100 ready-to-run cyber tabletop exercises across 15 incident domains. Search them, pick one at random, or tell us who will be in the room and we'll rank the scenarios that fit those people best. Every exercise shows who to involve, how long it runs and an outline — and the scenario prompt is free to copy and read out.
Running one for real? Pro adds the facilitator's run sheet for each exercise: a minute-by-minute timeline, timed injects, step-by-step facilitation guide and the questions to put to each person. Or build your own with the Tabletop Runbook Generator.
Who's in the room?
Pick the people you have — we'll suggest exercises that fit them.
It is 23:15 on the Friday before a long weekend. The only on-call engineer gets an alert for mass file renames on a file server, then twelve more servers in five minutes. The SOC is outsourced: it has opened a ticket but cannot isolate hosts without written approval. The IT manager is on a flight until 06:00, the CISO is not answering, and the incident response retainer's hotline wants a contract number nobody on shift has. The attacker is still active. Who can authorise isolation right now, and what do you pull first?
At 07:30 on Monday the head of IT calls the CEO. Most office systems show a ransom note, email is down, and only the phones work. Staff are arriving and asking what to do. The note gives an email address and says the price doubles in 48 hours. Your cyber insurance policy sits in a shared folder that is now encrypted. Nobody is sure who should be in the room or who decides. In one hour the first customer calls will start. What happens in that hour?
It is 05:40 on a Monday at a 900-person auto-parts manufacturer running three shifts. Office laptops started showing ransom notes an hour ago. Now the night-shift supervisor reports that two HMI screens on the stamping line show the same note, and the historian server has stopped updating. The PLCs are still running and the presses are still making parts, but operators can no longer see process values on screen. The first shift arrives in 80 minutes. Do you keep the line running blind, shut it down, or cut the plant off from the corporate network first?
A colocation provider’s night technician calls your on-call engineer at 22:40. He found a man in a high-visibility vest inside your company’s locked cage, holding a laptop with a cable plugged into a top-of-rack switch. The man said he was ‘from the network team’ and left before site security arrived. The front desk logged him following one of your contractors through the entry mantrap two hours earlier. Your cage hosts the card payment platform for 2 million customers. What do you check first, and who do you call?
Friday, 18:20. A correspondent bank calls your payments operations desk about three outbound cross-border transfers sent in the last two hours: $4.2 million, $6.8 million and $9.5 million, to beneficiaries in three countries you rarely deal with. The messages were authenticated through your own payment messaging gateway using two valid operator accounts, one belonging to someone on leave. The daily reconciliation that would have caught them runs at 22:00, and today's printed confirmation report shows nothing unusual. Some of the funds may already have been credited. Who calls whom first, and what do you switch off?
It is 07:40. Overnight your SOC confirmed that an intruder has had access to the customer database for at least nine days. Containment is under way but not finished. The chair has heard a rumour from another director and wants a call with the full board at 18:00 today. You do not yet know how many records were taken, whether the attacker is still inside, or whether a regulatory clock has started. You have ten hours to decide what the board needs to hear, who says it, and what you will refuse to guess at.