Purdue Model Builder & Defender
Build an OT/ICS network the way the Purdue model intends — six levels plus an IT/OT DMZ — then draw the conduits between zones and let the lab grade your segmentation against ISA/IEC 62443. It rewards a real DMZ that brokers every IT↔OT flow, default-deny between non-adjacent levels, a replicated historian, and no flat path from the enterprise to the plant floor. Everything runs in your browser; nothing you build is uploaded.
The corporate/enterprise network and its internet and cloud connectivity: data centers, corporate AD, SaaS, VPN concentrators and the open internet. The most exposed tier in the whole architecture.
Site-level business IT: ERP, plant scheduling that feeds the business, email, file servers and engineering document stores. Standard enterprise IT lifecycle — patched, internet-adjacent, phished.
The demilitarized zone that terminates every IT↔OT flow. Replicated historians, patch/WSUS/AV staging, reverse proxies, jump hosts and remote-access brokers live here so that no session ever spans IT and OT in one hop.
Site-wide operations management (MOM/MES): production scheduling, batch management, the plant historian, OT Active Directory/domain services and OT patch/AV management. The top of the OT trust zone.
Area/cell supervisory systems: HMIs, SCADA servers, engineering workstations (EWS) and local alarm/historian collectors. This is where operators observe and issue setpoints for a line or unit.
The controllers that read Level 0 and drive it in real time: PLCs, RTUs, DCS controllers and safety instrumented systems (SIS). Deterministic, long-lived, and often unpatchable for years.
The physical equipment and instrumentation that does the work: sensors measuring the process and actuators acting on it. A compromise here has direct real-world, safety-of-life consequences.
Conduits (allowed flows)
Declare which zones may talk. Each is scored live against IEC 62443.
Zone map
Findings
No segmentation violations in the current design.
How the design is scored
The lab evaluates your zones and conduits against these ISA/IEC 62443 zone-and-conduit expectations.
Without a 3.5 DMZ, every IT↔OT flow is a direct conduit between a high-exposure zone and the process.
A direct enterprise/business → controller path is the classic ransomware and remote-attacker route to physical impact.
Level-skipping conduits defeat the hierarchical containment the model exists to provide.
Exposing the live L3 historian to IT puts a production system one query away from the enterprise network.
Interactive sessions into supervisory/control let an attacker operate the process by hand.
Plaintext credentials and config over the OT network are trivially sniffed or spoofed.
A control write from outside the cell/area zone can change physical state from an untrusted origin.
An any-any conduit is the absence of segmentation dressed up as a rule.
A compromised basic-control path must not be able to reach the safety instrumented system.
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Sample report · illustrative data
Sample result: Purdue model design review
Example design with five assets placed (PLC at L1, SCADA Server at L2, Historian at L3, ERP System at L4, Corporate AD at L5), no DMZ, and conduits L1-L2, L2-L3 and L3-L4.
Segmentation score
- Score
- 54 / 100
- Grade
- F (Flat / unsafe)
- How it is computed
- Starts at 100; a forbidden conduit costs 14 (24 if critical), a questionable one 6, no DMZ between IT and OT assets 24, an exposed historian 8, a misplaced asset 6
Findings, most severe first
| Severity | Finding | Suggested fix |
|---|---|---|
| Critical | No IT/OT DMZ: IT and OT assets are present with nothing at 3.5 to broker between them | Add DMZ brokers (historian replica, jump host, reverse proxy, patch staging) and route all IT to OT traffic through them |
| High | Forbidden conduit L3 to L4: crosses the IT/OT boundary without terminating in the DMZ | Re-route through the DMZ: IT connects to a DMZ broker or replica, and OT pulls from that broker |
| High | Live historian exposed toward IT | Place a Historian Replica in the DMZ and let IT read only the replica |
Also in the report
- Assets listed per level from L0 Process / Field up to L5 Enterprise, with the DMZ at 3.5
- Each declared conduit with its verdict: allowed, review or forbidden
- A Markdown copy of the design, score and findings
Made-up example data. Your own run uses your inputs. Downloads of the full report need Pro.
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