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Payload Ransomware Hijacks Group Policy: GPO Checklist

November 22, 2026 · Team PlayCISO
TL;DR · the short version

Payload is a ransomware and data-extortion operation that, per Picus Security, surfaced in February 2026. In an April 2026 attack on a Middle East manufacturer investigated by Kaspersky GERT, the attacker logged in to a FortiGate SSL VPN with a stolen domain account, reached domain-admin-level rights, stole data from file servers, then created two Group Policy Objects linked at the domain root. "PAYLOAD" put ransom notes and a pre-logon ransom banner on every workstation, replaced the wallpaper and lock screen and disabled the local Administrator account; "win Firewall Off" turned off Windows Firewall on all profiles. Kaspersky confirmed no files were encrypted on Windows, yet the attack caused organisation-wide disruption at the first reboot, and the stolen data was later published. Defend Group Policy itself: separate GPO creation from linking, alert on event IDs 5136, 5137 and 5141 and on gPLink changes at the domain root, put phishing-resistant MFA on VPN, and remove malicious GPOs on the domain controllers before cleaning endpoints.

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Payload is a ransomware and data-extortion operation that, per Picus Security, surfaced in February 2026. Its best-documented attack, investigated by Kaspersky's Global Emergency Response Team (GERT) and published on Securelist on 21 September 2026, did not need an encryptor on Windows at all. With a stolen domain account, the attacker stole data, then used two malicious Group Policy Objects (GPOs) linked at the domain root to put ransom notes on every workstation, disable the local Administrator account and switch off Windows Firewall. Kaspersky: "We confirmed that no files were encrypted on Windows machines." The disruption was organisation-wide all the same. Picus revisited the group in a 20 November 2026 explainer.

Who this is for: CISOs, identity and Active Directory owners, Windows infrastructure teams and incident responders.

Based on Kaspersky's Securelist report and Picus Security's 20 November 2026 analysis, read on 22 November 2026. PlayCISO is not affiliated with Kaspersky or Picus. The victim was not named. Names on Payload's leak site are claims and are not repeated here.

Confirmed vs not yet known (22 November 2026)

Confirmed by Kaspersky's investigation: two GPOs, "PAYLOAD" and "win Firewall Off", both linked at the domain root; ransom notes, a pre-logon ransom banner, new wallpaper and lock screen, the local Administrator account disabled, Windows Firewall off on the domain, private and public profiles; no Windows files encrypted; data exfiltrated from file servers and other systems and later published on the dark web; an ESXi variant of Payload found.

Reported: entry through a FortiGate SSL VPN with a compromised domain account on 11 April 2026, domain-admin-equivalent rights by 13 April, visible impact after reboots on 14 April (CyberInsider's summary of Kaspersky). "No vulnerability was exploited" (Picus).

Not in the reports: any change to Microsoft Defender by these GPOs. "Disable Windows protections" here means the firewall and the local admin account.

Not known: how the domain credential was stolen, the victim's name, and whether a ransom was paid.

How the attack worked

  1. A valid login, not an exploit. The attacker came in through the company's FortiGate SSL VPN with a compromised domain account. Picus maps it to Valid Accounts (T1078) and External Remote Services (T1133).
  2. Enough rights to write Group Policy. By 13 April the attacker held domain-administrator-equivalent rights. Picus notes the account needed to create a GPO and link it at the domain root: domain admin, or a delegated equivalent such as Group Policy Creator Owners plus link rights on the domain object.
  3. Data first. Kaspersky: "Data exfiltration was observed originating from the file servers and several additional systems." That data was later published.
  4. GPO 1, "PAYLOAD". Copied a ransom note from SYSVOL to the desktop and drives as README-payload.txt, set the logon banner (legal notice) to the ransom message so it shows before anyone signs in, pointed the desktop and lock-screen images at payload.jpg, and disabled the built-in local Administrator account, the account responders often use to get back into a broken machine.
  5. GPO 2, "win Firewall Off". Turned off Windows Firewall on every profile on every domain-joined endpoint.
  6. Wait for the reboot. Computer settings apply at restart or policy refresh. Picus: the GPOs were written on 13 April, the impact came a day later, and "That gap gave the operator a quiet window for exfiltration."

