100 ready-to-run cyber tabletop exercises across 15 incident domains. Search them, pick one at random, or tell us who will be in the room and we'll rank the scenarios that fit those people best. Every exercise shows who to involve, how long it runs and an outline — and the scenario prompt is free to copy and read out.
Running one for real? Pro adds the facilitator's run sheet for each exercise: a minute-by-minute timeline, timed injects, step-by-step facilitation guide and the questions to put to each person. Or build your own with the Tabletop Runbook Generator.
Who's in the room?
Pick the people you have — we'll suggest exercises that fit them.
At 07:10 customers of a 700-person online bank start reporting that the login page looks slightly wrong and asks for their one-time passcode twice. Your engineers find the domain’s name servers were changed overnight through the registrar’s web portal, using a staff account protected only by a password and SMS codes. DNS now points to attacker-controlled servers, and a certificate for your login hostname was issued to someone else at 03:40. Some resolvers still have the old records cached. The registrar’s support line opens at 09:00. How do you take your domain back, and what do you tell customers?
It is Sunday morning at a regional bank with 600,000 retail customers. Fraud operations reports 1,400 instant payments in 18 hours from customer accounts to newly added payees, most just under the daily limit, about $3.1 million in total. Every payment passed one-time-passcode checks. Social media is filling with customers whose balances are zero, and the call-centre queue is 90 minutes. The digital banking team suspects SIM swaps or a phishing kit; nobody has confirmed either. Turning off instant payments to new payees stops the fraud, and it also stops legitimate rent and wage payments. Do you pull the switch?
Friday, 18:20. A correspondent bank calls your payments operations desk about three outbound cross-border transfers sent in the last two hours: $4.2 million, $6.8 million and $9.5 million, to beneficiaries in three countries you rarely deal with. The messages were authenticated through your own payment messaging gateway using two valid operator accounts, one belonging to someone on leave. The daily reconciliation that would have caught them runs at 22:00, and today's printed confirmation report shows nothing unusual. Some of the funds may already have been credited. Who calls whom first, and what do you switch off?