SSVC Calculator: CISA Track, Attend, Act Decision Tree
SSVC turns five answers about a vulnerability into one decision: Track, Track*, Attend or Act. The answers are the state of exploitation, whether the attack can be automated, the technical impact, and how much your mission and public well-being rely on the affected component. Enter them below and the matching row of CISA's 36-row decision table lights up. Everything runs in your browser.
Last reviewed 2026-11-03 against the CISA SSVC Guide (November 2022) and the CERT/CC calculator file “CISA Coordinator v2.0.3”. Independent tool; not a CISA product.
CISA Coordinator v2.0.3 (CERT/CC SSVC calculator file). Answer for your own organisation and the date today.
CISA definition: “The vulnerability contains specific characteristics that may require closer monitoring for changes.”
In practice: Still no escalation, but watch it closely, especially if a fix is missing or hard to apply. A second analyst opinion is sensible.
Row 23 of 36. Mission prevalence Support plus well-being impact Minimal combine into medium.
The 36-row decision table (matching row highlighted)
| # | Exploitation | Automatable | Technical impact | Mission & well-being | Decision |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | none | no | partial | low | Track |
| 2 | none | no | partial | medium | Track |
| 3 | none | no | partial | high | Track |
| 4 | none | no | total | low | Track |
| 5 | none | no | total | medium | Track |
| 6 | none | no | total | high | Track* |
| 7 | none | yes | partial | low | Track |
| 8 | none | yes | partial | medium | Track |
| 9 | none | yes | partial | high | Attend |
| 10 | none | yes | total | low | Track |
| 11 | none | yes | total | medium | Track |
| 12 | none | yes | total | high | Attend |
| 13 | poc | no | partial | low | Track |
| 14 | poc | no | partial | medium | Track |
| 15 | poc | no | partial | high | Track* |
| 16 | poc | no | total | low | Track |
| 17 | poc | no | total | medium | Track* |
| 18 | poc | no | total | high | Attend |
| 19 | poc | yes | partial | low | Track |
| 20 | poc | yes | partial | medium | Track |
| 21 | poc | yes | partial | high | Attend |
| 22 | poc | yes | total | low | Track |
| 23 | poc | yes | total | medium | Track* |
| 24 | poc | yes | total | high | Attend |
| 25 | active | no | partial | low | Track |
| 26 | active | no | partial | medium | Track |
| 27 | active | no | partial | high | Attend |
| 28 | active | no | total | low | Track |
| 29 | active | no | total | medium | Attend |
| 30 | active | no | total | high | Act |
| 31 | active | yes | partial | low | Attend |
| 32 | active | yes | partial | medium | Attend |
| 33 | active | yes | partial | high | Act |
| 34 | active | yes | total | low | Attend |
| 35 | active | yes | total | medium | Act |
| 36 | active | yes | total | high | Act |
Decision record for this vulnerability
CISA says exploitation answers should be time-stamped. The record stores the inputs, the outcome and the date. Nothing leaves your browser.
SSVC decision: Track*. Model: CISA Coordinator v2.0.3 (CERT/CC SSVC calculator file). Exploitation=poc, Automatable=yes, Technical Impact=total, Mission Prevalence=Support, Public Well-being Impact=Minimal, Mission & Well-being (derived)=medium. Decided 2026-11-03.
The five decision points, in plain language
Value names are CISA's. The explanations and examples are ours.
Exploitation: none, poc, active
What is known today, not what might happen. None: no sign of use and no public exploit. Poc: a public proof of concept exists, for example in Metasploit or ExploitDB, or the method is well known. Active: reliable, shared evidence that attackers are using it. A CISA KEV listing is the usual evidence. Check it with the KEV checker.
Automatable: no, yes
Can an attacker reliably automate the first four kill-chain steps: reconnaissance, weaponisation, delivery and exploitation? An unauthenticated remote code execution flaw in an internet-facing service is typically yes. A flaw that needs a human to craft each attack, or that is hard to find on the network, is no.
Technical impact: partial, total
Total means the attacker gets full control of the software or all the information on the system. Partial is anything less, including denial of service and limited disclosure. This is the same idea as severity in CVSS, but judged on the component in your scope.
Mission prevalence: Minimal, Support, Essential
How central is the affected component to what your organisation exists to do? Essential: it directly provides a mission-essential function, such as the payment-file gateway for a bank or the dispatch system for an emergency service. Support: it supports such functions. Minimal: neither. CISA notes this measures prevalence, not impact, so ignore compensating controls here.
Public well-being impact: Minimal, Material, Irreversible
What happens to people if the system is compromised? Minimal: below the thresholds. Material: major safety impact such as physical harm, environmental damage, serious financial loss or psychological harm. Irreversible: catastrophic impact such as multiple fatalities or collapse of social systems. Most IT systems are Minimal. Medical, industrial control and utility systems often are not.
Mission prevalence and public well-being impact are merged into a single Mission & Well-being value: high if the mission is Essential or the well-being impact is Irreversible; low only when both are Minimal; otherwise medium.
