IEC 62443 Security Level Calculator
Set a target Security Level (SL-T) for an OT/ICS zone, work through the requirement checklist mapped to the seven IEC 62443 Foundational Requirements, and the calculator derives your achieved Security Level (SL-A) per FR and overall — using the standard’s cumulative rule (you only reach a level once every requirement up to it is met, and the zone SL is limited by its weakest FR). You get a target-vs-achieved radar, a ranked gap list with remediation, and CSV/Markdown export. Runs entirely in your browser — nothing is uploaded.
Protection against intentional violation using simple means with low resources, generic skills and low motivation.
Significant gaps remain. Prioritise the weakest foundational requirements first.
FR 1 Identification & Authentication Control · IAC
Identify and authenticate every human, software process and device before granting access to the control system.
Every human user is identified and authenticated before being granted access to the control system.
Remediation: Remove shared/anonymous local accounts; require each operator and engineer to log in under their own identity on HMIs, engineering workstations and historians.
User accounts are uniquely assigned — no shared or group logins for individual actions.
Remediation: Eliminate shared operator accounts; map each person to a unique account so actions are attributable.
Multi-factor authentication is enforced for human access from untrusted networks (e.g. remote/vendor access).
Software processes and devices (PLCs, RTUs, services) are identified and authenticated, not just trusted by network location.
Remediation: Enable device/service authentication (certificates, pre-shared keys, mutual TLS) rather than relying on IP address or VLAN membership alone.
Authenticators (passwords, keys, tokens) are managed over their lifecycle — issued, rotated and revoked.
Remediation: Change all default credentials, set rotation for shared secrets, and revoke authenticators when staff or vendors leave.
Password-based authentication enforces a defined minimum strength (length/complexity) where technically feasible.
Remediation: Apply a password policy on accounts that support it; document and compensate for legacy devices that cannot enforce one.
FR 2 Use Control · UC
Enforce the privileges assigned to each authenticated entity, monitor use of those privileges, and keep an audit trail.
Access is authorized against assigned privileges — authenticated users can only perform the actions they are entitled to.
Remediation: Define and enforce privilege levels (view / operate / configure) so an operator account cannot reprogram logic or change safety setpoints.
Permissions are mapped to roles rather than granted ad hoc per account.
Remediation: Introduce role-based access control (operator, engineer, maintenance, admin) and assign users to roles instead of per-user permission lists.
Interactive sessions lock after a defined period of inactivity (consistent with operational safety).
Remediation: Enable session lock/timeout on engineering workstations and non-safety-critical HMIs; exempt only consoles where a lock would create a safety hazard, and compensate with physical access control.
Security-relevant events are logged to a central, auditable record (logins, config changes, access denials).
Remediation: Forward device and workstation logs to a syslog/historian collector; define the minimum set of auditable events.
Audit records carry reliable, synchronized timestamps across the control system.
Remediation: Deploy a trusted time source (NTP/PTP) and point all logging devices at it so events can be correlated.
Non-repudiation is provided for critical actions — an operator cannot deny having issued a command.
FR 3 System Integrity · SI
Protect the integrity of the control system against unauthorized manipulation — in transit, at rest and at runtime.
Communication integrity is protected against unauthorized modification in transit.
Remediation: Use protocols or mechanisms that detect tampering (signed/authenticated messages, integrity checks) on control traffic where feasible.
Cryptographic mechanisms protect the integrity of communications, not just checksums.
Remediation: Add cryptographic integrity (e.g. TLS/IPsec, signed OPC UA) on conduits carrying control or configuration data.
Malicious-code protection is in place on components that can support it (workstations, servers, jump hosts).
Remediation: Deploy application allow-listing on engineering workstations and endpoint protection on supporting IT-class assets; use removable-media controls on devices that cannot run an agent.
Security functions are verified periodically to confirm they still operate as intended.
Remediation: Schedule verification of controls (e.g. test that logging, authentication and segmentation rules still work) and record the results.
The integrity of software and configuration is protected and verifiable (known-good baselines).
Remediation: Maintain golden images / signed firmware and configuration baselines; detect unauthorized changes to PLC logic and workstation software.
Session integrity is protected against hijacking or injection (e.g. for remote engineering sessions).
Remediation: Use authenticated, integrity-protected session channels and invalidate sessions on anomalies.
FR 4 Data Confidentiality · DC
Protect the confidentiality of information on communication channels and in data stores against unauthorized disclosure.
Confidential information (credentials, keys, sensitive process data) is protected against unauthorized disclosure.
Remediation: Classify sensitive OT data and restrict who/what can read it; avoid storing credentials in clear text in project files.
Confidential data is protected at rest and when crossing untrusted networks (encryption).
Remediation: Encrypt sensitive data in transit over shared/untrusted links and at rest on portable media and backups.
Information is purged from shared resources and decommissioned devices before reuse or disposal.
Remediation: Define a sanitization procedure for repurposed or retired OT devices and media so residual data is not disclosed.
Where cryptography is used, it uses standards-based, non-deprecated algorithms and key management.
