Fraudulent cross-border payment messages leave through your own gateway
The prompt — read this to the room
Friday, 18:20. A correspondent bank calls your payments operations desk about three outbound cross-border transfers sent in the last two hours: $4.2 million, $6.8 million and $9.5 million, to beneficiaries in three countries you rarely deal with. The messages were authenticated through your own payment messaging gateway using two valid operator accounts, one belonging to someone on leave. The daily reconciliation that would have caught them runs at 22:00, and today's printed confirmation report shows nothing unusual. Some of the funds may already have been credited. Who calls whom first, and what do you switch off?
Who to involve
Most important first.
- CISO / Head of security
- Incident response lead
- CFO / Finance
- IT operations
- Legal counsel
- CEO / Managing director
- SOC analyst
What it tests
- Start fund recall with correspondent and beneficiary banks inside the first hour
- Contain the payment environment (gateway, operator accounts, jump hosts) without destroying evidence
- Establish whether reconciliation and confirmation controls were tampered with
- Coordinate law-enforcement, regulator, board and messaging-network notifications
Outline of activities
- 1The correspondent bank's call
- 2Stop, recall, preserve
- 3How they got in, and what else they touched
- 4Notifications: law enforcement, regulator, messaging network, board
- 5Restart decision: when payments resume, and under what controls
Free preview from the run sheet
First inject · minute 20
Recall status
Correspondent bank: "The $4.2m transfer is held pending your recall. The $6.8m has been credited to the beneficiary bank, which is closed until Monday. The $9.5m is still in our queue, but we need a formal recall message and a call from someone senior."
Questions for the CISO / Head of security
- Do you halt all outbound payment messaging now, and who has authority to do that?
- What do you isolate first: jump hosts, operator workstations or the gateway itself?
- How do you confirm whether the attacker still has access to the payment environment?
- Which customer security framework controls failed or were bypassed here?
Built on: SWIFT Customer Security Programme and Customer Security Controls Framework (public overview); FFIEC IT Examination Handbook, Wholesale Payment Systems; Computer-Security Incident Notification rule for US banking organisations (12 CFR Part 53, 225 subpart N, 304 subpart C): notify the primary federal regulator as soon as possible and no later than 36 hours after determining a notification incident has occurred; FinCEN suspicious activity reporting requirements; NIST SP 800-61r3.
The full run sheet below has every timed inject, the facilitator guide and questions for each role.
Run sheet
The facilitator's timeline of execution, the detailed steps for running the session and the questions to ask each person.
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