Kaspersky found no malicious Windows executable, persistence or running malware on the workstations. The whole Windows-side attack lived in Active Directory and SYSVOL, which is why tools that watch files and processes missed it.

Payload does have encryptors. Picus describes a Windows build that encrypts files with Curve25519 and ChaCha20, appends .payload, patches Event Tracing for Windows, wipes the event logs and deletes itself, plus a Linux build that targets ESXi virtual machine disks. In this case, the Group Policy route alone did the job.

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Timeline

DateEventSource
17 Feb 2026Earliest recorded Payload activity; Windows and ESXi encryptors appearPicus
23 Mar 2026Microsoft describes a different GPO-based ransomware attempt that tried to disable Defender (not attributed to Payload)Microsoft Security blog
11 Apr 2026Attacker connects through the victim's FortiGate SSL VPN with a compromised domain accountCyberInsider, summarising Kaspersky
13 Apr 2026Domain-admin-equivalent rights; the two GPOs are created and linked at the domain root; data exfiltration from file serversKaspersky, Picus
14 Apr 2026Workstations restart and the GPOs take effect across the organisationCyberInsider
21 Sep 2026Kaspersky GERT publishes its investigationSecurelist
20 Nov 2026Picus publishes a Payload explainer with the group's timeline, techniques and defencesPicus

GPO hardening checklist

Each item comes from Kaspersky's or Picus's recommendations or follows directly from how this attack worked.

  1. Separate creating a GPO from linking one. Kaspersky: "Separate GPO creation from GPO linking rights, and grant both only to a dedicated, audited administrator role." Nobody should be able to write a policy and push it domain-wide alone.
  2. Empty or shrink Group Policy Creator Owners, and review who holds link rights on the domain object and on top-level OUs. Remove stale delegations.
  3. Turn on Audit Directory Service Changes on every domain controller and alert on event IDs 5137 (GPO created), 5136 (attribute changed) and 5141 (deleted).
  4. Alert on any change to gPLink at the domain root. Kaspersky calls these "the most telling indicators of this attack class". A new link there should page someone, day or night.
  5. Watch SYSVOL. New scripts, images or text files that did not arrive by replication are a red flag. So are logon-banner (legal notice), firewall, local-account and Defender settings appearing in a new GPO.
  6. Put phishing-resistant MFA on VPN and every remote access path. This attack started with a valid password.
  7. Protect the accounts that can touch Group Policy: privileged access workstations, Credential Guard, and Windows LAPS so the local admin password is unique on every machine (Kaspersky's list).
  8. Forward logs off the host and off the domain. Payload's Windows encryptor wipes event logs; a copy in your SIEM survives.
  9. Keep backups out of reach of domain credentials. If a domain admin account can delete them, so can the attacker (Picus).
  10. Baseline your GPOs today, so after an incident you can see exactly what changed.

Read-only checks to run this week (GroupPolicy and ActiveDirectory PowerShell modules):

# GPOs created or changed in the last 7 days (GroupPolicy module)
Get-GPO -All | Where-Object { $_.ModificationTime -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-7) } |
  Sort-Object ModificationTime -Descending |
  Select-Object DisplayName, Id, CreationTime, ModificationTime

# What is linked at the domain root (Kaspersky: the most telling place to look)
(Get-GPInheritance -Target (Get-ADDomain).DistinguishedName).GpoLinks |
  Select-Object DisplayName, GpoId, Enabled, Enforced, Order

# Who can create GPOs
Get-ADGroupMember "Group Policy Creator Owners" -Recursive | Select-Object Name, SamAccountName
# Baseline today so you can compare after an incident (run from an admin workstation)
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path C:\GPOBaseline -Force | Out-Null
Backup-GPO -All -Path C:\GPOBaseline
Get-GPOReport -All -ReportType Html -Path C:\GPOBaseline\all-gpos.html

If it happens to you: fix the domain controllers first. Kaspersky's order is to delete both GPOs, clean SYSVOL and rotate the compromised credentials, then run gpupdate /force on endpoints. Clean a workstation first and the next refresh reapplies the bad policy. Then treat it as what it is: a domain compromise with data already gone.