Remediation: Replace deprecated ciphers/protocols (e.g. SSLv3, DES); manage keys with defined generation, storage and rotation.
FR 5 Restricted Data Flow · RDF
Segment the control system into zones and conduits and restrict unnecessary data flows between them.
The control system is segmented into security zones separated from the enterprise/IT network.
Remediation: Establish an IT/OT boundary (e.g. a DMZ per the Purdue model) and group assets into zones by function and risk.
Zone boundaries are protected by conduits with controlled, inspected traffic (firewalls / data diodes).
Remediation: Place a managed firewall or gateway on each conduit between zones; document and review the allowed flows.
Boundary protection operates deny-by-default: only explicitly permitted flows are allowed.
Remediation: Convert permissive firewall rules to an explicit allow-list; drop everything not required for the process.
General-purpose person-to-person communication (email, web, messaging) is blocked from the control zones.
Remediation: Remove internet/email access from OT workstations; route any required external interaction through the DMZ.
Applications are partitioned so a compromise in one does not grant free data flow across zones.
Remediation: Separate critical application functions and restrict inter-application data paths to what the process requires.
FR 6 Timely Response to Events · TRE
Respond to security violations by notifying the right authority, reporting evidence, and taking timely corrective action.
Audit logs are accessible to authorized personnel so incidents can be investigated.
Remediation: Ensure security staff can retrieve and read OT logs (read-only) without disrupting operations; retain them for a defined period.
Security events are continuously monitored and anomalies raise an alert to a responsible party.
Remediation: Feed OT telemetry into monitoring (SIEM / OT-IDS such as passive network monitoring) with defined alerting and an on-call owner.
A documented incident-response process covers OT, with defined roles and an escalation path to operations/safety.
Remediation: Write and exercise an OT-specific IR plan that names who declares an incident, how operations is informed, and when to isolate a zone.
FR 7 Resource Availability · RA
Ensure the control system is resilient against the degradation or denial of essential services (availability of the automation).
The control system is protected against denial-of-service that would degrade essential functions.
Remediation: Rate-limit/segment management traffic, harden exposed services, and ensure a network flood cannot starve control communications.
Control-system backups (logic, configuration, images) are taken and stored protected.
Remediation: Back up PLC programs, HMI projects and device configs on a schedule; store copies offline/immutable and off-site.
Recovery and reconstitution procedures exist and are tested — you can restore a failed component to a known-good state.
Remediation: Document and periodically test restore of a PLC/HMI from backup; measure the time to recover against operational tolerance.
Components are hardened to their secure configuration baseline (unused services/ports disabled).
Remediation: Apply vendor hardening guides; disable unused protocols, ports and default web/management services on each device.
Least functionality is enforced — devices and hosts run only what the process requires.
Remediation: Remove unneeded software, utilities and accounts from OT hosts; justify every running service.
A current inventory of control-system components (hardware, firmware, software versions) is maintained.
Remediation: Build and keep an asset inventory (ideally from passive discovery) including firmware/software versions to drive patch and vuln management.
Security Level reference (IEC 62443-3-3)
- SL 0 — No specific requirement
- No specific security requirements or protection necessary.
- SL 1 — Casual
- Protection against casual or coincidental violation — accidental exposure, a curious insider, a mistyped command.
- SL 2 — Intentional, low resources
- Protection against intentional violation using simple means with low resources, generic skills and low motivation.
- SL 3 — Intentional, moderate resources
- Protection against intentional violation using sophisticated means with moderate resources, IACS-specific skills and moderate motivation.
- SL 4 — Intentional, extended resources
- Protection against intentional violation using sophisticated means with extended resources, IACS-specific skills and high motivation (e.g. a nation-state).
Educational self-assessment. Requirement statements are plain-language paraphrases mapped roughly to IEC 62443-3-3 System Requirements; they are not the normative text and this tool does not constitute certification. Consult the published standard and a qualified assessor for a formal SL-A determination.
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Sample report · illustrative data
Sample result: IEC 62443 security level gap report
Example inputs: a zone named "Zone 1 - Process control" with target SL-T 2, and Yes, Partial or No answers across the seven Foundational Requirements.
Verdict
- Zone
- Zone 1 - Process control
- Target
- SL-T 2 (intentional violation, low resources)
- Overall achieved
- SL-A 1, one level short of SL-T 2
- Rule
- The overall level is the lowest level achieved across the seven requirements
Achieved level by Foundational Requirement
| Requirement | Achieved | Target | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| FR1 Identification and Authentication Control | SL 2 | SL 2 | Met |
| FR2 Use Control | SL 2 | SL 2 | Met |
| FR3 System Integrity | SL 1 | SL 2 | Gap |
| FR4 Data Confidentiality | SL 2 | SL 2 | Met |
| FR5 Restricted Data Flow | SL 1 | SL 2 | Gap |
| FR6 Timely Response to Events | SL 1 | SL 2 | Gap |
| FR7 Resource Availability | SL 2 | SL 2 | Met |
Unmet in-scope requirements for FR3, FR5 and FR6 are listed as gaps to close to reach the target.
Made-up example data. Your own run uses your inputs. Downloads of the full report need Pro.
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