Worked example
A file-transfer appliance on your perimeter has an unauthenticated remote code execution flaw (hypothetical, no real CVE). The vendor and CISA report exploitation, so Exploitation = active. The flaw needs no login and can be scripted, so Automatable = yes; it gives full control of the host, so Technical impact = total. It is the only channel through which partners deliver payment files, so Mission prevalence = Essential; a failure does not endanger people, so Well-being = Minimal. Essential makes Mission & Well-being high, which is row 36: Act. Move the same flaw to a lab server (Minimal and Minimal) and the answer drops to row 34, Attend. Same CVE, same CVSS score, different decision, which is the point of SSVC. Use the “Load the worked example” link above the questions to try it.
The BOD 26-04 tab
CISA Binding Operational Directive 26-04 (issued 10 June 2026) sets remediation timelines in a table CISA says is informed by SSVC. The CERT/CC SSVC repository publishes it as the decision tablecisa:DT_BOD2604:1.0.0 with four inputs and five outcomes: fix on system upgrade, 60 days, 14 days, 3 days, and 3 days with forensic triage. We implemented all 16 rows from that file. The directive applies to US federal civilian agencies. For KEV lookups, queues and due dates use the BOD 26-04 calculator.
What this tool does not do
- It does not look up your CVE. Answer from your own evidence, and date the record.
- CISA's guide says the mitigation status (fix available, difficulty, fix or workaround) does not change the decision in this tree, but should still be tracked. Put it in the record notes.
- It does not replace severity scoring. Pair it with the CVSS calculator.
Sources
- CISA, Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC) and the CISA SSVC Guide PDF, publication November 2022, Table 1 (outcomes), Table 8 (mission and well-being) and Table 9 (36 rows). Accessed 2026-11-03.
- CERT/CC, SSVC repository, CISA-Coordinator.json, title “CISA Coordinator v2.0.3”. Compared row by row on 2026-11-03. Copyright Carnegie Mellon University; the repository's licence file states CC BY-NC 4.0.
- CERT/CC, decision table cisa:DT_BOD2604:1.0.0. Accessed 2026-11-03.
- CISA, BOD 26-04, Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk, 10 June 2026 (“Table 1: Remediation Timelines is informed by the SSVC system”). Accessed 2026-11-03.
- CERT/CC, SSVC documentation. Accessed 2026-11-03.
Frequently asked questions
What is SSVC?
SSVC, Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization, is a decision-tree method for deciding how urgently to respond to a vulnerability. It was created by Carnegie Mellon University SEI and CERT/CC with CISA, and CISA built its own tree from it in 2020. You answer a few questions about exploitation, how automatable the attack is, technical impact, and how much your mission and public well-being depend on the affected component. The tree returns one of four decisions: Track, Track*, Attend or Act.
What do Track, Track*, Attend and Act mean?
Per CISA: Track needs no action at this time, only monitoring and reassessment. Track* has specific characteristics that may need closer monitoring. Attend needs attention from internal supervisory-level people, and CISA recommends remediating sooner than standard update timelines. Act needs supervisory and leadership attention and remediation as soon as possible. Track and Track* both stay within standard update timelines.
How is SSVC different from CVSS?
CVSS rates how severe a flaw is in itself. SSVC decides what your organisation should do about it, so it asks about evidence of exploitation and your own mission and safety exposure. Two organisations can reach different SSVC decisions for the same CVE with the same CVSS score. They answer different questions and are usually used together.
Who decides mission prevalence and public well-being impact?
You do, for your own context. Mission prevalence asks whether the vulnerable component is mission-essential or supports mission-essential functions. Public well-being impact asks about harm to people. CISA's guide has no "unknown" option: if you are unsure, pick the most reasonable assumption from past events and write down why.
Can SSVC replace CVSS?
No, and neither CISA nor this page claims it should. SSVC does not produce a severity score. It produces a response decision. CVSS still describes the technical characteristics of the flaw, and many teams keep a CVSS score on the record next to the SSVC decision.
How does SSVC relate to CISA BOD 26-04?
CISA says Table 1 of BOD 26-04, which sets remediation timelines, is informed by SSVC. CERT/CC publishes it as an SSVC decision table named cisa:DT_BOD2604:1.0.0 with four inputs (publicly exposed, in KEV, automatable, technical impact) and five outcomes from fix on system upgrade to 3 days with forensic triage. The second tab on this page implements it. The directive binds US federal civilian agencies; others can use it as a benchmark.
Is this the official CISA SSVC calculator?
No. This is an independent implementation of the published decision table. CISA publishes its own calculator and guide. We checked our 36 rows against the table in CISA's SSVC Guide and the CERT/CC file, and a test script in our repository compares every row. Treat the output as decision support and keep your own record.
Which exploitation value should I pick if I am not sure?
Use the best evidence you have today and date the answer, because exploitation status changes. A listing in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog is evidence of exploitation in the wild. A public exploit in Metasploit or ExploitDB points to PoC. No public exploit and no reports means none. Re-run the calculator when the evidence changes.
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