Your domain is hijacked at the registrar
The prompt — read this to the room
At 07:10 customers of a 700-person online bank start reporting that the login page looks slightly wrong and asks for their one-time passcode twice. Your engineers find the domain’s name servers were changed overnight through the registrar’s web portal, using a staff account protected only by a password and SMS codes. DNS now points to attacker-controlled servers, and a certificate for your login hostname was issued to someone else at 03:40. Some resolvers still have the old records cached. The registrar’s support line opens at 09:00. How do you take your domain back, and what do you tell customers?
Who to involve
Most important first.
- IT operations
- Incident response lead
- CISO / Head of security
- Cloud engineer
- Vendor / procurement manager
- Communications / PR
- Legal counsel
What it tests
- Regain control of the domain through every channel available before the registrar opens.
- Limit customer harm from credential and passcode phishing while DNS is wrong.
- Get the fraudulent certificate revoked and find any others issued.
- Harden registrar, DNS and certificate controls so this cannot be repeated the same way.
Outline of activities
- 1Customer reports and the name-server change
- 2Reaching the registrar: escalation paths outside business hours
- 3Protecting customers: fraud controls, sessions and warnings
- 4Certificates: transparency logs and revocation
- 5Recovery, DNS cache tail and notification
- 6Registry lock, MFA and domain governance
Free preview from the run sheet
First inject · minute 8
DNS lookup
Name servers for your domain at the TLD: ns1.edge-dns-host.example and ns2.edge-dns-host.example (yours were ns1/ns2 at your DNS provider). NS record TTL at the TLD: 172800 seconds (48 hours).
Questions for the IT operations
- How do you prove the change happened at the registrar and not at your DNS provider?
- What can you change yourself right now, and what needs the registrar or registry?
- How do you handle the 48-hour cache tail?
Built on: CISA Emergency Directive 19-01 Mitigate DNS Infrastructure Tampering; NIST SP 800-81-2 Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Deployment Guide; RFC 6962 Certificate Transparency and RFC 8659 DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA); US banking agencies Computer-Security Incident Notification Rule (36 hours to the primary federal regulator); DORA (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554) Article 19 major ICT-related incident reporting, for EU entities; NIST SP 800-61r3.
The full run sheet below has every timed inject, the facilitator guide and questions for each role.
Run sheet
The facilitator's timeline of execution, the detailed steps for running the session and the questions to ask each person.
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