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Hands-on lab

Purdue Model Builder & Defender

Build an OT/ICS network the way the Purdue model intends — six levels plus an IT/OT DMZ — then draw the conduits between zones and let the lab grade your segmentation against ISA/IEC 62443. It rewards a real DMZ that brokers every IT↔OT flow, default-deny between non-adjacent levels, a replicated historian, and no flat path from the enterprise to the plant floor. Everything runs in your browser; nothing you build is uploaded.

A
100/100
Well segmented
0
Critical
0
High
L5EnterpriseCorporate network & internet

The corporate/enterprise network and its internet and cloud connectivity: data centers, corporate AD, SaaS, VPN concentrators and the open internet. The most exposed tier in the whole architecture.

Protocols: HTTPS, Cloud APIs, Corporate services, VPN
No assets placed.
L4Site BusinessBusiness planning & logistics

Site-level business IT: ERP, plant scheduling that feeds the business, email, file servers and engineering document stores. Standard enterprise IT lifecycle — patched, internet-adjacent, phished.

Protocols: HTTPS, SMTP, SMB, SQL, LDAP
No assets placed.
DMZIT/OT DMZThe broker between IT and OT broker zone

The demilitarized zone that terminates every IT↔OT flow. Replicated historians, patch/WSUS/AV staging, reverse proxies, jump hosts and remote-access brokers live here so that no session ever spans IT and OT in one hop.

Protocols: Brokered OPC UA, HTTPS (reverse proxy), Replication, RDP/SSH (to jump host only)
No assets placed.
L3Site OperationsSite-wide manufacturing operations

Site-wide operations management (MOM/MES): production scheduling, batch management, the plant historian, OT Active Directory/domain services and OT patch/AV management. The top of the OT trust zone.

Protocols: OPC UA, SQL, MQTT, Historian APIs, HTTPS (internal)
No assets placed.
L2Supervisory ControlOperators watch and steer the cell

Area/cell supervisory systems: HMIs, SCADA servers, engineering workstations (EWS) and local alarm/historian collectors. This is where operators observe and issue setpoints for a line or unit.

Protocols: OPC UA, OPC DA, Modbus TCP, EtherNet/IP, Vendor SCADA protocols
No assets placed.
L1Basic ControlControllers that run the process

The controllers that read Level 0 and drive it in real time: PLCs, RTUs, DCS controllers and safety instrumented systems (SIS). Deterministic, long-lived, and often unpatchable for years.

Protocols: Modbus, EtherNet/IP, PROFINET, DNP3, S7comm, IEC 61850, OPC UA (embedded)
No assets placed.
L0Process / FieldThe physical process itself

The physical equipment and instrumentation that does the work: sensors measuring the process and actuators acting on it. A compromise here has direct real-world, safety-of-life consequences.

Protocols: 4-20mA, HART, PROFIBUS-PA, Foundation Fieldbus, IO-Link
No assets placed.

Conduits (allowed flows)

Declare which zones may talk. Each is scored live against IEC 62443.

No conduits declared yet.

Zone map

L5EnterpriseL4Site BusinessDMZIT/OT DMZL3Site OperationsL2Supervisory ControlL1Basic ControlL0Process / Field
Allowed Review Forbidden

Findings

No segmentation violations in the current design.

How the design is scored

The lab evaluates your zones and conduits against these ISA/IEC 62443 zone-and-conduit expectations.

criticalIEC 62443-3-3 SR 5.1 / zone-conduit
An IT/OT DMZ exists and brokers all IT↔OT traffic

Without a 3.5 DMZ, every IT↔OT flow is a direct conduit between a high-exposure zone and the process.

criticalIEC 62443 zone-conduit / Purdue hierarchy
No flat path from IT (L4/L5) to control/field (L0/L1)

A direct enterprise/business → controller path is the classic ransomware and remote-attacker route to physical impact.

highIEC 62443-3-3 SR 5.2
Default-deny between non-adjacent levels

Level-skipping conduits defeat the hierarchical containment the model exists to provide.

highIEC 62443 reference architecture
Historian data reaches IT via a DMZ replica, not the live plant historian

Exposing the live L3 historian to IT puts a production system one query away from the enterprise network.

highIEC 62443-3-3 SR 1.x / SR 2.x
No inbound interactive remote access (RDP/VNC/SSH/Telnet) into L0–L2

Interactive sessions into supervisory/control let an attacker operate the process by hand.

mediumIEC 62443-3-3 SR 1.5 / 4.1
No plaintext management protocols (Telnet/FTP/TFTP/HTTP/SNMPv1-2c) into OT

Plaintext credentials and config over the OT network are trivially sniffed or spoofed.

highIEC 62443 conduit restriction
Control-protocol writes (Modbus/DNP3/S7/EtherNet-IP) originate only inside the cell

A control write from outside the cell/area zone can change physical state from an untrusted origin.

highIEC 62443-3-3 SR 5.2 (least privilege)
No any/any allows across a zone boundary

An any-any conduit is the absence of segmentation dressed up as a rule.

highIEC 62443 / IEC 61511
Safety systems (SIS) are isolated from routine control conduits

A compromised basic-control path must not be able to reach the safety instrumented system.

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Sample report · illustrative data

Sample result: Purdue model design review

Example design with five assets placed (PLC at L1, SCADA Server at L2, Historian at L3, ERP System at L4, Corporate AD at L5), no DMZ, and conduits L1-L2, L2-L3 and L3-L4.

Segmentation score

Score
54 / 100
Grade
F (Flat / unsafe)
How it is computed
Starts at 100; a forbidden conduit costs 14 (24 if critical), a questionable one 6, no DMZ between IT and OT assets 24, an exposed historian 8, a misplaced asset 6

Findings, most severe first

SeverityFindingSuggested fix
CriticalNo IT/OT DMZ: IT and OT assets are present with nothing at 3.5 to broker between themAdd DMZ brokers (historian replica, jump host, reverse proxy, patch staging) and route all IT to OT traffic through them
HighForbidden conduit L3 to L4: crosses the IT/OT boundary without terminating in the DMZRe-route through the DMZ: IT connects to a DMZ broker or replica, and OT pulls from that broker
HighLive historian exposed toward ITPlace a Historian Replica in the DMZ and let IT read only the replica

Also in the report

  • Assets listed per level from L0 Process / Field up to L5 Enterprise, with the DMZ at 3.5
  • Each declared conduit with its verdict: allowed, review or forbidden
  • A Markdown copy of the design, score and findings

Made-up example data. Your own run uses your inputs. Downloads of the full report need Pro.

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