What security leaders should do this week

  • Ask one question: how many accounts can create a GPO, how many can link one at the domain root, and are they the same people? Get names, not a number.
  • Confirm an alert exists for event IDs 5136, 5137 and 5141 and for gPLink changes at the domain root, and that someone is on call for it.
  • Check VPN MFA coverage, including service and break-glass accounts. Plan phishing-resistant MFA with the phishing-resistant MFA planner.
  • Add "malicious GPO pushed from the domain root" to your incident playbook, with the remove-on-DCs-first order. Rehearse it in the IR Playbook Lab.
  • Test that your logs survive a wipe: the audit log integrity checker walks the questions.
  • Rate yourself against a domain-wide attack with the ransomware readiness scorecard, and practise the credential attacks that lead to domain admin in the Kerberos Attack Lab.

Related: AuditTeam's OpsAgent ransomware, another 2026 Kaspersky case, and the tcherber VPN access broker, which sells exactly the kind of VPN access this attack started with.

FAQ

What is Payload ransomware?

Payload is a ransomware and data-extortion operation that, per Picus Security, surfaced in February 2026, with Windows and VMware ESXi encryptors and a leak site where it names victims. Picus, citing derp.ca, describes it as a Babuk derivative. Its best-documented attack, investigated by Kaspersky's Global Emergency Response Team (GERT), used two malicious Group Policy Objects (GPOs) instead of an encryptor on Windows.

Can ransomware disrupt a company without encrypting files?

Yes. In the April 2026 case Kaspersky investigated, the attackers stole data, then pushed two GPOs from the domain root that put ransom notes and a ransom banner on every workstation, replaced the wallpaper and lock screen, disabled the local Administrator account and turned off Windows Firewall on every profile. Kaspersky says: "We confirmed that no files were encrypted on Windows machines." The attack still "caused organization-wide disruption within seconds of the first reboot."

Did Payload disable Microsoft Defender through Group Policy?

Not in the case Kaspersky documented. The two GPOs turned off Windows Firewall for the domain, private and public profiles and disabled the built-in local Administrator account; neither report says they changed Defender. Other GPO-based ransomware has turned Defender off: Microsoft described one such case in March 2026. Monitor for Defender policy changes too, because the same technique works for any setting.

How did the attackers get into the network?

With a stolen domain account over a FortiGate SSL VPN, per CyberInsider's summary of Kaspersky's report; Picus says "No vulnerability was exploited". How the credential was stolen is not known. By 13 April 2026 the attacker had domain administrator-equivalent rights, enough to create a GPO and link it at the domain root.

How do I detect a malicious GPO?

Kaspersky recommends enabling Audit Directory Service Changes on domain controllers and alerting on event IDs 5137 (GPO created), 5136 (attribute changed) and 5141 (deleted), and watching gPLink changes at the domain root, which it calls "the most telling indicators of this attack class". Also watch SYSVOL for files that were not written by replication, and forward logs off the host, because Payload's Windows encryptor wipes event logs.

How do I recover from a malicious GPO?

Fix the domain first. Kaspersky's order: delete both GPOs, clean SYSVOL and rotate the compromised credentials, then run gpupdate /force on endpoints. If you clean workstations first, the next Group Policy refresh puts the bad settings straight back. Treat it as a full domain compromise: the attacker held domain-admin-level rights and had already taken data.

Who should be allowed to create and link GPOs?

As few people as possible, and not the same people for both. Kaspersky: "Separate GPO creation from GPO linking rights, and grant both only to a dedicated, audited administrator role." Review membership of Group Policy Creator Owners and of everyone holding link rights on the domain object and on top-level OUs.

Sources

Educational guidance for security leaders, not a threat-intelligence report. Check Kaspersky's report for indicators before acting.

Find the gaps before an attacker uses them
Score privileged access, logging, backups and response plans against a domain-wide attack like this one, and leave with a gap list.
Open the ransomware readiness scorecard
Take this with you
How the attack worked · Timeline · GPO hardening checklist · What security leaders should do this week · Sources

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