

  • Authenticate command sources; allow-list masters
  • Protocol-aware IDS to flag unexpected commands
  • Interlocks requiring multiple conditions to actuate
Spoof Reporting MessageT0856Evasion · Impair Process Control

Send falsified status/telemetry so operators see normal values while the process is being manipulated.

  • Independent sensing / out-of-band process verification
  • Authenticated protocols where available
  • Cross-check HMI values against raw field data
+37 more open — export the full model for the complete list.

Real incidents your model touches

Oldsmar water plant · 2021

Attacker used exposed remote-access software to change the sodium hydroxide setpoint on a water treatment HMI.

Stuxnet · 2010

Worm that re-programmed Siemens S7 PLCs to damage uranium centrifuges while spoofing normal readings to operators.

BlackEnergy / Ukraine 2015 · 2015

Spearphishing into utilities, then operators watched remote attackers open breakers via hijacked HMIs; KillDisk wiped systems.

Industroyer / CrashOverride · 2016

Purpose-built grid malware speaking IEC-101/104, IEC-61850 and OPC DA to trip breakers in Kyiv.

Industroyer2 · 2022

IEC-104 variant aimed at a Ukrainian substation, tailored to specific RTUs/breaker configurations.

Pipedream / Incontroller · 2022

Modular toolkit (CODESYS, OPC UA, Modbus, Omron, Schneider) able to scan, command and brick a wide range of PLCs — the most flexible ICS malware found to date.

TRITON / TRISIS · 2017

Malware targeting Triconex safety controllers to disable the SIS at a Saudi petrochemical plant — the first attack aimed squarely at safety.

Colonial Pipeline · 2021

IT ransomware forced a precautionary OT shutdown — a loss of availability via the enterprise side.

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Sample report · illustrative data

Sample result: ATT&CK for ICS threat model

Example model for an invented site with a PLC, HMI, engineering workstation, historian and remote-access path selected, with a few techniques marked mitigated or accepted.

Model summary

Components
PLC / Controller, HMI / SCADA, Engineering Workstation, Data Historian, Remote Access
Status values
Open, mitigated, accepted (an accepted risk keeps 40% of its weight)
Exposure bands
Low residual, Moderate, High, Critical
Weighting
Impact, Impair Process Control and Inhibit Response techniques weigh 3; initial access, execution and lateral movement weigh 2; the rest 1

Prioritised remediation queue (open techniques)

TechniqueTacticWeightExample mitigation
T0836 Modify ParameterImpair Process Control3Alarm/limit-check on setpoint changes
T0878 Alarm SuppressionInhibit Response Function3Independent alarm annunciation / hardwired alarms
T0855 Unauthorized Command MessageImpair Process Control3Authenticate command sources; allow-list masters
T0822 External Remote ServicesInitial Access2Enforce MFA and per-session approval on all remote access
T0812 Default CredentialsLateral Movement2Change every default credential at commissioning

Exports

The model also lists each technique with its status, the OT asset types it applies to, Purdue levels and the mitigations, plus the public incidents the techniques are drawn from.

Made-up example data. Your own run uses your inputs. Downloads of the full report need Pro.

This tool maps your OT components to MITRE ATT&CK® for ICS. ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation; the ATT&CK content is © The MITRE Corporation and used under its terms of use. PlayCISO is not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by The MITRE Corporation.