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Leak-Site Claim Checker

Someone says a supplier was hit by ransomware. Before you act on a screenshot, check it: search the name on a public ransomware tracker and in SEC 8-K filings, get a plain verdict (claimed, reported or confirmed) and a short plan for what to ask, what to rotate and when to escalate. We never open leak sites or show leaked data.

The name is sent to PlayCISO only to search the public ransomware.live tracker and SEC EDGAR. It is not stored. Your ticks and answers stay in your browser. We never open leak sites or show leaked data.

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Sample report · illustrative data

Leak-site claim check: Example Logistics Ltd

A made-up supplier and a made-up group, to show what a check returns. A procurement team heard that its freight supplier had been “hacked” and ran the name before replying to anyone.

Tracker listings · ransomware.live

Group (claim)Listed asDiscovered (UTC)Country
ExampleLocker (fictional)Example Logistics2026-11-12GB

SEC filings · Form 8-K

No Item 1.05 (material cybersecurity incident) 8-K filed under this name. Example Logistics Ltd is private and UK-based, so it would never file one.

Verdict: Unverified claim

Example Logistics Ltd was named on the ExampleLocker leak site on 2026-11-12; Example Logistics Ltd has not confirmed. A leak-site listing is a claim by a criminal group, not proof of a breach.

Escalation: Act now · rotate shared credentials

They hold: personal data (delivery addresses), an API key for the shipping integration. Contract: notification clause, 72 hours (as recorded by the team).

  • Ask the supplier in writing; name one owner and a date to chase.
  • Rotate the shipping API key: issue, verify, switch, then revoke the old one.
  • Review the integration's calls since the earliest date in the claim.
  • Ask privacy whether your own notification duties could apply if the addresses are in scope.
  • Warn the logistics desk about invoice and bank-change emails that use the news.

Made-up example data. Your own run uses live sources. The supplier letter and the record download need a plan.

TL;DR

What this tool is

4 points
  • Type a supplier or company name. The checker searches the public ransomware.live tracker for leak-site listings and SEC EDGAR for 8-K filings under Item 1.05 (material cybersecurity incidents).
  • It shows only the group, the name as listed, the date the tracker logged it, the country and a link to the tracker record. It never opens a leak site and never shows leaked data.
  • A plain verdict follows: not found on the tracker, unverified claim, reported by a reputable outlet (you tick it), or confirmed by the company, an 8-K or a regulator.
  • Then a decision guide: what to verify, what to ask the supplier, whether to rotate shared credentials, and when to escalate based on the data you share and your contract.

Claimed, reported or confirmed

Ransomware groups post victims on leak sites to pressure them into paying. Trackers mirror those posts within hours, and the name spreads on social media as “X was breached”. That is a claim. The verdict uses four steps, and only the last one is a confirmed incident:

  • Not found on the tracker. No listing names the company and no Item 1.05 8-K exists. Not proof of safety: trackers do not see every incident.
  • Unverified claim. “Named on the X leak site on <date>; the company has not confirmed.” Treat it as a lead.
  • Reported. A reputable outlet covered it after checking. You tick this yourself: the tool does not scrape news.
  • Confirmed. A company statement, an SEC 8-K under Item 1.05 or a regulator notice. Even then, the group's description of what it took stays a claim.

Where to verify

  • The company's own newsroom and investor-relations page. Statements often appear there first, sometimes as a short “cybersecurity incident” notice.
  • SEC EDGAR. For US-listed companies, full-text search for 8-Ks under Item 1.05. Some companies disclose an incident under another item, such as 8.01, so read any 8-K that mentions a cybersecurity incident.
  • Breach notice portals. State attorney general lists such as California and Washington, and the HHS breach portal for health data. Notices there come weeks or months later, but they are confirmations.
  • Regulators and courts in the supplier's country: data-protection authority notices and court filings.

What to ask the supplier

  1. Are you aware of the claim, and are you investigating it?
  2. Which legal entity, subsidiary, joint venture or system does the claim concern?
  3. Is any data you hold for us, or any access you have to our systems, in scope? If you do not know yet, when will you?
  4. Have you contained the incident, and since what date have you been sure the attacker no longer has access?
  5. Do we need to rotate any credentials, API keys or certificates we share with you?
  6. Will you notify us in writing within the contract's notification timeline, and who is our contact until then?
  7. Have you notified, or do you expect to notify, a regulator or law enforcement?

When to rotate and when to escalate

The deciding factor is what the supplier holds or can reach, not how loud the claim is. If it holds credentials, API keys, SSO or network access to you, rotate now: issue the new credential, verify it, switch over, then revoke the old one. If it holds personal, health or payment data, ask privacy or legal early whether your own notification duties could apply if the claim is confirmed and your data is in scope. If it holds nothing sensitive, monitor. Escalate to your incident process when the incident is confirmed and the supplier held regulated data or access. The third-party breach intake records the details once you start.

Caveats. Groups exaggerate, re-post old data and recycle other groups' leaks. The name at the top of a post may not be the entity that was hit: in November 2026 a post headlined as Boeing concerned Boeing Sikorsky Aircraft Support, which Boeing described in 1997 as a joint venture with Sikorsky (see our Boeing write-up). Trackers mirror claims; they do not verify them. Never download or open data said to be leaked.

Frequently asked questions

How do I check if a company is on a ransomware leak site?

Search the name on a public tracker such as ransomware.live, which records new posts on ransomware and extortion leak sites. This tool does that search for you and shows only the group, the name as listed, the date it was logged and a link to the tracker record. Do not visit leak sites yourself: they are run by criminals, and downloading data said to be leaked can create legal and security problems.

Does a leak-site listing mean the company was breached?

No. A listing is a claim by a criminal group. Groups exaggerate, recycle old data, list the wrong entity or post a well-known parent company when the real target was a smaller subsidiary or joint venture. Only the company, a regulator, a court filing or a reputable outlet that checked the claim can confirm it. Until then, say "named on the X leak site; the company has not confirmed".

What is an SEC 8-K Item 1.05 filing?

Item 1.05 of Form 8-K is where a US-listed company discloses a cybersecurity incident it has determined to be material. Per the SEC, it is generally due four business days after that determination, and it can be delayed if the US Attorney General decides immediate disclosure would pose a substantial risk to national security or public safety. Private and non-US companies do not file 8-Ks, so "no 8-K" says nothing about them.

A supplier was named on a leak site. What should I do first?

Ask the supplier in writing whether they are aware of the claim and whether your data or access is in scope. At the same time list exactly what you share with them and with which legal entity. If they hold credentials, API keys or network access to you, rotate those now without waiting for confirmation. Pull the contract to find the breach-notification clause, and ask privacy or legal whether your own notification duties could apply if the claim is substantiated.

Should I rotate credentials if the breach is not confirmed?

If the supplier holds credentials, API keys, tokens or network access to your systems, yes. Rotation is cheap compared with the cost of being wrong. Do it in the safe order: issue the new credential, verify it works, switch every consumer over, then revoke the old one. For data the supplier only holds (not access), asking and tracking is usually enough until the claim is confirmed or ruled out.

Why does the tool not find a company I know was attacked?

Trackers only see groups that post publicly, names are listed in different forms (brand, legal name or web domain), and many incidents are never posted at all, for example when a ransom is paid or the attacker does not run a leak site. Try the domain and the legal name too. "Not found" is a result of this check, not a clean bill of health.

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